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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

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AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

JANUARY 1972

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 50 JANUARY 1972 No. 2

THE NEW ECONOMICS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

By C. Fred Bergsten

IN the summer of 1971, President Nixon and Secretary Connally revolutionized U.S. foreign economic policy. In so doing, they promoted a protectionist trend which raises questions about the future of the U.S. economy at least as fundamental as those raised by the abrupt adoption of wage-price controls. In so doing, they have also encouraged a disastrous isolationist trend which raises questions about the future of U.S. foreign policy at least as fundamental as those raised by the President's essentially positive and decidedly non-isolationist China initiative, Vietnam policy and negotiations with the Soviet Union. Both the U.S. economy and U.S. foreign policy for the relevant future hang in the balance.

The President decided to seek a massive improvement in the U.S. balance of payments—substituting aggressive concern for our largely "benign neglect" posture toward the deficits of the last decade. He terminated the convertibility of the dollar, shattering the linchpin of the entire international monetary system—on whose smooth functioning the world economy depends. He imposed an import surcharge, proposed both the most sweeping U.S. export subsidy in history and discrimination against foreign machinery by making it ineligible for the Job Development Credit, bludgeoned East Asia into a "voluntary" restraint agreement on textiles, and sought to extend and tighten the existing "voluntary" agreement on steel—completely reversing the traditional position of U.S. administrations in resisting protectionism and leading the world toward ever freer trade. He abandoned the essential Executive role as protector of foreign aid and joined the competition to gain domestic political credit for

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cutting it, contributing directly to the near-scuttling of the entire aid program in the Senate just two months later. He violated the letter and the spirit of the reigning international law in both the monetary and trade fields, reversing the traditional American role of leading the effort to strengthen the rules governing global conduct.

Most Americans, and many foreigners, can support the broad objectives enunciated by the Administration. The world economic roles of America must be reconciled with the growth to power of Europe and Japan. There must be fundamental reform of the international monetary system. There must be renewed efforts to reduce world trade barriers. The underlying U.S. balance of payments has deteriorated. The yen had to be sharply revalued.

But the new foreign economic policy went much too far. It set impossible objectives, both quantitatively and qualitatively. It has been alternately pursued with violent hyperbole and supreme indifference. It appears based on some totally erroneous, and exceedingly dangerous, theory that the United States has played Santa Claus to the world for the last 25 years. It is wrong for the American economy, for it risks immediate losses of jobs and investments, as well as long-term insulation from the indispensable impulses of global competition. It courts disaster for U.S. global interests, as spelled out below. It has suffered from the American tradition of waiting too long to act, then lunging unpredictably from one extreme to the other, instead of proceeding deliberately to a new equilibrium. Its dangers increase exponentially as time passes with no resolution of at least the issues of immediate urgency which it has raised. Quick action is needed, by the United States and major foreign countries, to avoid the most serious breach in the world economy and international politics since World War II. The signs of progress in early December toward resolving some of the immediate issues are thus highly welcome.

II

The international component of the New Economic Policy was wholly unnecessary.

To be sure, America was running a large balance-of-payments deficit. The deficit was due primarily, however, to the huge international movements of liquid capital which are so prevalent in

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today's world economy. Such capital had moved massively out of the United States since early 1970, when U.S. interest rates declined at record speed and Europe persevered in its effort to fight inflation by maintaining tight money. It could be expected to move back to the United States just as massively when the interest rate differentials narrowed again. Indeed, precisely such inflows to the United States occurred in both 1966 and 1968–69, causing large U.S. payments *surpluses* and forcing Germany to *sell* us gold to help meet the resulting dollar *shortage*. Deficits caused by such transitory events hardly call for the countermeasures of last August.

In addition, private speculation entered the picture twice: in favor of the German mark in May, and against the dollar in late July. The floating of the mark ended the first episode. The second was due primarily to the hugely inflationary wage settlements of the summer in steel and several other key U.S. industries, and resultant fears that the United States had not only lost the battle against inflation but given up trying to fight it. This reminded us that a stable and dynamic U.S. domestic economy is the key to a sound American external financial position and world confidence in the dollar. The freeze, its successor stabilization program, and proper monetary and fiscal policies were thus the proper antidote for "the international money speculators" as well as for domestic inflation per se.

It is highly significant that there are as yet no reports that foreign holders of dollars had lost their cool before August 15th, and demanded sizable amounts of U.S. gold. There is little evidence that they would have done so at any later time which might have proved more politically embarrassing to the present Administration. Even the existence of such a risk, however, would have justified at most the suspension of gold convertibility—not the panoply of protectionist trade and isolationist aid measures which accompanied it.

Inflation, past and present, had of course eroded the international competitive position of the United States. However, structural changes in both the U.S. economy and external position have sharply reduced the size of the trade surplus needed for overall U.S. payments equilibrium since the trade surplus high of $6.8 billion in 1964. Annual income on our foreign investments has risen by over $6 billion, foreign long-term investment in the United States has risen by several billion dollars per year,

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and foreign capital markets are able to take a large part of the load borne almost solely by the United States at that time. All these trends continue to move in our favor. Overseas military expenditures and U.S. interest payments to foreigners have risen significantly since 1964, but both are coming down as we withdraw from Vietnam, dollars flow back to the United States, and our interest rates decline. Tourist spending and outflows of U.S. private capital have continued to rise, but not nearly enough to require a return to the 1964 level of trade surplus to achieve overall payments equilibrium.

The bulk of the deterioration in the U.S. trade surplus in early 1971 was in fact due to purely temporary factors, and our long-term shift was fully mirrored in the improved positions of just three countries: Japan, Germany and Canada. Remedial action was called for—and was already taking place. The mark was revalued by 9 percent in late 1969, and had moved upward another 8 percent since being floated in May 1971. The Canadian dollar had floated up by 8 percent since May 1970. In addition, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Austria had appreciated their currencies by smaller amounts. The full payments effects of exchange-rate changes take at least two years to appear, but the process of adjustment was underway well before August.

There did remain one big exchange-rate problem: Japan. Much of the blame for the present turmoil must be laid on its doorstep, although the standard U.S. perception of Japan today over-estimates by far both its competitive invincibility and the real trade effects of its remaining controls. In addition, the greatest tragedy of the U.S. textile effort is that it absorbed virtually all of the attention of the two governments in their economic relations from early 1969 through mid-1971. The exchange rate and overall trade policy issues, with their much wider effects, were permitted to fester unattended. The U.S. government apparently made no serious effort before August to get Japan to meet its international economic responsibilities, though the United States demonstrated shortly thereafter—on textiles—that it was willing to apply great leverage to achieve objectives deemed of truly great importance.

Finally, political pressure was certainly mounting for protectionist trade legislation.[1] The New Economic Policy would help preëmpt a quota bill if it brings a prosperous domestic

[1] See the author's "Crisis in U.S. Trade Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1971.

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economy, reduced inflation, a significant exchange-rate realignment and greater flexibility of exchange rates, and a new credibility for administration toughness in negotiating U.S. foreign economic policy. However, except for Japan, the major exchange rates had already moved. There had been no major effort to negotiate a yen revaluation, or the needed changes in the monetary system. Negotiating credibility in trade matters could have been achieved at any time by the adoption of specific retaliatory measures against any foreign barriers which were illegally restricting U.S. exports. The Administration has announced no progress whatsoever in developing a new adjustment assistance program to cushion the domestic effects of freer trade, one crucial element in restoring a progressive trade policy. No effort to build the needed new coalition of political constituencies, to combat the concentrated push of organized labor, can be observed. The import surcharge, the other trade moves, and the rhetoric accompanying the whole effort actually foster domestic and foreign protectionism. So the new international policy is hard to justify on these grounds as well, except as an admission of total neglect in seeking similar ends through far less risky means.

There are only two plausible interpretations of the real rationale behind the international component of August 15th, aside from simple error or misjudgment. The first is that it represents a straightforward effort to export U.S. unemployment to other countries. Unemployment is our cardinal domestic problem at the moment, but exporting it to others is unacceptable in principle and cannot possibly work anyway. Indeed, precisely such an effort contributed mightily to throwing the world into its deepest depression in modern history. It is fully legitimate, of course, to seek adequate trade improvement to achieve the needed payments position. Seeking sufficient trade improvement to achieve a huge payments surplus is illegitimate, however, and the Administration target of a $13 billion swing would do just that. Seeking sufficient trade improvement to permit sharply increased U.S. capital outflows, in effect changing the structure of our balance of payments, is also unacceptable to such unlikely allies as the AFL-CIO and the Common Market. So the excesses of the present approach connote pure mercantilism at its worst, and belie the reasonableness of its broad objectives.

The second interpretation is that the Administration con-

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cluded that the United States needs a large trade surplus to maintain its international political power. This view is true only to the extent that a surplus is needed to support a liberal trade policy, which does carry considerable political weight though making little economic sense. Such a conclusion ignores all of the empirical evidence, however: Britain was in trade surplus in only four years of the century of the Pax Brittanica, and the U.S. world role well survived the sharp decline in our trade balance in the late 1950s. In fact, a "weak" payments position has on balance promoted U.S. international objectives heretofore; at most, an equilibrium *payments* position is needed to underpin a continued active world role for the United States.

III

The New Economic Policy could produce dramatic improvements in the international monetary and trading systems, and deserves unstinting support toward those ends. But it is an extremely high-risk strategy, and could lead instead to extremely damaging effects on national economies around the globe.

The policy could easily lead to the first real international trade war since the 1930s. The surcharge and discrimination of the Job Development Credit are already having an addictive effect domestically, and will be increasingly difficult to lift as individual industries become accustomed to their protection. The arithmetic is simple: an industry now protected by the ten percent surcharge plus a ten percent appreciation of the yen will not want to swap the combination for a 12 to 18 percent yen revaluation, especially if it is now helped by the "Buy America" rule as well. And the textile and steel deals, while they may reduce the zeal with which these industries seek quotas themselves, legitimize protection for others on "equity" grounds.

The difficulty is compounded by the domestic politics of U.S. trade policy. The AFL-CIO has already begun to rally support behind the incredibly protectionist legislation which it will seek in 1972. Since organized labor has made trade and foreign investment one of its top priority issues, both parties will be sorely tempted to support such legislation at least partially in the coming election campaign—as they woo the huge labor vote, which is less committed now to either of the two major parties than in any presidential election since World War II. If the surcharge is still in effect when labor begins to push, then its permanent

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retention will look to many like a moderate compromise. The President himself presaged such a comparison last August, when he asserted that the surcharge was superior to import quotas—a true statement about a false choice, since no one was even thinking of trying to pass a quota bill in 1971. The only possible reconciliation is that he foresaw the surcharge as much more permanent than was implied at that time, a reading which was reinforced by his own press conference statement of September 15th. The continued retention of the surcharge, when the floats have already produced most of the needed revaluations—despite the fact that the surcharge itself brakes them—adds to the fear that it is being turned from a temporary negotiating lever and payments adjustment measure into a permanent protectionist device.

The surcharge, even on its avowedly temporary basis, has already begun to produce emulation and reaction abroad. It could not help but do so, since it directly affects jobs throughout the world. Canada, which reacts first to U.S. economic moves but often accurately forecasts countermeasures elsewhere, moved quickly to provide domestic subsidies to its exporters hurt by the move. Denmark cited President Nixon by name in justifying its own adoption of an import surcharge. Japan will probably slow its trade liberalization. The DISC export subsidy,[2] if authorized by law, will certainly be emulated. And retaliation does not require overt import restrictions abroad: quiet pressures by European governments could seriously disrupt the activities and profits of the European subsidiaries of U.S. corporations, and Japan's quasi-public purchasing agencies could sharply reduce their purchases of U.S. farm goods. If the U.S. surcharge came to be seen as a permanent feature of the international landscape, retaliation and emulation would be swift and certain, if not always open and obvious.

Beside such specific effects, the whole debate has been shifted by the Administration's moves and rhetoric. Exporting unemployment has been sanctioned. The President himself has made protectionism respectable, whereas he had previously deviated from the principles of liberal trade only for textiles, for well-understood if deplorable reasons. The broad message to Congress and the public is that the Executive, by far the most

[2] The measure would authorize creation of Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISC), domestic subsidiaries of U.S. firms which could defer, perhaps indefinitely, corporate tax payments on their export profits.

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powerful—and sometimes the only—bastion against protectionism in the United States, has also switched sides.

The potential effects of this switch are magnified enormously by the vast expansion of presidential legal power to act in the trade field implied by the recent acts. Was the surcharge legal? Most lawyers had always thought it would require congressional action. Was it legal, not to mention judicious, to invoke the Trading With the Enemy Act as authority to apply textile quotas against Japan unilaterally and thus force it to "voluntary restraint"? Was it not ludicrous to call the balance-of-payments situation a "national emergency" sufficient to justify invoking that Act, when the deficit at its peak amounted to less than one percent of our gross national product and when the textile effort began more than two years earlier when our payments were in large surplus? Such an expansion of executive power will obviously create domestic political pressures to use it again and foreigners will fear that it will be precisely so used.

Continuation of the status quo threatens the world economy through monetary as well as trade effects. Truly floating exchange rates would help solve international economic problems, but the present array of "dirty floats" could seriously exacerbate them. Individual countries will be increasingly subjected to domestic pressures to reduce the appreciation of their rates or even to depreciate them against the dollar, to regain competitive advantage, and most have already acted in precisely this direction. The wholesale destruction of the international rules governing exchange-rate changes, completed by the suspension of dollar convertibility, makes this one of the easiest means to "retaliate" against the U.S. protectionist devices. We, of course, triggered the "dirty floats" ourselves, by coupling the surcharge with our suspension of convertibility. Trade wars could become full economic wars, precisely as they did under similar international conditions in the 1930s.

These reactions to such a U.S. policy could have been expected at any time. But they come at a particularly dangerous moment because of the poor economic outlook in numerous key countries: unemployment is higher in Canada than in the United States and higher relative to historical norms in Britain; much of Europe is in or headed toward recession, and Japan has experienced a sharp slowdown. The danger is particularly acute because of the uncertain economic outlook in our country, and

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the consequent tremendous pressure on the Administration to show results, especially in reducing unemployment, in time for the 1972 election—results whose popularity would hardly be diminished, in this period of rising isolationism, if they were achieved partially at the expense of foreigners. Aside from the principles involved, this is the worst time in the postwar period to risk such an effort—and it is hard to believe that the weekenders of Camp David would have tried it had they considered the world, rather than just the American, economy.

The uncertain outlook for the world economy heightens the need for precisely the opposite approach to foreign economic policy, both here and abroad. Mercantilist efforts to achieve full employment at the expense of others are doomed to fail, because domestic politics in all countries assure that all will play the same game. In fact, such efforts are counterproductive in meeting today's economic dilemma, because they foster inefficiency and monopoly and hence exacerbate inflation. The only effective economic policy approach is to use domestic fiscal and monetary policies to restore and maintain full employment; institute an effective balance-of-payments adjustment mechanism so that such policies will not produce intolerable external financial difficulties; and develop effective incomes policies and other selective measures, including maximum *liberalization* of world trade, to restrain inflation. A throwback to trade restrictions and competitive depreciations would lead just where they did once before —toward a world depression. And it would make it impossible to agree on new exchange rates, the only way to really improve the U.S. balance of payments and increase U.S. jobs.

IV

These economic effects would have a disastrous impact on U.S. foreign policy, and on our own national security.

Continuation of our military commitments to NATO have already been undermined by xenophobic rhetoric, and a tough European reaction to our moves would add dramatically to existing congressional disenchantment with present force levels. Incredibly, the Administration has contributed directly to such sentiment by again demanding better "burden-sharing," after having apparently cooled the issue less than a year earlier, and after rallying the entire foreign policy community to help defeat the Mansfield Amendment only a few months ago.

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Such a reduction in the credibility of U.S. military support for Europe would threaten Chancellor Brandt's *Ostpolitik* in the short run, and push Germany toward either accommodation with Moscow or extreme nationalism over the long run. It would push all Europe toward neutralism by strengthening neo-Gaullists within all major countries there and by creating an anti-American attitude which would render pragmatic problem-solving across the Atlantic increasingly difficult. The evolution of the Common Market could easily take on a distinctly anti-American flavor, self-fulfilling the prophecies of those who have always viewed it as counter to U.S. interests and thus pitting the United States against one of the dominant political drives in Europe—now including Britain, perhaps our closest ally. It would become almost impossible for us to do business constructively with Europe in such an atmosphere, on the whole range of issues where we interact daily, from trade and investment themselves to nuclear coöperation and allied defense.

Japan, the key influence in Asia for at least decades to come, has been badly shaken internally and has already begun to reconsider whether her whole national policy should continue to be based overridingly on close ties to the United States. Canada is making the same reappraisal, though it has little alternative. The less-developed countries, which were given favored treatment under all major balance-of-payments measures previously taken by the United States, were singled out for adverse treatment —the aid cut, the new trade barriers to their most dynamic export industries, demolition of any possibility of U.S. trade preferences in the foreseeable future, new uncertainties to cloud their development efforts. Even worse politically, they have no control at all over the unfolding events; they will continue to face the surcharge until the industrialized countries reach a negotiated settlement. It is no surprise that these countries see August 15th, and the subsequent events which it triggered, as further confirmation that the United States has copped out of helping them with the problems which they deem most important to their national futures. No area of the non-communist world is left unscathed by the new approach, which ignores domestic politics abroad as fully as it now caters to domestic politics at home.

Indeed, America is now pursuing two separate and contradictory foreign policies. This comes as no surprise to students of bureaucratic politics, since different people are obviously

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running each. But the new economic approach, coupled with the coming presidential visits to Peking and Moscow, produce the most bizarre U.S. foreign policy imaginable: war on our friends, concessions to our traditional adversaries. Even within the economic area itself, the Administration has achieved the desirable objective of moving the communist countries toward most-favored-nation treatment by the highly undesirable method of raising our duties toward everyone else. This dual policy is doubly dangerous at this time, as the new overtures have already made our friends extremely nervous—witness Japan regarding Peking, and Europe regarding the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)—and thus heightened, not relieved, the need to take their sensitivities fully into account.

It is ludicrous for the United States to call for a new sharing of responsibility among allies, and then unilaterally unleash a bombshell which both upsets such coöperation directly and makes it more difficult, economically and thus politically, for others to contribute. Or to call for an era of greater equality among allies, and then to seek to dictate terms of settlement on the central internal political issues of others. Or to call for a liberal trading and payments system, and then break all the rules and seek to export unemployment. Or to mount a massive campaign to defeat the Mansfield Amendment and cool the burden-sharing issue, and then to provide new ammunition for the next Mansfield attempt by stridently accusing Europe of not pulling its weight. Or to call for an era of consultation, and then use public rhetoric to impugn both the motives and policies of others. Or to refer to aid as a central component of the Nixon Doctrine, and then pull the rug from under it. Or to deplore abrupt shifts in policy as unsettling, and then reverse course overnight on every fundamental aspect of foreign economic policy.

Even those who argue that the United States "would win a trade war" admit that this means only that we would lose less in economic terms than would others. Some say this is enough to deter others from lashing back, especially when they consider their reliance on the United States in security terms as well. But such restraint is almost inconceivable in major countries with self-respect in today's global mood of virulent nationalism, particularly given the pressure on their leaders to respond with at least verbal toughness and thus constrain their future actions just as the tough U.S. rhetoric constrains ours.

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In the short run, it is unclear which foreign policy will prevail. Protectionist economics mean isolationist politics, and vice-versa, and it is extremely doubtful that an outward-looking military and political policy can coexist for long with an inward-looking foreign economic policy. Short-term U.S. politics appear to pull in the protectionist direction at this point, but it is hard to imagine that losses of farm exports, curtailment of the overseas activities of U.S. firms, a stock market depressed in part by fears of a trade war, and deep rifts with our closest allies would produce a very impressive score even on this narrow criterion.

Even if the existing pattern of relations survives these immediate dangers, the New Economic Policy has raised fundamental questions for U.S. foreign policy over the longer term. Has the United States turned basically isolationist? Or will we be able to accommodate ourselves constructively to our reduced power position in the world economy? Has the executive branch finally given up the battle to keep isolationism at bay? Will we begin to use the leverage of our military and political position to achieve economic objectives, reversing the mode of the past when economic programs were used as much to promote our security objectives as to improve American economic welfare? Would other countries succumb to such U.S. pressure, or simply jettison our political support and hence permit wreckage of the postwar alliance system? Will we abandon the effort to preserve an open political system outside the communist world, or support the economic trends toward bloc creation and move consciously toward geographic spheres of political influence?

One specific issue will be our international monetary policy. From World War II to August 15, 1971, the United States was largely passive with respect to any deficits in its balance of payments. These deficits were of great importance in supporting postwar reconstruction in Europe and Japan, economic development everywhere, a steady trend toward trade and payments liberalization, and the avoidance of major political frictions deriving from economic conflict. Our payments deficits were an economic umbrella for the rest of the world, similar to the defense umbrella provided by our nuclear deterrent—except that the economic umbrella modestly improved the economic welfare of the American people, by permitting us to consume real resources from abroad and accumulate foreign assets, while the nuclear umbrella cost us substantial sums of money. To be sure,

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U.S. deficits are no longer needed for some of these purposes; for example, the invention of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) means that the world need no longer rely on U.S. deficits to create new dollar reserves and thus avoid a new cross of gold on which economic growth might founder. But the continuing growth of private demand for dollars around the world, and demand from monetary authorities to build at least their dollar working balances, means that equilibrium in the U.S. balance of payments will equate with a moderate deficit on any of the standard accounting definitions.

It is even dubious that a "strong" U.S. balance of payments would provide a sounder basis for a proper U.S. foreign policy than the "weak" balance of payments of the past, as the Administration asserts. An active, even if not aggressive, U.S. balance-of-payments policy would completely change the basic foundations on which the world economy rests. The essentially mercantilist external financial objectives of most of the other major countries are already incompatible with each other, and have been met even partially only through U.S. acquiescence. Such acquiescence makes sense from both the U.S. and global standpoints, since we are at once the biggest single factor in the world economy and the least dependent of any nation on trade. Adoption of similar mercantilist objectives by America could make the global economic system unworkable, since no other country can or will take our place as the balancer. Other countries will have to adjust their economic thinking and behavior no less radically than those small countries in East Asia which must adjust their security thinking to U.S. withdrawals and the Nixon Doctrine. For the future, only an effectively internationalized monetary and trading system could provide the basis for a viable world economy without U.S. stewardship. We turn now to what that world might look like, and how to get there.

V

The first requirement is for America and the other major countries to assess their priorities among the wide range of issues which have been raised. For reasons already stated, early elimination of the U.S. surcharge and the related "Buy America" credit are the most important immediate targets. The United States must thus clarify what it wants in return and present its proposals to others, and the foreign response must be adequate.

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Our more fundamental objective, however, must be basic reform of the international monetary system to avoid in the future the errors of the crisis-prone past and to provide the foundation for a second generation of postwar prosperity. The system needs more effective means of adjusting national payments imbalances through greater flexibility of exchange rates in order to avoid the build-up of large disequilibria including our own. It needs ways of regulating the growth of international money without excessive reliance on the dollar, and hence excessive economic and political risks for the United States, which means new reliance on Special Drawing Rights. These issues are extremely complex, and will take time to work out. A two-stage approach is called for, with the surcharge removed in the first stage and basic reform achieved in the second.

Fortunately, both the short-term and long-term needs point to a single major ingredient for the first stage: an adequate realignment of national exchange rates. On August 15th, the President made such a realignment the sole condition for removal of the surcharge, and we should abandon the new "Buy America" discrimination and the DISC export subsidy as well if we could get larger revaluations in return. Indeed, this is the only way the United States can achieve a sizable sustained improvement in the U.S. balance of payments and an increase in U.S. jobs from rebuilding our trade surplus. Realignment is also a necessary prerequisite for more basic monetary reform, since no country will agree to new rules unless it knows the starting points for all countries and since a régime of greater flexibility of exchange rates can begin smoothly only if rates are near equilibrium at the outset. Fortunately, most countries have already floated their exchange rates close to the new levels which they need to find. Widening the margins within which rates would fluctuate around the new parities, to at least three percent on either side compared with the 0.75 percent which prevailed in most countries prior to August 15th, would provide for the inevitable margin of error in setting new rates.

The second U.S. and foreign priority should be new steps to liberalize world trade, building on the recent proposals of the President's Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy and using the Organization for Economic Coöperation and Development (OECD) High Level Group already created for this purpose. Such an effort is necessary to reverse the present

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momentum toward protectionism, and a commitment to move should be a part of Stage One. The President has no authority to make any U.S. trade concessions at present, however, so new legislation is needed to pave the way for negotiations, as well as to demonstrate that the Administration's commitment to liberal trade encompasses substance as well as rhetoric.

It would probably be possible for the United States to get some minor nonreciprocal trade concessions in Stage One. However, they would provide little help for the desired payments swing, appear purely cosmetic, and actually undermine the credibility of the tough new U.S. approach. More important, they could cost us something on the amount of the foreign revaluations, and thus actually represent a net loss for the United States if they simply represented an acceleration of steps to be taken subsequently anyway. Because different people handle trade and monetary policy in all countries, because different institutions are involved in Europe, and because the political effects of trade changes are much more obvious and thus more difficult than monetary changes, insistence on a sizable trade package could seriously delay Stage One. Actual negotiations on trade matters—and on defense burden-sharing, for precisely the same reasons—should be left to Stage Two.

Other countries have already raised two obstacles to this two-stage approach, even if it were adopted by the United States. They insist that the United States raise the official price of gold as part of the exchange-rate realignment, and that the United States resume some form of dollar convertibility at that time as well. Both points are understandable politically: the United States should "share" in the realignment by devaluing the dollar overtly, instead of solely via the revaluations of others, and others should not be forced to remain on the dollar standard imposed explicitly by August 15th after they have accommodated to a sizable improvement in the U.S. balance of payments.

Changing the gold price is the lesser evil of the two. The maximum change envisaged is five to ten percent, which would leave the official price well below the free market price and so provide no windfall profits for speculators, Russians, or South Africans. By clearly ruling out a large increase in the price, it could even discourage gold speculation. The need for congressional action could perhaps be delayed by adopting the proposal of Senator Javits that the Treasury simply declare a new selling price tem-

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porarily, without changing the official gold parity, and that Congress tidy up the legal situation as part of the fundamental reforms of Stage Two. And a willingness to change the gold price could result in a larger revaluation package since France would probably accept a five percent appreciation against the dollar via the gold price, Germany is reluctant to move more than five percent above France, Japan wants to move no more than five percent above Germany, and Italy, Britain, and some smaller Europeans will not move at all unless France does.

The negative effects of the gold price change on the monetary system could be countered by some corollary conditions. As will be explained shortly, the United States should not resume any form of convertibility, including gold convertibility, for the dollar until the satisfactory reform of the system in Stage Two. There would thus be no U.S. gold transactions at the new price until later, when new roles for the SDRs should mitigate any psychological boost which such transactions might give to gold. The change would not be meaningless, however, since other countries could trade gold among themselves or with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) at the new price.

The unfavorable psychological effects could also be met by simultaneous agreements in principle to move SDRs to the center of the monetary system. SDRs should be the future *numeraire,* in which all currencies are defined, replacing gold and the dollar in that role; we could denominate the new dollar parity in SDRs to highlight the shift, and further reduce the risk of boosting gold psychologically through the dollar devaluation. A special issue of SDRs should be authorized into which countries could convert any reserve assets now in their portfolios which they wish to get rid of, mainly dollars and sterling, but also gold itself. There should be sufficient creation of new SDRs (at least $4–5 billion annually) in the multi-year allocation period beginning in 1973, to assure adequate reserve growth without relying on dollars or gold. The details of these steps, or of steps to reduce the role of gold directly, will clearly take time to elaborate. Agreement on the governing principles should be possible in Stage One, however, if it is necessary to take the risks associated with an increase in the official dollar price of gold.

Convertibility of the dollar into U.S. reserve assets is much more critical than the gold price for the United States, and for the system as a whole. From the U.S. standpoint the external

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effects of the exchange-rate changes and the domestic disinflation program will take at least two years to be felt. The anticipated reversal of capital flows could get us to an official settlements balance much faster, but premature resumption of convertibility could produce losses of a sizable portion of the remaining U.S. reserves, for purely transitional reasons, when the whole objective is to strengthen the U.S. payments position. Other countries would lose, too, given their stake in having a strong dollar in the system and their interest in avoiding hair-trigger U.S. moves in the future, which smaller U.S. reserves would promote. And it is they who want the U.S. adjustment to be spread over time to cushion their own accommodations.

On the other hand, other countries want to minimize the duration of the dollar standard onto which they were formally thrust on August 15th. Before that date, foreign monetary authorities could convert any dollar accruals into U.S. reserve assets or at least justify holding dollars to their domestic critics by pointing out their right to do so. In the face of our suspension of convertibility, they now have only two choices when the United States is in deficit: to acquire dollars, or to eliminate their own surpluses by inflating, imposing controls on capital inflows or accomplishing the same end through multiple exchange rates, or appreciating the value of their currencies. Avoidance of this dilemma is precisely why these countries should be willing to move quickly to reform the international monetary system. Since the surcharge and probably the gold price will have to go in Stage One, the resumption of dollar convertibility will be the only U.S. lever to prod any such reform. Without it, we could easily see a repetition of 1967–69, when the British-French-German exchange-rate realignment led to much talk of reform but removed all pressure for it, and the likelihood of an August 15th was sharply accelerated.

To be sure, other countries fear that the United States wants them to revalue and then be stuck with a dollar standard forever. Such a fear is, of course, whetted by the inward-looking economic tendencies which do clearly exist, so the United States would have to display consistent sincerity in pushing toward constructive reform. Our insisting on agreements "in principle" about Special Drawing Rights in Stage One should be reassuring. It should be snapped up by the others precisely in order to maintain momentum away from a new dollar standard—especially by

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the Europeans, who can veto all significant decisions on Special Drawing Rights under International Monetary Fund voting rules, and hence maximize their international monetary power by promoting an SDR standard to replace it.

VI

Stage Two should comprise negotiations aimed at producing fundamental improvements in both the international monetary system and international trade arrangements. Both must be included because money affects primarily the macroeconomic problems of nations, and trade affects the microeconomic problems of particular industries within nations. The underlying political objective is to adapt world economic relations to the new underlying economic and political balance, reducing the relative role of the United States and enhancing the relative roles of Europe and Japan. The reforms must preserve the benefits of growing world economic interdependence while meeting the insistence of national authorities that they retain adequate means of control over their individual societies.

The most important monetary need is a better process through which national balance-of-payments positions can adjust. Financing is generally available only for temporary periods and limited amounts, especially for deficit countries; it is essential in avoiding excessive adjustment costs, but if used too freely will simply permit disequilibria to cumulate and thus make the inevitable adjustment all the more painful. Adjustment via domestic deflation or inflation is exceedingly costly in terms of domestic economic objectives, especially if domestic needs call for moves in the opposite direction; thus such adjustment is frequently unacceptable for internal political reasons. Controls adopted for payments reasons carry significant economic and political costs and at best suppress imbalances, delaying the need for more fundamental measures and perhaps increasing their magnitude.

Changes in the exchange rate are thus the only economically effective means of adjustment which is likely to be politically acceptable in most countries at most times. This is particularly true for the United States, where adjustment via changes in domestic policy would be extremely costly, because foreign transactions represent such a small part of our total economy. Exchange-rate changes raise political problems, too, since they produce sharp changes in income distribution within a society, but

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the main barrier to their use in the postwar period has been the inadequate international rules by which they are governed. As it evolved, the Bretton Woods system discouraged changes except when "fundamental disequilibria" had clearly developed. This meant that the problem was obvious for all to see. Speculators could make easy money by betting on a change with virtually no risk of even modest loss; and governments dug in defensively to avoid the admission of previous errors, "national failures," or, in the case of surplus countries, "solving the other country's problem." Particularly in the case of surplus countries, no effective pressures existed to force exchange-rate changes when needed. With regard to deficit countries, there was no sure protection against unnecessary or excessive changes. The result was a devaluation bias against the dollar, the pivot currency of the entire system.[3]

A new régime thus needs to be established, essentially to depolicitize exchange-rate movements as much as possible and to equalize the incentives to adjust for surplus and deficit countries. To do so, exchange-rate changes need to be fostered on a smaller scale, and hence occur more frequently. New attitudes on the part of national monetary authorities are essential to such a new régime, and should be readily accepted by them as providing a new policy instrument to help cope with the complex array of responsibilities which they face.

It is doubtful that such changes in attitude will suffice, however, especially to induce surplus countries to take timely action. International agreement is thus needed on four changes in the rules. The margins around exchange-rate parities need to be widened permanently, to at least three percent and preferably five percent on either side, to permit greater fluctuations and hence encourage small parity changes. The International Monetary Fund Articles need amendment to clearly permit parity changes when disequilibria are pending, not accomplished facts. The international community needs to agree on guidelines which will indicate when parity changes are needed—essentially in those "dilemma" cases when the external balance calls for a domestic economic policy which clashes with the needs of the internal economy—with a presumption that changes will take

[3] See the author's, "The United States and Greater Flexibility of Exchange Rates," in Bergsten, Halm, Machlup, Roosa, eds., "Approaches to Greater Flexibility of Exchange Rates: The Bürgenstock Papers," Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.

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place in such cases. And sanctions should be available to the international community to apply against a country which does not do so.

Such an approach would provide effective international surveillance of balance-of-payments adjustment via the exchange rate, the policy instrument through which national economies interact. As such, it would clearly represent a new "invasion" of national sovereignty. At the same time, however, it would provide national authorities with a new policy instrument to help meet their needs. In addition, through the stepped-up process of international consultation which would be triggered by the guidelines, countries could justify their failure to change their exchange rates by pointing to other policy actions they had taken, or attempt to persuade others that their payments imbalance required no action at the time. The tension between effective international control and maintenance of national sovereignty will always exist, but such a process would provide ample scope for both as it evolved toward improving the payments adjustment process.

The second key monetary need is to reform the means by which international reserves are created and held. The dominant role of the dollar in the reserve system has raised major international political problems and created major difficulties for the United States by circumscribing its ability to change its own exchange rate. (Under any reform, the dollar will doubtlessly maintain its predominant role in financing private international transactions, and for exchange market intervention use by monetary authorities.) A return to gold would reverse the evolution of money through all history, and subject the world economy to the uncertainties of South African production and private demand. If only because of the shortcomings of the alternatives, future reliance must be placed on Special Drawing Rights.

Fortunately, there are persuasive positive reasons for doing so as well. Only via Special Drawing Rights can the international community truly manage the growth of world liquidity through a rational decision-making process. Special Drawing Rights can be used to replace reserve assets presently in the system, including dollars, which other countries may no longer wish to hold and which the United States wishes to remove as a threat to its reserves. They combine the attractiveness of a gold-

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value guarantee and interest earnings. And they are managed by the International Monetary Fund, providing a base for enhancing the role of the institution; this is critical for successful reform of the adjustment process. Some countries will want to continue holding reserve currencies in their portfolios, and new rules could be adopted to permit them to do so while avoiding the risk of adverse international consequences from switches among assets as has been possible in the past.

At the same time, one may fairly ask: What are Special Drawing Rights? Where does their value come from? Will they always have value? The answer is simple: their value comes from agreement among virtually all non-communist countries to accept them in settlement of payments imbalances. Countries agree to provide their currencies, or other reserve assets, in exchange for Special Drawing Rights.

The value of the Special Drawing Rights rests on international coöperation. It is thus true that they might not survive a major war, or a total breakdown of international economic coöperation. The risk of either is remote, even under the pessimistic outlook described earlier. In addition, most countries will continue to hold a "war chest" of gold—whose official price and acceptability also depends on international coöperation—against such a contingency; gold converted into the special issue of Special Drawing Rights could even be retained physically in the territory of the converter as such a hedge. So the overwhelming superiority of Special Drawing Rights to either alternative, in any situation short of international disaster, renders it by far the best choice as the monetary base of the world economy of the future.

With such reforms, the United States could agree to finance completely any deficits in its basic payments position with reserve assets. Dollar convertibility would thus be resumed on a much more meaningful basis than before August 15th, into whatever assets we chose to use when necessary. We should be willing to undertake such an obligation in view of the assured creation of adequate liquidity via Special Drawing Rights; the improved prospect for prompt adjustment by other countries, reducing the pressures on our own balance of payments; and the new capability to move ourselves via changes in the exchange rate of the dollar, the only economically effective means of adjustment which is also politically feasible in the United States.

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It would be disastrous to U.S. foreign policy to keep the dollar inconvertible and try to maintain a world dollar standard, if most other currencies were fixed or most countries wished to return to such a régime. And such an effort would doubtlessly trigger foreign reactions which would seriously hurt wide segments of our economy as well.

On the trade side, negotiations are needed on a host of issues. The most pressing problem is agriculture, where we should be willing to swap some of our industrial protection and our dairy quotas for reductions in the stimulation afforded European production of feedgrains and other commodities by the Common Agricultural Policy. Tariffs on industrial trade remain important, particularly in those industries where they range much higher than the national averages of six to ten percent, and should be reduced reciprocally. Specific nontariff trade distortions, such as discriminatory government procurement rules and practices, need to be eliminated or moderated.

Meaningful action, however, might require a more imaginative leap than simply extending the current style of trade negotiations to more of the existing and well-recognized issues. Indeed, the development of a whole new range of relevant topics desperately requires new international rules, or at least new modes of coöperation. The multinational corporation and international transfers of technology are subject to no international understandings, despite their tremendous importance. International coöperation in devising and implementing adjustment assistance programs could prove a necessary part of any further trade liberalization. National policies adopted for purely domestic reasons, such as environmental control and regional development, will have significant trade effects. And a major breakthrough in reversing the protectionist tide may require a quantum leap toward liberal trade, perhaps a new treaty pointing to the phased removal of all remaining tariffs and most other barriers over the next 10 to 20 years, just as the Kennedy Round could be accomplished only through the adoption of new techniques which represented such a jump a decade ago.

One way to attack the subject would be to set out consciously to restructure the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The IMF Articles would be basically restructured by the monetary reforms suggested above, which would substitute a presumption of exchange-rate changes for the pre-

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August 15th presumption of fixed rates, and reliance on SDRs for the previous reliance on gold and dollars. There is widespread agreement that many of the key GATT rules, while appropriate when devised in the late 1940s, simply cannot be expected to cope with trade problems a generation later. And an explicit effort to reconsider GATT would meet directly the perceptions of many Americans that the international trade rules are unfair, exposing them in most cases as unfounded but providing the best possible means to air the issues comprehensively.

Investment is not covered at all by GATT. Agriculture and nontariff distortions are covered inadequately. The basic most-favored-nation rule no longer governs a majority of world trade. The rules governing customs unions did not foresee the evolution of the Common Market. The trade controls permitted to meet balance-of-payments needs are outdated. The border tax rules were based on inadequate economic theory. New means of measuring reciprocity are needed to convince skeptical legislators of the fairness of future trade concessions. Indeed, it is legitimate to speculate about whether international economic responsibilities should continue to be bifurcated, with the IMF handling money and the GATT handling trade, now that the U.S. government has forced a widespread realization of how closely they are related. The absence of a single forum in which to consider both is a serious impediment to rapid resolution of the present problem.

VII

In view of their new positions of power, their resulting claims for international economic responsibility, and the uncertainties of U.S. leadership, Europe and Japan should initiate efforts to solve both the short-run and long-term phases of the present impasse. Such a step at this time would mark without doubt their transition to true international equality in the post-postwar world, and accord them new dignity and respect which would profoundly affect world politics for the 1970s and beyond. It has now become especially urgent for Europeans to put aside their differences, some petty and personal, but even those economic and very real, and achieve sufficient monetary unity to provide the basis for a common front at least on international financial issues. Only in that way will they be able to at least respond as one to the United States and to Japan, and offer any

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hope of seizing leadership in order to move back from the abyss.

Unfortunately, it is doubtful that other countries can mobilize quickly enough to take the lead in meeting the ever-tightening time limit for achieving a constructive Stage One. In addition, it is the United States which has primarily plunged the world into the present perilous situation. It is thus extremely gratifying that the United States has finally begun to present proposals on which immediate action can be based. In so doing, the United States has started to clarify its own priorities among the broad agenda it has tabled for discussion, to moderate its demands, and to adopt a more reasonable—though still extremely tough—negotiating approach. Failure to do so would be one more piece of evidence that the Administration was prepared to sit indefinitely behind the surcharge and an inconvertible dollar, pandering to the most isolationist elements in American society. In view of the dangers which loom in the absence of definitive action, the change came none too soon—and must be carried through to a prompt settlement of Stage One.

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THE CIA AND DECISION-MAKING

By Chester L. Cooper

"The most fundamental method of work . . . is to determine our working policies according to the actual conditions. When we study the causes of the mistakes we have made, we find that they all arose because we departed from the actual situation . . . and were subjective in determining our working policies."—"The Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung."

IN bucolic McLean, Virginia, screened by trees and surrounded by a high fence, squats a vast expanse of concrete and glass known familiarly as the "Pickle Factory," and more formally as "Headquarters, Central Intelligence Agency." Chiselled into the marble which is the only relieving feature of the building's sterile main entrance are the words, "The Truth Shall Make You Free." The quotation from St. John was personally chosen for the new building by Allen W. Dulles over the objection of several subordinates who felt that the Agency, then still reeling from the Bay of Pigs débâcle, should adopt a somewhat less lofty motto. (In those dark days of late 1961, some suggested that a more appropriate choice would be "Look Before You Leap.") But Dulles had a deeper sense of history than most. Although he was a casualty of the Bay of Pigs and never sat in the Director's office with its view over the Potomac, he left a permanent mark not only on the Agency which he had fashioned but on its building which he had planned.

Allen Dulles was famous among many and notorious among some for his consummate skill as an intelligence operative ("spook" in current parlance), but one of his greatest contributions in nurturing the frail arrangements he helped to create to provide intelligence support to Washington's top-level foreign-policy-makers.

Harry Truman, whose Administration gave birth to both the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, recalls that, "Each time the National Security Council is about to consider a certain policy—let us say a policy having to do with Southeast Asia—it immediately calls upon the CIA to present an estimate of the effects such a policy is likely to have. . . .[1] President Truman painted a somewhat more cozy relationship between the NSC and the CIA than probably existed during, and certainly since, his Administration. None the less, it is fair to say that the intelligence community, and espe-

[1] "Memoirs of Harry S Truman." New York: Doubleday, 1958.

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cially the CIA, played an important advisory role in high-level policy deliberations during the 1950s and early 1960s.

To provide the most informed intelligence judgments on the effects a contemplated policy might have on American national security interests, a group especially tailored for the task was organized in 1950 within the CIA. While this step would probably have been taken sooner or later, the communist victory in China, the Korean War and growing East-West tensions stimulated the Truman administration's interest in obtaining carefully prepared intelligence assessments and projections. The Office of National Estimates (ONE) was headed initially by Professor William Langer, eminent diplomatic historian, leading authority on the American duck and master of prose-style. Under his brief stewardship he established guidelines for crisp, objective assessments that have been maintained for two decades.

Since its inception, the Office of National Estimates has maintained its independence within the hierarchy of the CIA, within the intelligence community, and within the national security and foreign policy elements of the government. Each National Intelligence Estimate is written after due consideration of contributions submitted by intelligence analysts both within and outside the Agency, but the final wording bears the unmistakable stamp of ONE's style of composition and analysis.

Estimates, about 50 a year, are written on a variety of subjects relevant to situation or policy considerations affecting the national security interests of the United States—from such elaborate, highly technical examinations as Chinese communist nuclear capabilities as they may develop over the next several years, to more speculative judgments about, say, the probable course of Japanese-Soviet relations in the light of evolving American foreign and economic policy.

The estimates are, by their very nature, a projection into the future: "What will be the effects of . . .?" "What are the probable developments in . . .?" "What are the intentions of . . .?" "What are the future military capabilities of . . .?" When *Pravda* has been scanned, the road-watchers' reports from Laos checked, the economic research completed, Pham van Dong's recent speeches dissected, radar signals examined, satellite observations analyzed, and embassy cables read, the estimators set about their task. What emerges reflects a mass of distilled information, a painstaking search for the *mot just* and an assiduous effort to

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coördinate the views of all appropriate elements of the intelligence community. And,when all is said and done, what emerges is an opinion, a judgment. But it is likely to be the best-informed and most objective view the decision-maker can get.

The ten men on the National Estimates Board and the twenty or so on the National Estimates Staff (the Board and Staff make up the Office of National Estimates) have virtually unlimited access to classified and unclassified information concerning the political, military and economic situations of foreign countries. Their access to high-level White House, Defense or State policy thinking is much more limited; the fear of leaks which has pervaded the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations has tended to seal off even such élite intelligence groups as the Office of National Estimates from advance knowledge of sensitive "options" under serious consideration by the President. On occasion, now less frequent than in previous years, the Estimates folk are given an inkling of closely held courses of action that may be under high-level review through requests from the White House or the NSC to undertake a "Special" National Intelligence Estimate on "The Consequences of Certain Possible Steps the United States May Take Toward (let us say) Cashmania."

The position of the men and women in the Office of National Estimates, particularly those on the Board, is unique in the government (their closest counterparts were members of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State prior to the recent reorganization of that staff). They are among the most senior civil servants in the government, but unlike their peers elsewhere in the CIA or in other agencies and departments, they have no managerial or administrative responsibilities, they are not obliged to concern themselves with the painful and mundane matter of the annual budgets, they are not asked to appear before congressional committees. Their assigned responsibility is to brood about the world's problems and to project their views about how these problems are likely to affect American national security interests. No one has ever tried to cost out the production of a National Intelligence Estimate. Even if the dollar costs could be determined, who is to weigh the nondollar value of a considered, objective judgment, based on all relevant available information, on a matter important, perhaps vital to American security? At a time when government officials of whatever

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stature find themselves so harried that thinking time is at a premium, a group of experts that has an opportunity to ponder is a scarce and precious national asset.

The salad days of CIA's Office of National Estimates were during the Eisenhower administration. It was in this period that the estimators sensed that they had a direct, or at least discernible, participation in the policy process. The National Security Council then played a more important role in the formulation of national security policy than it did under its creator, President Truman, or has under any subsequent administration, including the present one. Anxious to make the NSC a more orderly and effective body, President Eisenhower established a Planning Board charged with "staffing out" policy reviews and recommendations prior to consideration by the Council itself. The Planning Board was chaired by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs and its membership included representatives from the departments and agencies which comprised the NSC. The State Department member, for example, was the chairman of the Policy Planning Staff. The CIA adviser (both the CIA and the Joint Chiefs are nominally, at least, "advisers" rather than "members" of the NSC) was the Deputy Director for Intelligence to whom the Office of National Estimates was then responsible.[2]

The typical Planning Board arrangement involved assigning to the State Department's Policy Planning Staff the task of writing a "position paper" on the issue at hand and to the intelligence community, through the Office of National Estimates, the chore of preparing a National Intelligence Estimate. In due course, a Planning Board draft would be prepared incorporating the essence of these two documents and appropriate contributions from the Bureau of the Budget, the Department of Defense or other member groups.

While this was a far cry from having a firm assurance that the President and his advisers personally read the National Intelligence Estimates, it provided a built-in arrangement for gearing intelligence guidance into the policy-making process. Moreover, Allen Dulles, then Director, included a summary of relevant Estimates in his weekly briefings to the Council. This did not mean that every Estimate was heeded or even taken very seri-

[2] ONE has since been removed from the Intelligence Directorate of the CIA and now operates under the Office of the Director.

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ously by the policy-makers. But the estimators had some confidence, then, that their views were at least considered prior to a National Security Council position and a presidential decision.

President Kennedy was more interested in dealing with selected individuals than with formal institutions. He abolished the Planning Board together with other subordinate groups that had mushroomed under Eisenhower's NSC and, like President Johnson later, used the Council primarily as a vehicle for communicating decisions already reached in smaller, more congenial forums. There were still high-level, sometimes urgent, requests for Estimates directly addressing pending policy decisions,[3] but ONE's umbilical cord to the policy-making process was severed with the disappearance of the Planning Board. The fact that John Kennedy was a "reading" President was, of course, some compensation. (He is reported to have once called a startled young member of the Estimates Staff about a point in an estimate on Indonesia.)

Aside from momentary diversions into the Caribbean and the Middle East, the Johnson administration's foreign policy concerns were dominated by Vietnam. It is revealing that President Johnson's memoirs,[4] which are replete with references to and long quotations from documents which influenced his thinking and decisions on Vietnam, contain not a single reference to a National Intelligence Estimate or, indeed, to any other intelligence analysis. Except for Secretary McNamara, who became a frequent requestor and an avid reader of Estimates dealing with Soviet military capabilities and with the Vietnam situation, and McGeorge Bundy, the Office of National Estimates had a thin audience during the Johnson administration. This is not to say, of course, that "current intelligence" on crisis situations was ignored. It is to say that Estimates, think pieces and in-depth analyses were far from best sellers.

Early in its tenure the Nixon administration publicly emphasized its determination to restore the National Security Council to its place at the pinnacle of the policy-making pyramid and to establish a more orderly process of policy planning and review. But the system that evolved relegated the National Estimates to but a tiny fraction of the studies, analyses, position

[3] During the Cuban missile crisis, for example, the President's "Executive Committee" requested several estimates.

[4] Lyndon Baines Johnson, "The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency, 1963–1969." New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971.

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papers, contingency plans, research reports and memoranda generated by the large new NSC staff murmuring the magic words, "The White House wants immediately. . . ." How much of this deluge of paper has ever been read and assimilated by even those NSC staffers who originally requested the material is a well-kept secret and understandably so. How much ever went beyond their overflowing desks to Mr. Kissinger's busy deputy, to the harassed Mr. Kissinger or to the even more harassed President can only be imagined. A safe bet would be precious little.

Most Americans concerned about foreign affairs have long had to accept on blind faith that our government takes pains to provide its highest officials with the best possible intelligence guidance—and then to squirm under our private suspicions that this advice is, all too often, regarded with indifference. Thanks to Daniel Ellsberg, those of us who have not seen a National Intelligence Estimate for many years, or who have never seen one, can address the matter with somewhat more confidence than we could have a few months ago. Although it probably did not cross Ellsberg's mind when he released the "Pentagon Papers" to *The New York Times,* he succeeded in doing what the Agency, on its own, has rarely been able to do for more than 20 years: he made the CIA "look good" through what inhabitants of the Pickle Factory themselves would call a "highly credible source."

II

By some stroke of prescience, President Truman singled out Southeast Asia as his example of a problem area where the National Security Council would call for intelligence guidance for policies under consideration. Since Truman wrote his memoirs, this troubled part of the world has given rise to a fair share of NSC deliberation, intelligence analysis and policy decisions. While the "Pentagon Papers" tell us little about what actually happened in the White House Cabinet Room, they do reveal much about the intelligence guidance made available to the policy-makers. The record, recently amplified by President Johnson's memoirs, gives us some insight into the extent to which such guidance was reflected in policy decisions. A review of the record is disquieting.

In the summer of 1954, following the Geneva conference, the Eisenhower administration was desperately attempting to erect

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a shield against further communist expansion in Asia. Secretary Dulles, especially, was determined to develop a strong anti-communist government south of the 17th parallel in Vietnam and to replace the French economic, military and political influence in that area with our own. The man the United States counted on to establish strong anti-communist rule was Ngo Dinh Diem. By mid-summer, the issue of American support for Diem's fledgling and untried government was high on the NSC's agenda. The CIA was requested to prepare an Estimate on the viability of a Western-supported, anti-communist government in Vietnam. According to the "Pentagon Papers," the National Intelligence Estimate of August 3 warned that "even with American support it was unlikely that the French or Vietnamese would be able to establish a strong government and that the situation would probably continue to deteriorate." The NSC, nevertheless, recommended American aid for the frail and untried Vietnamese government, a recommendation that was soon followed by President Eisenhower's fateful letter to Diem offering American support.

This estimate has long since been validated and it seems clear that the United States would now be better off if President Eisenhower had paid more heed to that warning and less to the strong pressures that were being exerted by his Secretary of State and hard-line members of Congress. But this would probably be asking too much, considering the atmosphere in Washington during the summer of 1954. In any case, the Diem régime proved reasonably effective and stable until 1959, four years after the estimate—a period about as long as any intelligence judgment can be projected with confidence and any particular policy can be expected to be viable. It is probably a moot point, therefore, whether the estimators or the policy-makers were right in terms of what they knew and what they said and did in 1954. What is worth noting for our purposes here is the readiness of the estimators to send forward a point of view very much at variance with the current policy "line." This attribute, comes through time and again over the succeeding years.[5]

The 1954 Estimate was but the first of many blinking yellow lights flashed from intelligence analysts to the Eisenhower, Ken-

[5] The Vietnam estimate of August 1954 was by no means the first example of this kind of objectivity; many estimates on East Asia written during the 1950s went squarely against the policy inclinations of the time.

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nedy and Johnson administrations on the course of events in Vietnam. In August 1960, according to the "Pentagon Papers," the National Security Council was told that unless Diem's government took "more effective measures to protect the peasants and to win their positive coöperation" the Vietcong would expand their areas of control. If adverse trends were not checked, the estimate noted, "they will almost certainly in time cause the collapse of Diem's régime." Six months later officials in the new Kennedy administration were given an even sharper warning: "An extremely critical period . . . lies immediately ahead." Diem's "toleration of corruption" and his reliance on "one-man-rule" cast doubt on his ability to lead the government. And in October 1961, when Kennedy's NSC was considering deploying SEATO (South-East Asia Treaty Organization) ground forces to Vietnam, it was cautioned that, "The communists would expect worthwhile political and psychological rewards from successful harassment and guerrilla operations against SEATO forces. The DRV (North Vietnamese Government) would probably not relax its Vietcong campaign against the GVN (South Vietnamese Government) to any significant extent." In November 1961, shortly after General Taylor and Walt Rostow returned from their trip to Vietnam recommending, *inter alia,* that the United States "offer to introduce into South Vietnam a military Task Force," a National Intelligence Estimate warned that any escalation of American military activities in Vietnam would be matched by a similar escalation by Hanoi: "the North Vietnamese would respond to an increased U.S. commitment with an offsetting increase in infiltrated support for the Vietcong." Kennedy turned down the recommended "Task Force," but approved a substantial increase in American military advisers.

In June 1964, CIA analysts challenged the validity of the hallowed "domino theory." According to the "Pentagon Papers," President Johnson asked the Agency: "Would the rest of Southeast Asia necessarily fall if Laos and South Vietnam came under North Vietnamese control?" "With the possible exception of Cambodia," the President was told, "it is likely that no nation in the area would quickly succumb to Communism as a result of the fall of Laos and South Vietnam. Furthermore, a continuation of the spread of Communism in the area would not be irreparable. . . ." So long as the United States retained its

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offshore bases in Asia, China and North Vietnam could be deterred "from overt military aggression against Southeast Asia in general." But, as President Johnson himself confides, the "domino theory" continued to dominate his thinking about Vietnam: ". . . from all evidence available to me it seemed likely that all of Southeast Asia would pass under Communist control, slowly or quickly, but inevitably, at least down to Singapore but almost certainly to Djakarta . . ." if the United States "let South Vietnam fall to Hanoi."[6]

Intelligence officers apparently have been consistently bearish about the effectiveness of American bombing of North Vietnam. During late 1964, when a group of contingency planners were examining the costs and advantages of bombing North Vietnam, intelligence analysts took issue with those who maintained that bombing would force Hanoi to cease supporting the insurgency in South Vietnam: "We do not believe that such actions [*i.e.* bombing the North] would have a crucial effect on the daily lives of the overwhelming majority of the North Vietnam population. We do not believe that attacks on industrial targets would so exacerbate current economic difficulties as to create unmanageable control problems. . . . [The Hanoi régime] would probably be willing to suffer some damage to the country in the course of a test of wills with the United States over the course of events in South Vietnam." As the Pentagon historians note, this view had little influence on the contingency paper which emerged.

In November 1965, after eight months of American bombing without any discernible effect on Hanoi's ability to continue the war, there was a quest for more "lucrative" targets. The Joint Chiefs proposed bombing North Vietnamese petroleum storage facilities, and Secretary McNamara asked for the views of the Board of National Estimates. "Hanoi would not be greatly surprised by the attacks," the Board responded. "Indeed . . . it has already taken steps to reduce their impact. . . . We believe that the DRV is prepared to accept for some time at least the strains and difficulties which loss of the major POL facilities would mean for its military and economic activity." After the petroleum storage facilities had been bombed in June 1966, it became clear that Hanoi had pre-positioned adequate oil caches throughout the country.

A month later, McNamara asked the Board to estimate the

[6] *Op. cit.*, p. 151.

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effect on Hanoi of a substantial escalation of American ground and air activity. There must be many officials of the Johnson administration who now wish they had taken more cognizance of this in late 1965: "Present Communist policy is to continue to prosecute the war vigorously in the South. The Communists recognize that the U.S. reinforcements of 1965 signify a determination to avoid defeat. They expect more U.S. troops and probably anticipate that targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area will come under air attack. Nevertheless, they remain unwilling to damp down the conflict or move toward negotiation. They expect a long war, but they continue to believe that time is their ally and that their own staying power is superior." "An escalation of the bombing would not be decisive: the DRV would not decide to quit; PAVN [North Vietnamese Army] infiltration southward would continue. Damage from the strikes would make it considerably more difficult to support the war in the South, but these difficulties would neither be immediate nor insurmountable."

Throughout 1966 intelligence analysts were to continue to maintain that the American bombing of North Vietnam would not produce "either a military victory or early negotiations." During a sober moment of rethinking about the bombing in the spring of 1967, McNamara requested three intelligence assessments on this issue. According to the "Pentagon Papers," one CIA study concluded that 27 months of bombing "have had remarkably little effect on Hanoi's overall strategy in prosecuting the war, on its confident view of long-term communist prospects, and on its political tactics regarding negotiations." Another described North Vietnamese morale as one of "resolute stoicism with a considerable reservoir of endurance still untapped." And a third noted that although the bombing had "significantly eroded the capacities of North Vietnam's industrial and military bases," the damage had "not meaningfully degraded North Vietnam's material ability to continue the war in South Vietnam."

III

The snippets of intelligence guidance which the "Pentagon Papers" reveal may not, of course, be the whole story of intelligence judgments offered and intelligence judgments heeded. The complete text of the documents which were cited may have couched the conclusions in a more tentative form; Intelligence

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Estimates and memoranda tend to be generously sprinkled with "on the one hand and on the other hand" and "on balance we believe." The Pentagon historians refer to other documents which countered or at least dissipated the effect of those prepared in the intelligence community as a whole or within the CIA itself. For example, the "Pentagon Papers" frequently refer to assessments of American bombing submitted by the Joint Chiefs which were typically more bullish than those generated within CIA or produced by the Office of National Estimates with contributions from and the concurrence of the Defense Intelligence Agency. The extent to which Defense Intelligence analysts had a hand in the Joint Chiefs' assessments is unknown, but one must assume that they played some role. Secretary McNamara may have become concerned about this apparent schizophrenic tendency within the Defense Intelligence staff because he tended, increasingly, to rely on the Board of National Estimates or other components within CIA for their own, uncoördinated, views on current or projected U.S. courses of action regarding Vietnam. Who besides McNamara was influenced by the CIA judgments, and who by the JCS, the "Pentagon Papers" do not say.

But they do indicate that the CIA's estimators and analysts, if not those within the Pentagon, appear to have passed the test of time, the sternest test of all. Confronting one of the most passion-laden, persistent and dangerous foreign crises the United States has confronted since World War II, they consistently seem to have kept their cool, they remained impeccably objective, and they have been right. But if the record was so good, why wasn't anyone Up There listening?

Sherman Kent, a seer among the professional intelligence analysts and a long-time Chairman of the Board of National Estimates, has said, "The nature of our calling requires that we pretend as hard as we are able that the wish is indeed the fact and that the policy-maker will invariably defer to our findings. . . ." He feels that his associates' concern about their influence is misplaced; "no matter what we tell the policy-maker, and no matter how right we are and how convincing, he will upon occasion disregard the thrust of our findings for reasons beyond our ken. If influence cannot be our goal, what should it be? . . . It should be to be relevant within the area of your competence, and above all it should be to be credible."[7]

[7] Sherman Kent, "Estimates and Influence," *Foreign Service Journal,* April 1969, p. 16.

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This exemplary admonition must be satisfying to Mr. Kent's co-professionals, but it is less than nourishing to those of us who are not as lofty-minded nor so high above the battle. Intelligence judgments on Vietnam, we now know, were both "relevant" and "credible" but were ignored or cast aside. Why? Because, since at least the early 1960s, they ran counter to the mood prevailing in the upper reaches of the policy-making community.

With the notable exception of Secretary McNamara (whose eventual change of view on the wisdom of our Vietnam policy may in no small part have been influenced by the seriousness with which he regarded CIA's assessments), senior officials seem to have dismissed the intelligence judgments as "just another opinion." It would be surprising if President Johnson had actually read the intelligence documents referred to in the "Pentagon Papers." Indeed, as he points out in his memoirs, the "Wise Men" he had assembled to examine American policy alternatives following the communists' 1968 Tet offensive were receiving "gloomier" assessments of the situation in Vietnam than he had been aware of. On important and sensitive political questions, intelligence judgments were virtually excluded from consideration. The State Department's Intelligence Bureau, for example, was cut off from the distribution of telegrams dealing with negotiations initiatives in 1966 and 1967, and thus was precluded from playing any useful role in this area. Intelligence analysts were thus banished to the darkness of official indifference. We know much less about the disposition of the Nixon administration, but it is no secret that the word has been passed down that Nixon officials are interested in "facts, not opinions."

IV

What can we realistically strive for in closing the yawning gap between the ultimate analytical product of an elaborate and costly intelligence structure and the tight if not always orderly process of arriving at national security and foreign policy decisions? Obviously, it is unrealistic to expect that policy-makers should be bound by the advice of intelligence analysts or even that intelligence judgments or guidance should be influential in every major decision; we already have acknowledged that other considerations may override intelligence assessments concerning the probable risks or advantages in a particular course of action. But the operative verb should be "override," not "disregard."

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We do have a right to expect that the findings of Intelligence Estimates be put forward in policy councils, pondered upon and then accepted or, by conscious decision, set aside.

The policy-making process comes into final focus and decisions are ultimately reached through oral rather than written communication. It is at this critical juncture that officials should perceive, as clearly as possible, "the effects a policy is likely to have." And it is at this point that the men whose métier it is to render such judgments should be directly involved. But long-standing practice has insulated the estimators from face-to-face confrontation with those who grapple with policy issues and options. Clearly if they are to play a more direct and useful role, the estimators must be brought out of their cloister into the real world. They must, in short, engage the policy-makers.

If not *the* Board of National Estimates, *a* Board should be given a broader charter which would assign it responsibilities well beyond that of presiding over National Intelligence Estimates. In effect, Board members should function within their special areas of experience and expertise as senior intelligence advisers to the policy community. The issues they should undertake or be called upon to examine and the nature of their participation obviously call for discrimination. The value of their contribution will stem from their unique opportunity to form considered judgments and to maintain cool objectivity; indiscriminate participation in every policy discussion is likely to erode both of these precious attributes to the point where they are just one more group in Washington living by its wits in an atmosphere of advocacy and passion.

The recent reorganization of the intelligence community provides an opportunity to increase the prestige and the influence of an Estimates Board. The Director of Central Intelligence has been relieved of his day-to-day responsibilities for running the Central Intelligence Agency and has been given greater authority over all the government's intelligence services. The Director in his new role will need a strong, knowledgeable policy support staff experienced in extracting, digesting and using the information and analysis available throughout the intelligence community. One way of meeting this need would be to provide the Director with a senior personal staff which would work closely on issues under consideration in high policy councils and represent him in consequential, subordinate forums.

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Another, more draconic alternative for giving a greater emphasis to intelligence judgments would be to remove the estimating responsibility from the Central Intelligence Agency and place it within the National Security Council structure. In essence, this would expand the role of the new Net Assessments Staff created by the recent reorganization. Broad political and economic judgments as well as more quantitative assessments of the strategic balance could then be channeled directly into policy forums. Such a move would also give the estimators a more sensitive feel for policies under consideration. Close association with the policy element of the National Security Council would permit an Estimates Board to initiate intelligence analyses and estimates that would squarely confront national security issues in their early stages of review. Under these cirmumstances, estimates would be more relevant as well as more influential.

But what about objectivity, the quality that has distinguished the estimates over the years? The risk of sacrificing this in the quest for influence cannot be dismissed lightly. Obviously the objectivity-influence trade-off must be closely examined before giving the National Security Council ultimate responsibility in making intelligence judgments. On the assumption that the objectivity issue can be resolved, direct access to an Estimates Board by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and, on occasion, the President himself, would make available what every President since Truman has said he wanted, but what none of them has been able to obtain on a routine basis—the best possible first-hand intelligence judgments on critical international problems.

A move of this kind would obviously involve consequential changes in organization and philosophy within Washington's intelligence and policy hierarchies. It would also add to the influence on foreign policy exerted by the White House—an influence already a matter of congressional criticism and State Department concern. But, the price would appear tolerable if a more thoughtful and prudent approach to the world was the result.

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THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE NEW CANADA

By Ivan L. Head

EACH year, at a place called "Magnetic Hill," visitors to Canada by the thousands park their cars at the bottom, place the gearshift in neutral, and sit in delighted astonishment as they glide gradually but inexorably up the hill. The whole exercise is an optical illusion, of course. The cars only seem to be coasting uphill; they are actually going down. The tourists know this, but they come anyway. It's not the feat that is the attraction; it's the illusion.

The hue and cry that arose within Canada following the introduction in 1969 of the government's White Paper on Foreign Policy bears some resemblance to the events at Magnetic Hill. The criticism was directed less at the paper's views of what Canada could and should do in the world than at the illusion cherished by many Canadians that their country's moral influence was unbounded. At a time when the British government was reducing its forces east of Suez and when strong voices were being raised in the United States against that country's worldwide presence, some Canadians were aghast that the Canadian government should refer to Canada as a modest power with limited influence. What of idealism? What of our destined role? "It is . . . disconcerting," said one critic, "to find no place for heroes in the future diplomatic adventures of our country."

With heroes or without, a foreign policy is a relatively new acquisition . . . for Canada. One hundred years ago a leading Canadian newspaper was able to write: "We could not be freer than we are now, for we have no foreign policy to complicate things, and no army to provide."

The editorialist was not suggesting that Canada had no relations with other countries, only that we had no considered pattern of dealing with them. Perhaps because we had so few options, Canada's foreign policies are in large measure a product of the influence of two states with which it has been intimately related throughout its history: Great Britain and the United States.

The first relationship retained for some time the frustrations of a colonial past. As Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier said:

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"We should have the right to say to Great Britain: if you want us to help you, call us to your councils."

The second relationship bears an entirely different quality, but no less uneasy. In the words of Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau: "Living next to the United States is in some ways like sleeping with an elephant. No matter how friendly and even-tempered is the beast, one is affected by every twitch and grunt."

Formal policy or not, however, Canada has employed foreign pursuits for its own benefit for many years. Participating in the Versailles Peace Conference and engaging in treaty relations with another country directly, rather than through Britain's intermediary, led to full independence. Yet by 1945 Canada still had no cabinet minister responsible only for external relations. We had diplomatic representatives abroad in only 23 countries, and, had Canadians been asked, they most probably would have replied that they regarded "normalcy" as the period prior to the Great Depression. But in 1945 we began to realize that the war had converted Canada into an industrial power at the same time as it had destroyed the economic base of much of Europe. In this new, postwar world Canada recognized that its international relations had expanded at a swifter pace than had its foreign policy.

By 1949 this shortcoming had been corrected and a balanced foreign policy acquired. As befits all solid, functional structures, it had four corners: the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and our close relationship with the United States. The shape of that policy was first identified by Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent. If anyone had observed then that the United States formed a sturdy segment of three of those four legs, few Canadians would have regarded this as anything but a happy and appropriate situation.

Two decades later, with the cold war showing few signs of thaw, the anomaly of the world's most populous state still denied membership in the international community, social unrest more and more often turning to violent ends, and a world in which technology had deluded millions to think that growth was a goal which justified any excess, some Canadians began to look anew at that square structure. Inevitably, any suggestion of change attracted the criticism that it was motivated by anti-Americanism, as the much earlier move to independence had been interpreted by some as being anti-British. One might just as well

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describe as a "horse-hater" the farmer who had switched to tractors in order to accommodate new conditions.

Notice was given by Prime Minister Trudeau during the 1968 election campaign that a review of foreign policy was contemplated. The review was needed, he said, "because of the changing nature of Canada and the world around us." What was sought were policies which would "accord with our national needs and resources, with our ability to discharge Canada's legitimate responsibilities in world affairs." "Change" was the occasion, and "ability" was to be the measure. But would this be a departure from purpose and an abandonment of friends and allies? Mr. Trudeau claimed not when he addressed the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., in March, 1969:

> I want to emphasize that this review is not an excuse to prove our independence; that independence needs no proving. Nor is it an exercise intended to illustrate to the United States our potential for irritation. We have no desire, and no surplus energy, for that kind of activity.
>
> We are building a new society in Canada. It should not be surprising that the external manifestations of this society may be somewhat different than has been the case in the past. But just as one of the invariable principles of that domestic society is the primacy of the individual, so is one of the invariables of our foreign policy genuine friendship with the United States.

The new policy was not to be a simple reëvaluation of the old; nor was it expected necessarily to depart dramatically from familiar lines. The review process itself could claim novelty, however, for it proceeded on a conceptual basis and tested the thesis that a modest power need not necessarily pursue a foreign policy consisting largely of empirical adjustments. When completed, the concept was capable of presentation in modular form: a hexagon with six distinct, yet sometimes complementary and sometimes overlapping objectives: peace and security, a harmonious natural environment, sovereignty and independence, social justice, an enhanced quality of life, economic growth. The pursuit of these objectives, not the search for roles or influence, was the policy thrust adopted by the Trudeau government. In the words of the White Paper: ". . . it is . . . misleading to base a foreign policy on an assumption that Canada can be cast as the 'helpful fixer' in international affairs. . . . To be liked and regarded as good fellows are not ends in themselves; they are a reflection of but not a substitute for policy."

The six policy objectives are not mutually exclusive; the emphasis which the Canadian government gives to them will

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form a constantly changing pattern. They should not be listed in any given order, though, for this leaves the impression that they are related in a fixed and descending order of importance. Ideally, they should be illustrated schematically.

The objectives are neither exclusively foreign nor exclusively domestic. Mr. Trudeau has described them as the overall goals of his government. He has stated, as well, that their pursuit is an ongoing process which will make Canada a better place for Canadians in a world better for all human beings. In this essay those goals form the backdrop to the deep and complex Canada-United States relationship.

II

Because Canada and the United States share the greater part of a common continent, most of the important activities of either country inevitably affect the other, usually in a ratio proportionate to their relative sizes. Most Canadians have long been accustomed to this fact and, apart from a hardy, persistent, yet small number of shrill nationalists, become disturbed only occasionally. This seeming tranquility is part of an understanding that those areas where the American presence is most evident in Canada—activities flowing from our economic, cultural and environmental propinquity, and from our military alliance —are in large measure an inevitable result of geography. Tranquil though the attitude may appear, however, it is not without concern, and even, on occasion, a touch of fear. The fear has seldom been of the American government—that, like any focused external threat, would encourage a cohesive response; it is of the effects of the amorphous embrace of millions of American magazines and books, of hundreds of thousands of American investors, of thousands of American films and television programs, of the constant pressure—friendly yet overwhelming—of 200,000,000 talented, energetic, acquisitive Americans. More recently, however, the fear has been of U.S. economic policies.

These are twitches and grunts of which in many instances neither the U.S. government nor the average American is likely cognizant. We here gain the impression that the view from Washington of Canada and Canadians tends to be fitful and spasmodic. The image pulsates in time to events often unconnected with Canada. Visibility is generally clear from the Pentagon, for example, because Canada is an enormous land mass

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separating the United States from the Soviet Union. The scene reduces itself to a statistical table for economists who may regard us as an apparently endless source of mineral and energy resources, and an immense market for U.S. manufactured goods and U.S. investment capital. The prospect becomes warm and attractive to the speechmaker—Canada, a stable and friendly democracy adhering to the rule of law.

These variations in visibility are perhaps no greater than is the view from any other country, but they assume major significance when introduced into the policy of the most powerful state in the world. Canadians, it is assumed, are so similar to Americans that they must surely share the same goals, values and desires. If this assumption is borne out in some instances, as in support for the United Nations or in similarities in legal systems, it is not regarded as significant. Yet when variations appear, annoyance follows. And variations there are. Examples: belief on the part of Canadians that trade with Cuba in non-strategic goods is likely to encourage in response moderate policies and friendship; our long-standing willingness to test cautiously the sincerity of the Soviet Union and China as an alternative to the untenable tensions of a cold war of indefinite duration; our concern that the high risk of oil pollution in the beautiful, yet narrow and crowded, Strait of Juan de Fuca (through which the international boundary runs) is sufficient reason to place further south the tanker terminal for Alaskan oil; our conviction that all countries should cease nuclear weapons tests above and below the ground.

It is this comprehensive and unique blend of intimacy and assumption, shared interests and shocked misunderstanding, that probably explains why the two countries in the world with the greatest interpenetration at every level should in their most recent foreign policy reviews—President Nixon's "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's" and our "Foreign Policy for Canadians" —give little mention to one another. It would be impossible for either country to formulate a complete policy toward the other, for there is no area of life in either country which is not to some degree an influence, cause, or effect of policies in the other.

So long as the two countries remain so close geographically, economically and culturally, the assumptions will continue; so long as they continue as politically independent states, the misunderstandings will arise. In the view of the Canadian govern-

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ment, an independent Canada serves American as well as Canadian interests, partly because it contributes to the reputation of the United States as a good international citizen. Prime Minister Trudeau has emphasized this point in defending his view of the basic sincerity and general good will of the United States toward Canada. Freedom to pursue our own interests without undue interference proves the sincerity of U.S. foreign policy, not so much to Canadians, who are in doubt only occasionally, but to other countries which may be in the habit of calling that good faith into question.

It is important that persons on both sides of the border remember this, for the differences in attitude between the two countries are likely to increase in number in the future. Inexorably, Canada's resources and geography will demand of her responsibilities and decisions which may be contentious elsewhere. The "new society" which Prime Minister Trudeau mentioned in his Washington Press Club speech is one that places increasing emphasis on the quality of life and the importance of human relations. The philosophy of unrestricted growth has been challenged by his government. Gross national product as the determining measurement of the health of a society has been called into question and "Net Human Benefit" has been suggested as a substitute, a measurement which would take into account such factors as environmental deterioration, community overcrowding and resource depletion.

These values contributed directly to the decision of the government in 1970 to establish 100-mile pollution prevention and control zones in the Canadian Arctic. The delicacy of the ecological balance and the frailty of all forms of life in the Arctic required, in the Canadian view, prevention of oil spills, not haphazard attempts at clean-up after the event, the current norm of behavior. This particular legislation was protested by the American government on the ground that it was in breach of international law. Canada replied that the unilateral act was taken in order to protect the environment until such time as the international community agreed to act coöperatively and set new and necessary standards of international conduct. Canada argued that the classical concept of freedom of the seas was being exploited by some maritime powers and by flags of convenience to the point that freedom had become license for irresponsibility. The coastal states (Canada's coastline is the longest of any coun-

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try in the world) required protection against potential polluters and resource exploiters. A new balance of interest needed to be struck, not to deny the exploitation of mineral and living resources or to interdict maritime traffic, but to husband the resources and protect the wholesomeness of the environment.

To these ends Canada has been participating wholeheartedly in the preparatory work for the third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference and the 1972 United Nations Stockholm Environmental Conference. The Canadian goal is the international acceptance of adequate standards reflecting mankind's newly acquired knowledge and concern in environmental matters.

Canada cannot expect universal congratulations for pursuing policies of these sorts, however enlightened they may appear to liberal elements within this country. Population pressures elsewhere in the world and escalating U.S. demands for energy and minerals will undoubtedly cause Canada to be described from abroad as a selfish and self-indulgent country more concerned with protecting the high standard of living of its own citizens than of sharing its space and resources with the needy of the world. The needy in these circumstances will be portrayed variously as the crowded millions of South Asia, the fish-eating citizens of Japan and the air-conditioned apartment-dwellers of New York City. It will not be easy to counter these claims. Ironically, however, the easiest to answer may well be those of the developing countries. The Trudeau administration has reduced government spending since 1968 in every major sector but two—foreign aid and programs to overcome regional economic disparities within Canada. Foreign aid expenditures have increased regularly both in dollar value and as a percentage of GNP. Canada was the first GATT member to implement completely the Kennedy Round, offering new market opportunities to the third world. In addition, a unique center for international development research has been founded, supported by Canadian funds but guided by an international board of directors under the chairmanship of Lester B. Pearson.

But increasingly, Canadians will be called upon to justify to their neighbors to the south why they are not willing to export energy and other natural resources indefinitely even in return for the high prices that Canadian resources attract in U.S. markets; why in this respect and in others we adhere to a value system which has never been identical with that of Americans.

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It would be misleading to suggest that the Canadian public is so zealous in its devotion to its values that it would suffer any degree of economic hardship rather than make some compromise. After all, compromise is an element of the moderation which we believe we exercise. One must therefore inquire into the sturdiness of these beliefs. Is there, or is there not, a point at which Canadians will decide in favor of the increase in disposable income which would follow from some degree of economic integration with the United States?

Questions of this sort have been in the air since, and indeed before, Confederation. They have been influenced, of course, by repugnance to "Manifest Destiny" which has changed its form over the years but has never really disappeared. There is little likelihood of a revival of such patent evidence as was found in Article IV of the 1781 U.S. Articles of Confederation, permitting Canada to accede to the American Union and to become entitled to all its advantages; of "54-40 or fight;" or of the bill introduced in Congress in 1866 designed to facilitate the entry into the United States of the Canadian provinces and the Western territories. Nevertheless, there is evidence which takes other forms, sometimes unintentional but none the less worrisome.

The issues of free trade vs. tariffs, and reciprocity (with the United States) vs. protectionism, were the very stuff of Canadian election campaigns earlier in this century. The victor over the years was always Canadian independence, a preference for parliamentary institutions rather than republicanism, a belief in the superiority of the legal and political system which guaranteed the life style of both the English-speaking and French-speaking communities, and a recognition that a trading state such as Canada could not survive either in a world of protectionism or in the economic embrace of the United States. No one doubted the illogic of the economic cost of an independent Canada or of the problems posed by the vastness of the northern half of the continent; no one questioned the economic advantages which would accrue from a north-south linkage. Notwithstanding, Canadians chose Canada. A federal election in 1911 was fought on the issue of continentalism, and the government of the day, which advocated such a trend, was defeated. Prior to World War I, the source of most investment capital was the United Kingdom; the British preferential tariff still held many advantages for Canada; the challenges and opportunities of the frontier re-

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mained a stimulating and satisfying feature of Canadian life; mass communications facilities were in their infancy. As a result, few Canadians possessed either the stimulus or the facility to relate to other than their immediate surroundings or their largely European origins. Continentalism was not so attractive a concept as it appears today.

The reason, of course, is that during the decades since 1911 many of the above factors have changed. Today the siren song of material benefit floods across the border by television, radio, film and magazine. While Canadians are not likely any more devoted now than in 1911 to the improvement of their economic well-being, their world has moved from an agricultural and primitive industrial base to one of technology and mass production. Immense capital and reliable markets are the mainstays of the system. For these, Canada has long turned to the United States. The dollar value of our trade in 1970—almost $21 billion—illustrates the new intimacy. So does the extent of U.S. investment in Canada: an estimated $35 billion, about 30 percent of all U.S. foreign investment everywhere in the world. Diversification of trading partners and gradual repurchase of foreign investment could overcome some of this interdependency but would not reduce it substantially for many years. That being the case, Canadians will remain subject for some time to the vagaries of the United States economy. American inflation becomes our inflation, diminishment of U.S. capital outflows means a decrease in our growth rate, U.S. protectionism means Canadian unemployment. The dependency can be eliminated quickly enough, as the militant Canadian nationalists assert repeatedly, but at an immense cost to Canadians as individuals and to Canada in its relations with the United States.

Given that neither country wants such a schism, it can be argued that it is in the interest of each not to hurt the other either consciously or by indifference. When the vulnerability is almost totally on one side, there must be a proportionately higher degree of awareness on the other.

This awareness seemed to be missing last August. Canada was caught in a situation not of its own making and in consequence, thousands of Canadians have suffered grievously. This has done nothing to enhance the image of the United States in Canada; America's claims to greatness and to moral leadership are being challenged broadly for perhaps the first time in a century in the

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editorial pages of Canadian newspapers. One of the consequences has been a fresh questioning within Canada of the fundamental relationship of the two countries. That this should be so is cause for concern. The Prime Minister put it this way in reply to a newsman's question:

> When the Americans look at what they're doing they say: "Well you know, we're doing this to the Japanese and we're doing this to the Europeans," but they don't seem to realize what they are doing to Canadians. If they do realize what they are doing and if it becomes apparent that they just want us to be sellers of natural resources to them and buyers of their manufactured products—all these if's—we will have to reassess fundamentally our relations with them, trading, political and otherwise.

III

Canadians and successive Canadian governments have long assumed that the extensive economic relations of the United States and Canada were different from those between other countries, were "special." This view seems to have been shared in the past by U.S. governments in the formulation of policy. The integrated power grids, the oil and gas pipelines, the rationalization of much of the continent's automobile production, the massive investment flow (measured in total volume, American investment in Canada is far, far larger than the reverse; measured on a per capita basis Canadian investment in the United States is higher), the sheer size of our trade—all these are evidence that the relationship is intricately locked together. Yet none of this evidence weighed heavily enough at Camp David in August to dissuade President Nixon from applying universally his ten percent import surcharge. More bewildering even than the surcharge was the impression gained in Canada that the U.S. government was not aware of the facts of the economic relationship between the two countries. This episode seemed to be evidence of those spasmodic blind spots. Or is it Canada that is the impressionist? Consider the evidence.

Canada is far and away the most important world market for U.S. goods. Our purchases from the United States have for many years approached in value *the total of the purchases of America's four next largest trading partners*—Japan, Germany, Britain and France. U.S. sales to Canada exceed in value the total of U.S. sales to Japan and the Common Market combined, and to all of Latin America. There can be no dispute about this; the statistics are available in both our countries and from international

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sources. Yet President Nixon stated in a press conference in Washington on September 16, 1971:

> This is a time for our friends around the world—and they are all competitors—to build a new system with which we can live so that we don't have another crisis in a year. With regard to the Japanese incidentally, I think I can best summarize our dilemma in this way: after the Japanese were here I found that, both from the information they gave and the information we had ourselves, that Japan is our biggest customer in the world.

Apart from the fact that the value of U.S.-Canadian trade exceeded the value of U.S.-Japanese trade in 1970 by some $10 billion, what of the more important question? Has Canada contributed to America's undoubted trading difficulties? The Canadian government has answered emphatically "no." Between the turn of the century and 1968, there were only three years (1936, 1944 and 1945) when the United States did not enjoy a favorable balance-of-payments position in its merchandise trade with Canada. Canada has no discriminatory tariff or non-tariff barriers aimed at U.S. goods. Canada's dollar has been floating freely since June 1970 and cannot be suggested to have an artificial value compared with the U.S. dollar.

These last two points are important because the two factors which the U.S. government said had forced it to act were the artificial currency valuation and unfair trading practices of some countries. But not of Canada. Our sin, apparently, has been to sell more to the United States than we have bought in the past couple of years. Canadians have been given the impression that the U.S. government regards a bilateral merchandise surplus in favor of the United States as normal and proper but if that surplus turns into a deficit, partly because of an imbalance in purchases under the Canada-U.S. Defence Production Sharing Agreement—and this because America is at war in Vietnam—then Canada must be at fault somehow and draconian measures are justified, to the extent of driving up Canadian unemployment.

For that is the result in Canada of the American surcharge. One does not require a degree in economics to realize that unemployed Canadians are not likely to be able to buy many imported products—even products manufactured in the United States. Nor will American investment in Canada offer a healthy return should our economy become depressed.

For Canadians, the issue has moved from annoyance toward bitterness with the information that Canada's long-standing total

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current account deficit with the United States increased considerably during the first six months of the past year. Notwithstanding the merchandise surplus in 1970, our nonmerchandise deficit was so large that our total current account deficit in favor of the United States was $214 million. This U.S. current favorable balance skyrocketed to $273 million in the period January 1–June 30, 1971. (There is a net U.S. *capital* inflow into Canada, but this has nothing to do with current trading problems.) Canada, the source of much of America's foreign-exchange earnings, is bearing the unintended brunt of U.S. policies to increase those earnings. This contradiction seems not to be noticed in Washington.

In years gone by this continuing net benefit to the American economy from its intimate commercial relationship with Canada has been acknowledged. On the assumption that the basic awareness remained unchanged, the Canadian government responded promptly but in low key to the August economic policy announcement: a request of the U.S. government that the import surcharge not apply to goods of Canadian origin because Canada was not guilty of either of the two practices recited by President Nixon as being detrimental, and because the surcharge would be injurious to *both* countries; a statement of support for the restructuring of the international monetary system; total sympathy and understanding for the desire of the U.S. government to base its economy on a better footing. Canada has not disputed the propriety of America's acting initially in a nondiscriminatory fashion against all countries. No special favors have been sought. The argument advanced, simply, is that those countries (and there are many) that have demonstrated their innocence in the key areas be granted exemption immediately, and not be used as involuntary hostages in order to bring additional pressure on the recalcitrant minority.

There was little popular outcry in Canada for retaliatory measures, as, for example, placing a very heavy export duty on natural gas and oil exports. Indeed, only one Canadian political party, the New Democrats, urged any action approaching retaliation. The government did act to assist these Canadian companies which faced severe business disruption and the consequent layoff of thousands of employees. Nevertheless, the American attitude has not been sympathetic. The Canadian request for exemption from the surcharge has been rejected; Washington's

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reaction to the employment support legislation has taken the form of a warning that countervailing duties might apply if this legislation proves "injurious" to the United States.

The prevalent Canadian attitude thus far remains one more of sadness than of anger. The question Canadians face, however, is whether they can afford to remain so vulnerable. Some are even asking whether they can survive. After all, Canadian 1970 sales to the United States of $10.99 billion represented 13 percent of our GNP whereas American sales to Canada of $9.91 billion that same year represented only .97 percent of the American GNP.

The elephant simile is an appropriate one, but it should not be exaggerated. In a speech of welcome to Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin in Ottawa in October 1971, Mr. Trudeau said: "True friendship, when once attained, and if soundly based, is strong enough to endure temporary differences, and to emerge stronger for having been tested. Canada's long relationship with its oldest friends is proof to us that however uncertain may be the consequences from time to time of short-term events, the long run consists of a climate of understanding and coöperation."

IV

Notwithstanding that the bulk of this essay is directed to Canadian-American relations, not all of Canada's energies, of course, are devoted to living with its giant and sometimes unpredictable neighbor. The new directions of Canadian foreign policy are the result of new needs and of new demands upon us from a variety of sources. These changes in direction and emphasis will not always parallel the policies of the United States, but there is no reason to suppose that divergence is synonymous with disagreement or conflict. Both countries desire a peaceful world, and Canada recognizes its obligation to contribute toward that end. Present Canadian defense policy was articulated in 1969 as meeting four priorities: (1) the defense of Canada; (2) the defense of North America (through NORAD); (3) NATO obligations; (4) U.N. peacekeeping.

We are a three-ocean country; measured in terms of population, we rank seventh of the 15 NATO allies. It is unrealistic to assume that Canada can or should perform a defense role oriented solely to Europe, or on the same scale as the larger powers. It is equally unrealistic, however, to assume that Canada

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is unreliable or reluctant to assume its responsibilities. Canadian forces served with distinction in both world wars and in Korea; Canada has participated in every single U.N. peacekeeping and peace observation mission as well as being a member of each of the three International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Indochina. Canadian Armed Forces are now serving abroad with the U.N. Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus, the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization (Middle East), the U.N. Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, the Control Commissions in Vietnam and Laos, as well as in NATO Europe. A specially trained and equipped battalion group remains constantly on a stand-by basis in Canada, ready to fly instantly to any part of the world in response to a request for Canadian participation in international peacekeeping.

We have absorbed much of our costs in these undertakings rather than pass them on to the United Nations. We have willingly paid all our U.N. special and general assessments. Indeed the thought of resisting payment as a means of expressing distaste for U.N. policies or as a political lever would be so repugnant to most Canadians as to be preposterous even to consider.

Geography has placed Canada between the two superpowers and thus beneath the main routes of intercontinental nuclear missiles, whether they be rocket or bomber-borne. Canada's southern neighbor has been a traditional friend; it is in Canada's interest that her northern neighbor, notwithstanding its different economic, political and social systems, be friendly as well. A nation of 22 million people cannot be regarded as a threat by either the United States or the Soviet Union. That fact places upon Canada a responsibility to search for areas of common interest with each. Those areas are well identified in one direction, but require considerable probing and examination in the other. That process is now underway. Immense tracts of Arctic and sub-Arctic territory, giving rise to special transportation, communication and developmental problems offer to Canada and the Soviet Union a community of interest which each is anxious to explore. Hopefully, other links will in due course also develop and contribute to a climate of confidence extending from the Hindu Kush up over the Pole and down to the Gulf of Mexico.

We are a geographic interface between two nuclear adversaries; this has contributed to the innate Canadian abhorrence of war and to our active pursuit of internationally agreed disarma-

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ment and arms-control measures. Canada has been a member of every international body charged with these subjects since 1945. It earned this assignment because of the nuclear capability it gained during World War II as part of the American-British-Canadian coöperative development of the atomic bomb. The Government has declared to parliament that it regards disarmament and arms control as one of the most important aspects of Canadian foreign policy. Our goal differs not at all from the American goal; our approach, and our timing, however, often vary considerably. This is so partly because of our geographic location, partly because we regard large-power reluctance to act more promptly as a symptom of size, and partly because we are not ashamed to admit that we are frightened by the possibility of accidental war and disgusted by the advocates of overkill.

In what other ways does Canadian foreign policy depart from American? One of the most obvious arises from our position as a founding member of the Commonwealth of Nations. This gives Canada a direct, informal link with 755 million people from every continent and several of the oceans who comprise the 31-country association. The character of the Commonwealth has changed immeasurably in the past 25 years. That association plus the much newer 22-member "Agence de Coopération culturelle et technique des pays francophones," of which Canada is also a member, contribute dimensions distinct from American policy and with a focus quite unlike that of the United Nations and its several specialized agencies. Interestingly, the Secretary General of each of these international associations—the Commonwealth and La Francophonie—is a Canadian.

It is Canada's historic and linguistic separation from the United States which has given it the opportunity to cultivate these links. And they are taken seriously. Of the 12 countries which Prime Minister Trudeau has visited officially since 1968, eight have been Commonwealth members (the others: the United States, Japan, Indonesia, and the Soviet Union—plus a brief call at the Vatican). The existence of these relationships, plus our parliamentary traditions, go far to explain why Canada has never emphasized its hemispheric location.

Finally, if there is a single aspect of Canadian foreign policy that attracts greater public support than any other, it is that part which is devoted to economic assistance to developing countries.

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Indeed the bulk of public criticism of our aid programs asserts that it is not growing fast enough.

V

How to sum up any analysis of present Canadian foreign policy? Emphasize, perhaps, the absence of pretentiousness. Canada is not number one; it has little inclination toward chauvinism. It is not without pride, however, and it is not easily discouraged. One may hope that it may even have buried forever self-delusion. Certainly it pays more heed to common sense than to theory or theorists. All this has been better said by two Canadians, one a Prime Minister in 1969, the other a humorist in 1853. Each deserves a place in concluding this article.

Pierre Elliott Trudeau told a distinguished American audience in Washington: "We Canadians do not have an exaggerated view of our importance. We prefer to think that our place in the world is such that we can occasionally experiment with good ideas without risking a complete upset of the whole international order. We are as pleased as is any country when our views are sought or our assistance requested. But we may be excused, I hope, if we fail to take too seriously the suggestion of some of our friends from time to time that our acts—or our failure to act—this or that way, will have profound international consequences or will lead to widescale undesirable results."

The humorist was a Maritimer named T. C. Haliburton and he wrote on occasion about Canadian-American relations. His judgment is as sound today as it was a century and a quarter ago: "It is authors of silly books, editors of silly papers, and demagogues of silly parties that keep us apart."

Should any reader question the propriety of giving the last word on foreign policy to a social satirist rather than to a Prime Minister, he should be cautioned that Canadians would not regard such as inappropriate. That, perhaps, says something for the soundness both of Canadians and of their attitude toward the world.

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THE OTHER SOUTH VIETNAM: TOWARD THE BREAKING POINT

By Jean-Claude Pomonti

THE situation in South Vietnam grew perceptibly more fluid in 1971. With the continuing withdrawal of U.S. forces, the reverses suffered by the South Vietnamese troops in southern Laos in the spring and the political crisis of the autumn, the Saigon régime weakened and "Vietnamization" was dealt a hard blow. The structure which had stood for three years buttressed by American military power revealed its fragility at the very moment when public opinion in Vietnam and in the United States was showing ever-increasing war-weariness. As the American grip gradually loosened, unrest spread in a society overwhelmed by the disorder of the times, for which war had become a way of life. Even before the American military engagement was definitely coming to its end, the rhythm of public life had begun to change. It was as if South Vietnam were preparing to search—with much effort and difficulty, to be sure—for a new balance.

II

The institutions established in 1967 confronted their first real test in the presidential election of October 1971—a test which they did not pass with any noticeable success. The Constitution was flouted by the adoption of a bill designed to set aside the candidacy of Vice President Ky, who since the beginning of 1971 had acted as a catalyst in the political arena. When General Duong Van Minh withdrew from the contest, however, a fresh manipulation of the law by the Supreme Court was unable to revive Ky's candidacy. At this point, President Thieu preferred—with resigned American acquiescence—to maintain his now unique candidacy for the presidency; thus he was perfectly prepared to offend a majority of the voters, beginning with the Catholics. Perhaps the régime would have fared no better in a genuinely contested election. In any case, the imposing percentage (94.3 percent of the votes cast) to which Thieu treated himself strengthened neither his position nor the credit of a Constitution which the population had hardly been allowed to take

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seriously. The question, in fact, was not whether or not the South was ready for democracy, but whether political life could make itself felt within the framework of institutions imposed on the generals, nearly five years earlier, by their American protectors.

Once his two adversaries were no longer running for office, President Thieu displayed more concern for the maintenance of order than for the democratic façade of his régime. In September, and indeed up to the day of the balloting, the larger towns witnessed a deployment of police forces which bore no relation to the size of the anti-government and anti-American demonstrations which had begun to occur. The capital had been divided into sectors by a disposition of security forces which easily dispersed the sporadic manifestations organized by students and disabled veterans. More serious incidents took place elsewhere —particularly at Danang on election day—but on the whole, the police maintained their control of the situation without difficulty.

In fact, faced with the arrogance of power, the politicized groups proved indecisive, as if the possibility of challenge had not occurred to them. The Catholic establishment, with its considerable influence, was concerned, above all, to disassociate itself from the candidacy of President Thieu. The Church, with some three million communicants—one of every seven inhabitants of the South—feared that it would be suspected a second time of complicity in an unpopular experiment, as had been the case in 1963 with Ngo Dinh Diem. Originally, the Church had wanted Thieu's reëlection, but only as a result of a genuine contest.

In June, before the promulgation of the electoral law which was to result in the elimination of General Ky, one of the most respected Catholic politicians informed the head of state that the enactment of this law would be disastrous. In August, at the conclusion of the congress of prelates, Monseigneur Pham Ngoc Chi explained to one of the President's advisers that a narrow victory over his two principal rivals would be preferable to a victory with no opponents. However, when the Catholic hierarchy realized that these efforts were pointless, the Archbishop of Saigon invited the faithful to "act according to their conscience" on election day in October. The Church, more divided but less vulnerable than eight years earlier, called for neither participation nor abstention.

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The attitude of the Buddhists—particularly those of the An-Quang pagoda—was from the outset one of greater mistrust. After all, the régime in Saigon had only been able to establish itself after the successful repression of the insurrection incited by the bonzes at Hué and at Danang in 1966. The Buddhists, who are generally supposed to number some one million persons, returned to the public arena in the partial senatorial election of 1970 (their list, headed by Vu Van Mau, led the election), and in the election to the House of Representatives of August 1971. With some 25 to 30 sympathizers sitting in the new assembly they control over a sixth of the votes in the legislature. They even seemed ready to support the presidential candidacy of General Minh.

That they congratulated themselves for his withdrawal, and later invited the voters to boycott the presidential ballot, without calling on them for any public demonstration, underlines the marginal role they played at that time. Their following was strong only in the northern provinces of the South. Their miscalculations from 1963 to 1966 seemed to suggest they were afraid of pulling the chestnuts from the fire for someone else, specifically for the Catholics. Finally, their politico-religious apparatus was only slowly rebuilding, and they still felt too feeble to confront a well-established régime which this time was enjoying the benefits of American support.

General Minh withdrew from the presidential contest to avoid "window-dressing," lending his presence to an exercise he characterized as an "odious farce" organized by President Thieu's "giant machine." General Ky acted much as General Minh had, advancing almost identical arguments. But once these positions were established, the two men found themselves somewhat beyond their depth. "Big Minh" is no politician; he had acquired his popular credit as president of the military junta which, in 1963, disposed of Diem's dictatorship. Furthermore, he felt paralyzed by the mistrust his personality had aroused in many Catholic circles, and feared that one day he might be accused of fomenting disorder. Vice-President Ky, on the other hand, had assured himself of support among the Catholics and from the Army. President Thieu undoubtedly expected this rival to take a false step. But Ky was wise enough to avoid making any before polling day.

In South Vietnam, when an "élite" refuses to play its assigned

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role—both as a link and as a buffer between the power at the top and the aspirations of the people—public life immediately feels the change. With the beginning of the government crisis in August 1971, the Saigonese public—almost unanimous in its condemnation of President Thieu—none the less proved that it had "no common denominator." This reality had been perceptible much earlier, but final recognition of it came as rather a shock to public opinion even though it had been aware, since the unfortunate Laotian expedition, that the system was showing signs of exhaustion. In Vietnam, public consciousness is ready to let a great deal go unchallenged, but it also possesses a very acute awareness of even the slightest change. It is no accident that since last September, President Thieu has adopted a sharply defensive tone, as if he were trying to justify political manœuvres or a military undertaking.

III

When one considers the decade of American military intervention in Vietnam, 1969 and 1970 stand out as its two most successful years. In 1968, having repulsed the Vietcong attacks on cities and towns during the first six months of that year, the Americans and South Vietnamese continued their push. Prepared to risk considerable destruction, they managed to reëstablish their control over the productive countryside. From that time it became possible to install an administration, to strengthen the South Vietnamese army, to begin the first withdrawals of American troops, and, somewhat later, in the spring of 1970, to mount an expedition against the North Vietnamese and Vietcong "sanctuaries" in eastern Cambodia. Despite its flaws—particularly in the economic and social spheres—the system at that time seemed to be moving along under its own impetus.

In 1971, the picture was somewhat modified. Operation Lam-Son 719 in southern Laos and the simultaneous expedition into northeastern Cambodia had undoubtedly forced the Indochinese revolutionaries to defend their lines of communications and "sanctuaries" in the heart of the peninsula as a matter of priority. They were forced to pay a high price for this. But on the South Vietnamese side, these large-scale operations beyond the frontiers undoubtedly dealt a blow to the morale of the army. Saigon had lent its general reserves to the Laotian operation

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(paratroops, marines and rangers) as well as its first infantry division and several additional units. All of these were seriously hurt on the Ho Chi Minh trail. Before the end of the rainy season, elements of five other divisions had been engaged in heavy fighting on the Highlands in the regions of Snoul and Krek in Cambodia, and on the edge of the forest of U-Minh in the extreme south of Vietnam. In other words, ten large units, four of them élite units, suffered relatively heavy losses within a period of nine months.

The decline of morale was not reflected in a sudden increase in the desertion rate, or in gestures of revolt, but rather in growing demoralization of the spirit. For example, the paratroop division, several of whose battalions were broken up in Laos, has since regained its strength, both in men and equipment. But some of its officers feel that if they had to leave Saigon and the third military region today to fight in the area of Khesanh a high percentage of troops would melt away.

Last August, a regiment of the ninth light infantry division stationed in the Delta, between two branches of the Mekong, was scheduled to be sent as reinforcements to the demilitarized zone. This prospect was so badly received that the General Staff gave it up. Many soldiers who had settled their families in this relatively calm sector and had, in many cases, set up small businesses near the military camps, would have gone into hiding for the necessary period of time rather than to be flown to the North, which was thought of as hell.

After the marines too had suffered losses on the Ho Chi Minh trail, they were not allowed to recuperate in Saigon, undoubtedly because this division was commanded by an ally of Marshal Ky. In fact, these marines were used repeatedly in operations near the demilitarized zone. If one can believe South Vietnamese sources, their actual strength was reduced by one-half in October, and their morale was certainly not very high.

For the most part, guarding the frontiers became the responsibility of the South Vietnamese army. In many areas there was a noticeable slackening of effort. Night patrols were abandoned and soldiers increasingly avoided contact with the enemy. As the enemy took pains to remain hidden, information about their movements became even less precise than before. Far from American eyes, junior officers displayed less dynamism and fell more easily into routine performance. As for the leadership

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of the army, it was certainly not improved by political promotions.

The military cliques which had fought each other for power for nearly four years (1964–1967) seemed no closer to self-reform. But divisions were now commanded for the most part by colonels or anonymous acting generals who felt somewhat left to themselves by the political powers. With neither the faults nor the positive qualities of their better-known predecessors, they tended, for better or worse, to stick to well-worn paths. This became clear during the dry season of 1970–71, when the army, repeating an earlier error, began resettling the Montagnard population of the Central Highlands against the counsel of their American advisers. The operation was halted before it was finished, but the harm was already done.

If the incursion into the Ho Chi Minh trail resulted in the loss of precious time for the insurgents, the blow to the South Vietnamese army's head seemed to shake its entire body. Since then, regular South Vietnamese units have found themselves fighting hard in widely spaced but murderous attacks by small communist commando units operating under cover of a mortar or rocket barrage. The avowed objective of the insurgents is to damage the morale of the best units, attacking them when the occasion presents itself.

Through attacks of sappers and by using long-range fire, the Vietcong kept to their tactics of conserving their forces. But if, on the military plane, they were still far from having regained the upper hand, 1971 had brought them advances which would be valuable in the future. From Saigon's viewpoint, the most optimistic assessment is that the Americans will probably repatriate in 1972 at least half of their fighter planes, helicopters and heavy artillery. And, in the event of a heavy blow, these are precisely the elements which make a difference, *i.e.* by assuring the mobility and security of the Saigon forces, as was seen in October during the battle of Krek. Increasingly deprived of these assets—even if Washington decides to maintain a residual force in the South—Saigon could be forced to abandon not only northeast Cambodia, which was done in 1971, but equally a large part of the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. The war has become for Saigon what it has long been for the Vietcong, a matter of priority within an increasingly limited choice of investments. When will Saigon abandon large-scale operations in the mountains or in uninhabited areas?

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IV

The situation in the inhabited countryside will no doubt remain ambiguous. Official "pacification" statistics probably never reflected the reality of daily life, whether in the flooded rice-paddies of the Mekong Delta or in the small enclosed valleys of the central Vietnamese Highlands. However, after the heavy fighting of 1968, life in those areas was reorganized around a military administration which was not always competent but which at least had the advantage of a presence and its own methods of coercion. Notably in the Mekong Delta, the peasants have gradually grown accustomed—in a universe of barbed wire replacing the bamboo stakes of former times—to sending their children to the self-defense militia, sometimes planting Philippine "miracle rice," negotiating with the village chief, who was more often than not "elected," and paying somewhat less heed than they had done before to Vietcong tax collectors and American air raids.

The Vietcong, however, have never been reduced to wandering bands continuously harried by the forces of order. And they have since proved that "pacification" remains, at least in certain sectors, a fragile experience. On March 28, for example, they suddenly struck Cang-Long, one of the principal towns in the relatively tranquil Delta province of Vinh-Binh. This lightning night attack resulted in 74 dead and hundreds wounded among the military, the police, civil servants and their families. The 300 men of the Ninth South Vietnamese Division, who usually contributed to the protection of Cang-Long, were at that moment in Cambodia. A few other attacks have been launched since then, illustrating equally the permanence and the limitations of the Vietcong in populated regions.

The most equivocal situation is still that of the first military region, which has been most affected by the war. If the régime has been able to impose its military administration, reopen the principal roads and even the railway (Hué-Danang) and start a certain amount of cultivation once again in the countryside, this has all happened in the shelter of the powerful American military shield. It is in fact in the five northernmost provinces of South Vietnam that the United States has made its major war effort.

But this support has not been enough for the political power to take root even in the larger towns. Last September, in Danang

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as in Hué, the pagodas once again became central rallying points. Whatever their sentiments toward communism may be, the general population of these towns seems to have remained mistrustful of Saigon and hostile toward the Americans. These two large urban centers, like other towns on the coast—particularly Qui-Nhon—are forbidden to U.S. personnel because the smallest incident could set off an explosion of hatred. With the withdrawal of the last U.S. combat troops, probably before next summer, the urban centers will once again begin to withdraw into themselves, as the Vietcong slowly reëstablishes itself in the coastal plains of central Vietnam, especially the plain of Binh-Dinh.

The fragility of some of the programs launched by Saigon three years ago can be illustrated by the recent evolution of an experiment of considerable importance—the people's self-defense force. Those who have contributed most are supposed to enjoy military deferment once they reach the draft age of 18. The idea is not to keep persons too young or too old to stand guard alone at night in their villages and incorporated into the militia. These men can enjoy the advantages of continuing their work and remaining with their families, without running the risks attendant on serving in the regular army.

But, in certain locations, reality has diverged considerably from theory, with officers selling deferments to militia men. If members of the militia do not have the means to buy these deferments—which is often the case—they must then join the army or the regional forces. Sometimes, particularly in the Mekong Delta, some of these militia men prefer to join the Vietcong—a solution which seems to them to have a triple advantage: the risks are lower (free-fire zones have practically disappeared), they do not have to go so far from their homes and families, and they retain the possibility of revenge on the officials who abused their powers.

In the urban centers, the people's self-defense forces have never been very popular. Parents dislike seeing their children escape from their control for part of the night to play at soldier with real guns and undoubtedly to be exposed to pernicious influences. These young militia also receive a poor press. Rather than see this arrangement as a flexible form of civilian participation in an armed struggle, the general population is inclined to view it as an additional source of disorder and of government interference with family life.

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The only militia properly organized are those with a religious base, in sections of the country which are predominantly Catholic, Buddhist, Cao-daist or Hoa-Hao. But the government would probably be wrong to see a guarantee for the future in the size of the enrollment in these areas. In these particular cases, in periods of crisis, religious adherence counts for more than submission to the central power.

As time goes on, the administration of the provinces is being turned over to officials produced by the Vung-Tau School of Rural Development, and by the National Institute of Administration (INA) in Saigon. These men were placed under the command of higher officers personally chosen by President Thieu, with more regard for their political allegiance than to their competence. According to its own officials, the School of Rural Development has not reached the level set when it was founded. As for the INA, it is run by former members of the Dai-Viet (the party of Greater Vietnam), which has since formed a "progressive party," the Cap-Tien, and which holds rather rigid views on public life. Also, however well these government programs may have been conceived, the mediocrity of their administration has often slowed down their execution or distorted their aims. As the American advisers play a decreasingly prominent role, accommodation with the Vietcong has become more frequent than it was two years ago.

For example, last August, during the campaign for the legislative elections, the chief of one of the provinces in the Mekong Delta let his subordinates know that he was more interested in defeating the opposition candidates than in the methods they might employ to assure the security and calm of their respective districts. The opposition candidates were effectively trounced. Another type of accommodation with the enemy seems to be taking shape in the marginal provinces, where economic progress is in singular contrast to the absence of security, at least for the Americans. Observers agree that this phenomenon has become more and more frequent. As a sector reconstructs itself and commerce develops once again, the risk for the Americans of moving about unprotected grows accordingly, even along the principal highways. And this is true even in provinces where refugees from the North, most often Catholics, make up a large part of the population.

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V

The Vietcong and the North Vietnamese certainly understood very well the benefits they might reap from this evolution when they invited their adherents to fill the void left by the withdrawal of U.S. troops, to reinforce local guerrillas, to recruit deserters, to reconstruct the political infrastructure and to increase the number of "legal cadres," *i.e.* those who had infiltrated the ranks of the Saigon administration and army.

The communists estimate that since 1968 the U.S. military intervention in Indochina has been passing from the phase of "regional warfare" to that of "expanded special warfare": the withdrawal of American troops has begun, the air raids on the North are now only occasional, and the South Vietnamese Army has undertaken incursions into Cambodia and Laos under U.S. aerial protection and with U.S. logistical support. In their eyes, the struggle is far from over but is gradually changing its character, and their own strategy must reflect this change. It is the art of guerrilla warfare, which has been a Vietnamese tradition for several centuries and which draws its strength from its flexibility, which has allowed them to survive, ready to abandon a schema of classic revolutionary warfare, to disperse their large units for better protection, and to plan others which are smaller and have precise tasks—in short, to conceive of ways to counter this "expanded special warfare" which, in default of a Dien Bien Phu, Washington is imposing on them.

The time for conventional warfare is perhaps over now. Increasingly deprived of their American "motor," the South Vietnamese army will have fewer and fewer means for mounting large operations against "sanctuaries" and enemy infiltration routes. On the other hand, in so far as U.S. air power will intervene, the Indochinese revolutionaries will be forced to select their objectives with great care. They will probably turn once again to their commando units of gunners and sappers. And they will place greater emphasis on "exacerbating the internal contradictions of the Saigon administration," that is to say, on the political, economic and social aspects of their struggle.

Since 1970, they have been more and more openly sanctioning the action of anti-government movements in towns, and certain broadcasts of Radio Liberation, their clandestine station, are reminiscent of aspects of the Saigon press. In December 1970,

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the Prime Minister of North Vietnam, Pham Van Dong, had outlined an analysis of the struggle, which he considered a parallel struggle, led by the Vietcong on the one hand and certain non-communist urban pressure groups on the other "Everyone is fighting," he stated, "according to the slogans which are essentially those of the provisional government. It is no accident if we coincide."

In this spirit, and if the isolation of President Thieu continues, soon we may well be hearing again of an organization like the Lien Minh, the alliance of national, democratic forces for peace, created by a handful of intellectuals originating for the most part in Hué and Saigon, who joined the insurgents during the Tet offensive of 1968, and who have had their representatives inside the provisional government since its formation in June 1969. In a phase of military withdrawal, the Lien Minh could act only as a supplementary instrument of the National Liberation Front (NLF). But in a period of confusion or of repression, it could become what it should have been at its inception: an organ of communication between the insurgents and the urban intelligentsia. In this capacity it could advance a dialogue between the Vietcong and part of the Saigon political community. Some contacts have already taken place; but it is hard to judge their importance.

In any case, the summons launched by Nguyen Huu Tho on the eve on the presidential election of October 3 indicates that some thought had been given to moving in this direction. The President of the N.L.F. called for the "immediate" formation of a "unified anti-imperialist and anti-Thieu front." Even if this still seems premature, the division among the Saigon political types opposing Thieu could, if they persist, contribute to the growth of the present political void. Such a situation would, no doubt, incite the most radical factions of certain movements (including the Buddhists and the Catholics) to seek future guarantees—no longer from the retiring Americans, but from the Vietcong, who have certainly been weakened but who remain.

In any predictions concerning postwar life—and the fighting is far from over—economic factors will play a determinant role. During the first six months of 1972, the American presence will change not only its dimensions but also its character. The presence of such a weight, superimposed on an essentially agricultural economy, has fatally produced an economy controlled by the

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Americans and condemned to failure should U.S. support be suddenly withdrawn. After six years of heavy fighting and extensive destruction, a series of urban ghettos have sprung up. They now contain at least half the population, whereas in 1960 the country was still 85 percent rural. By 1968–69, the U.S. expeditionary force resembled a trunk whose sap was feeding millions of parasites, for the most part refugees. The sap is now circulating less and less freely, the trunk is drying out, and the parasites are threatened with the necessity of going to seek nourishment elsewhere.

The state, whose budget is more than half covered by American aid, finds itself burdened with an imposing load. In a country of less than 18 million inhabitants it has to pay a million military salaries, and 200,000 salaries to civil servants. The Veterans' Ministry—whose expenses this year are second after defense—administered 700,000 pensions in the autumn of 1971 to incapacitated veterans, war widows and orphans, and relatives of soldiers killed in combat. During the current fiscal year (1971–72), the national budget in principle should not exceed 300 billion piastres. In fact, once the necessary adjustments have been made, it will probably exceed 350 billion.

Without adequate means (taxes produce very little; exports are insignificant; and with the repatriation of American soldiers a source of income is drying up) the state has, for several years, been obliged to neglect important sectors such as education and health. There are, however, two gleams on the horizon: in 1971, inflation was less severe than in previous years, and the output of rice increased sufficiently so that within a year or two rice imports can be stopped, if the means of distribution can be somewhat reorganized.

But even the maintenance of a relatively high level of U.S. economic aid, direct as well as indirect, does not constitute a sufficient guarantee for the future. There is the risk that in 1972 inflation will become even more rapid, affecting first those with fixed incomes, soldiers and civil servants, which explains in part the high percentage of desertions and the bad conduct of the army, as well as administrative corruption. The withdrawal of U.S. troops, like the progressive closing of repair yards and other centers of activity stimulated by the American presence, will continue to affect many sources of supplementary income and nourish hidden unemployment. It remains to be seen whether

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or not this will exacerbate political and social tensions and bring society dangerously close to the breaking point.

This accumulation of political, economic and military difficulties could easily confront the country with a threat of anarchy. Premonitions of this abound. Rarely attending school and deprived of the security of their homes, young people in towns often join gangs led by deserters. The police, to a large degree, are recruited from those who have the means to avoid military service. Corruption in the army and in the public services is rampant. Schoolboys speak of going down into the street to "fight the cops" (the most commonly heard expression during the September demonstrations). Pressure groups are multiplying—invalids, unions, various associations—and, with the distribution of hundreds of thousands of firearms, many of which are available on the black market, their actions often approach the edge of banditry. Last October, for example, crippled war veterans with guns in their hands held nine American soldiers hostage following an incident near Danang. Finally, perhaps even more disquieting, certain rumors are becoming uncontrollable. While imposing a quasi-unanimity, the reëlected President is obliged to face up to a triple process of disintegration, demoralization and disaffection.

The Vietnamese do not judge a man by his ideas alone but first of all by the possibilities inherent in his policies. If Generals Ky and Minh cannot free them of President Thieu, one of them asked, why should people entrust their fate to them when confronting the Vietcong? This question applies equally well to the head of state. If his production of last October is a parade in order to prepare for a new act, he will have a chance to preserve some influence. But if it is simply a question of succeeding himself, or of consolidating his power, he will be just one more condemned man with a temporary stay of execution. More precisely, if this last hypothesis is correct he will be a man of the past, and his remaining in power will be regarded as an anachronism which must be removed when the opportunity presents itself.

The South Vietnamese have adapted themselves to the American presence. Some even approved and requested it. But public opinion has never accepted it, and that is what counts. Since the outset, the misunderstanding has been that where the Americans saw commitments on the part of their Vietnamese collaborators

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there were at best loose arrangements. The U.S. presence has always been felt as a mortgage on the national sovereignty rather than its guarantee, whatever any declared intentions might be, and, as was underscored by Paul Mus, history teaches that "no race has been able to resist the thrust of the Vietnamese, any more than any force has been able to exhaust their tenacious grasp of land." In addition, the Vietnamese people by war have traditionally proved themselves to themselves as well as to others. The refusal to give up, like the nonacceptance of a foreign body or a body felt to be foreign, explains why the U.S. intervention could not force the alternative which was its objective, but could only create—to borrow another expression from Paul Mus—a "suspension" which would doubtless last as long as the Americans had the means to refuse to recognize their mistaken game.

The misunderstanding became envenomed with the divergence of political behavior. A Saigonese with a thorough understanding of his countrymen recently remarked, "In the innermost being of every Vietnamese, even the purest, lurks a devious, lying Annamite." But the counterpart to this exists clearly and precisely too. As Ho Chi Minh said, "In Vietnam, even traitors are patriots." When the climate is not favorable to change, when confused popular aspirations lack a guide or a spokesman, or when the existing system has not yet exhausted its vitality, it is the "lying Annamite," a soft, accommodating personage, who carries the day in an atmosphere of apparent passivity. But when a page of history seems to be turning—and the signs of American withdrawal are an everyday reality—the "lying Annamite" withdraws in favor of another Vietnamese who is sharp and intransigent. What one might take for excessive versatility is in fact simply the reflection of this transformation. As an extreme case, it is perhaps in this way that one should explain the transformation of a man like General Ky.

"It is not opportunism," Paul Mus explains, "but rather a different intellectual rhythm." And he added this fundamental interpretation: "The moment a virtue—or we could say system—appears to be exhausted, and one can see that another is about to be substituted, earlier abuses, which had until then seemed tolerable, appear in an entirely new light. Then and only then the moment arrives when, with the help of the new principles, one must try to remedy those abuses. Thus, an attitude of intolerance succeeds extreme patience. Formerly, everything had

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been tolerated; now, nothing is. This is so because, very precisely, former values are no longer relevant."[1]

We are not yet quite at this stage. The "intellectual rhythm" is undoubtedly changing, but the other "system" about to "be substituted," in place of the preceding one cannot yet be clearly distinguished. The populace still prefers a "wait and see" attitude to a directionless activism. However, the apparent calm is no longer the expression of a genuine torpor, but rather of a suppressed anger, an accumulating tension, a growing repression of instinct (the introverted Vietnamese world can maintain a façade for a long time). The public attitude passes into a depressive phase—which is probably the most fitting word to describe the atmosphere prevalent in Saigon during the past September and October. This explains why public life is so subject to outbursts, which mark the end of a cycle and forecast the renewed cohesion of a world which can only be conceived as a whole.

Finally, to complete the picture, one must not forget that in the days of French colonization, "popular expectations were always ready to turn into insurrectionary movements."[2] This seems an equally valid characterization of the public attitude toward the present insurrection.

At the moment, when the U.S. military phase seems to be ending—it is no longer a question of principle but of method—these elements assume more importance. South Vietnam will undoubtedly appear for a time to be ungovernable, to be heading toward a period of fresh political and social turmoil. But this period will have a sense of direction and permanent, well-founded values, particularly the society's desire to cohere, and thus to shed the skin of the "lying Annamite." The social whole will reform with increasing momentum. Already, society is beginning to listen to political poets, tellers of tales, unemployed intellectuals like Trinh Cong Son: people who celebrate "yellow skin" (the Vietnamese), "the motherland" or, more simply, peace. It is as if, when the crisis arrives, the masses need to understand, to seek the real culprit, the cause of the unrest.

The outline of a settlement even seems to be in the cards and generally accepted. In return for their military withdrawal, the United States will obtain from Hanoi the liberation of its prisoners. The government, almost any government claiming

[1] Paul Mus, "Viêt-Nam: Sociologie d'une Guerre," Paris: Seuil, 1952.
[2] *Ibid.*

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"national unity," will succeed President Thieu, and will be charged, in the South, with working out a compromise with the Vietcong. On this basis, President Nixon will be able to continue postponing a negotiated settlement, but it is difficult to see how he will be able to evade that fact indefinitely.

This second Indochina war has not produced any heroes, an observation which applies equally to the Vietnamese and to the Americans. But for the former it was mainly a question of survival. In the South, those who are currently playing leading roles on both sides, are, for the most part, transitional men. The future—in five or ten years—lies with a new generation which is already partially engaged in the political apparatus, but whose members are not yet well known: political commissioners, Vietcong cadres on the intermediate level, bonzes, priests, and young Saigonese politicians and technocrats.

Whether President Thieu clings to power or renounces it, whether he succeeds in negotiating his departure (for example, in return for a ceasefire), or if he is turned out—in short, whether or not he is party to the negotiations—is more a matter of form than of substance. In return, the police and military personnel of Saigon will soon find themselves once again faced with responsibility. If they wish to play the leading role to which they claim to aspire, they must simultaneously channel and express popular sentiment. Such a victory over self is the price for achieving a leading role in the new cycle which will soon begin, and in which the élite will be able to justify its existence. If this does not happen, the current "popular expectation," which is still more or less passive, will turn toward those who will be left after such a failure, *i.e.* the only coherent rallying point: the Vietcong and their fellow travelers.

IV

History, for the South Vietnamese, was not stopped by the intervention of the United States, and is not, therefore, preparing to resume its course. It is simply that the U.S. interference, and hence its failure, suspended the normal tempo. In reaction, the South Vietnamese will probably not explode; rather, a certain form of equilibrium will be established among themselves. Meanwhile, they will suddenly have such need of this Vietnam which is their inheritance, and will feel so frustrated and guilty at not yet repossessing it, that they will take it back in a spirit of

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rage, which could translate itself for a time—but only for a time —into a blaze of anti-Americanism.

As for the time it will take and the new trials that must be endured and the political system that must be conceived—these are important considerations, but are no longer in their eyes vital. One should, perhaps, turn again to Paul Mus. As early as 1952, looking at a Vietnamese household—an old man, his daughter, and his two grandsons—he remarked: "Look at that group, which in itself forms a nest. Look at these people, living at the lowest poverty level, at this old man who, despite his poverty, has the face of an Aesop, and at this little boy, with the face of a prince. . . . Can one say that these people have no sense of their nationality? *That is all they have.* But what have we done for them? And what will we do?"

Who has been to Vietnam and has not felt this strongly, at least once? And how can one fail to add, 20 years later: but what have we done since then to understand and respect them?

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JAPAN'S GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT

By Zbigniew Brzezinski

IT is now customary for both Americans and Japanese to reiterate on every major occasion the overriding importance of the ties binding America and Japan. There is much talk of partnership, of close consultations, of common interests and of friendship. Yet for a close relationship between two major powers—which the American-Japanese relationship undoubtedly is—there are disturbing imbalances in it which portend some difficult years ahead. In essence, politically, and even more psychologically, American-Japanese ties are more important to the Japanese than to the Americans, and this the Japanese sense and resent; economically, the relationship now favors the Japanese, and this the Americans increasingly begrudge. The interaction of the two makes for trouble, unless each side accepts major adjustments.

For many years, America has been both Japan's roof against rain and its window on the world. The present Japanese élite has become accustomed to relating itself to the world via America, and to taking foreign events into account by first calculating their impact on America and on American-Japanese relations. Symptomatic of this was the enormous emphasis placed in the Japanese Foreign Ministry (and also in leading businesses) on training an élite attuned to American ways of doing things. For a diplomat, the pinnacle of his career, after attaining the post of Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, was to be accredited Ambassador to Washington. All this has stood in sharp contrast to the American attitude which, while respecting Japan, has put higher emphasis on European and Soviet matters. Japan, on the American side, has been a matter of concern for Asian specialists, but not for generalists broadly concerned with international affairs (who, typically, were actually European specialists).

The sudden emergence of Japan as an economic power enjoying a massive surplus in trade with the United States, the success of Japanese industry in competing with American products, and the simultaneous difficulties confronting America as it shouldered alone, for better or for worse, the various cold-war legacies, all shook American complacency and have caused Americans to reassess their relations with Japan. As a result, on both

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sides of the Pacific, new attention is now focused on the American-Japanese relationship.

On the American side, highly exaggerated estimates of Japanese economic and military power have provided the backdrop for more specific grievances. The image of a Japanese giant threatening America has been as erroneous as it has been harmful to balanced American-Japanese relations. Americans have simply been insensitive to the weaknesses and fragility of today's Japan.

On the other side of the ocean, a new popular mood toward the United States is gradually emerging within Japan. It is more critical, less inclined to idealize all that is American, somewhat more prone to emphasize the negatives. This is not only a matter of the intellectuals and the students, some of whom have been calling for a more critical Japanese approach in the Japanese studies of America and among whom the self-flagellations of American intellectuals find an eager and receptive audience. It is felt also in the upper echelons of the government-business élite. In part, it is the outcome of Japan's own economic recovery: there is no longer quite the same need to envy and admire America's material attainments. But it is more than that: the change, encouraged by a much more critical attitude toward the United States in the Japanese mass media (which, in turn, reflects predominant attitudes of the intellectual community), is also caused by a rising sense of national pride. Given the international realities of Japan in the last two decades, rising national pride has no alternative but to assert itself in the first instance against the United States.

However, it would be wrong to conclude that the Japanese public is becoming anti-American. What is new is the more critical and more assertive mood, and the possibility of a sudden emotional upsurge in the event of a major crisis in American-Japanese relations. The public mood could then turn strongly against the United States, not because of an enduring and widespread anti-Americanism but because of feelings of betrayal and disappointment—as well as injured pride and some underlying resentment.

These highly complex and volatile feelings could surface particularly quickly if American-Japanese disagreements adversely affected Japan's economic well-being. A recession within Japan would be blamed by many Japanese, right or wrong, on America.

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Given the "metastable" interdependence between Japanese economic and sociopolitical order, an economic squeeze within Japan, especially if produced in part by external, particularly American, pressures, would almost certainly precipitate turmoil both in Japanese political life and in Japanese-American relations. At that stage, Japan might react desperately, either by undertaking a crash program of military development, in total disregard of public reactions at home and abroad, or by adopting a new foreign orientation more openly critical of the United States and more inclined to explore the possibility of Japanese-Chinese diplomatic-economic coöperation.

Of these two possibilities, the latter is more probable. A program of accelerated large-scale rearmament is more likely to be induced by broader international developments, particularly by a combination of continued American disengagement with some critical precipitating event. The consequences of an economic crisis within Japan would be as divisive politically as they would be anti-American internationally. Hence a consensus for a crash program of military development would be more difficult to obtain than agreement on what—in the back of their heads—even many right-wing, as well as left-wing, Japanese desire: some sort of grand accommodation with China.

The issue of China could suddenly divide America and Japan in still another way. The Nixon initiative toward Peking violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the principle of joint consultation, and it is quite likely that in the future it will be more difficult for the two capitals to concert their policies. The Japanese henceforth will feel more justified than they have in the past to follow their own interests in such matters as Taiwan or the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with Peking.

It is, therefore, not unrealistic to conjure up the following scenario: China is in the United Nations and in the Security Council; Japan and China have diplomatic relations; the United States, despite the Nixon initiative, has still only indirect ties with Peking and it is still tied by the security treaty with Taiwan. A military crisis in the Taiwan Strait or in Korea could then have the effect of pitting Japan diplomatically, in the United Nations and elsewhere, against the United States and on the side of China. For the first time since World War II, Japan and the United States would be adversaries.

But such a reversal of alliances (whether because of economics

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or because of China) is the extreme possibility, and it is still unlikely. Enduring Japanese-Chinese collaboration would require more than just a tactical shift in the orientation of the Japanese ruling circles. It would go counter to the broader financial and economic involvements of Japan and to the widespread popular support for continued Japanese-American ties. A fundamental reversal would require the simultaneous conjunction of an emotional and political crisis in relations with the United States with a political upheaval within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) or in the LDP's national position, and an economic crisis within Japan. None the less, it is important to mention it, because both Americans and Japanese should ponder the imponderable, or they may both suddenly find that what is now a specter for each has inadvertently become a reality for both.

II

A progressive deterioration in the American-Japanese relationship could also, eventually, create a crisis. Such a lingering crisis is certainly more probable; indeed, it could be argued that we are already experiencing a crisis involving basically three broad issues: economics, security and status.

The economic issue has already surfaced and both sides are, at least, aware of it. The Japanese business community has finally come to realize that the deliberate U.S. policy favoring the Japanese recovery after World War II cannot be maintained in a setting of greater economic symmetry. This realization has been belated, grudging, and it is still hesitant. To the extent that they can, the Japanese will strive to minimize their concessions; they will wage a rear-guard action on the yen, conceding eventually but only when the world monetary system is on the eve of a broad crisis, and they will liberalize their economy while striving still to exclude some of the more sensitive items (*e.g.* computers). It is unlikely that they will abandon their limitations on foreign ownership.

They will resist and concede for the same reason: Japanese-American trade is more important to Japan than to the United States. On the one hand, this condition makes the Japanese reluctant to abandon their advantageous position because they feel themselves more vulnerable; on the other hand, eventually they will, because they have no option but to do so. But the concessions, slow and grudging, will probably not alter, at least in the

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near future, the basically favorable position that Japan enjoys in U.S.-Japanese trade. Japanese price indices favor exports over domestic consumer prices (giving rise to charges of dumping), and Japan will continue to import primarily raw materials and agricultural products from the United States and export finished, and increasingly sophisticated, goods.

Indeed, if Japanese concessions on liberalization obviate the American case against Japan and reduce the likelihood of American protectionism, it is quite likely that the advantage enjoyed by Japan will grow further. Computers and a few extremely advanced items aside, U.S. exports to Japan are likely to continue falling behind Japanese exports to the United States. Unless there is a major improvement on the American side (involving higher industrial productivity and competitiveness), or unless Japan is somehow prevailed on to exercise greater self-restraint (the American case for which would be much weakened by Japanese liberalization), big excesses in exports on the part of Japan are still to be expected.

Security problems are also likely to create lingering strains on the Japanese-American relationship. The return to Japan of Okinawa, and the assumption by the Japanese of the responsibility for the defense of that island, have thrust Japan into a strategic posture for which the country is not yet ready. Militarily, Japan is not prepared to play a strategic role, yet one is implied by the arrival of the Japanese Self Defense Force (SDF) on that geographically key Pacific bastion. Politically, Japan is not ready to play that role either by herself or in close military coöperation with the U.S. forces, as is implied by the present arrangements for Okinawa. Considerable public resentment is likely to be generated by complex tactical and strategic arrangements that will still have to be worked out for the joint use of bases and for the joint actions on Okinawa. The return of Okinawa to Japan has thus tied Japan to the United States more closely than before, and the new links have a political pinch.

More generally, the Japanese are somewhat confused by and resentful of U.S. efforts to get Japan to assume a larger security role in Asia. "Japanization" of Asian security does not appeal to the majority of the Japanese public nor to much of its business community, nor for that matter to most other Asians. Yet, perhaps somewhat unwittingly, the United States has generated

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the impression that the major objective of the Nixon Doctrine is to obtain a larger involvement of Japan in Asian security, in part as compensation for declining U.S. involvement. To be sure, this goal is not altogether unattractive to some Japanese, especially because it satisfies their status aspirations, but, for the moment at least, it does not command majority appeal.

The problem, of course, is further complicated by the fact that the security of Japan proper is inseparable from the wider problem of Asian security, and the American side has a legitimate complaint when it argues that even defense of Japan in the main is still shouldered (and financed) by the United States. Yet a more autonomous self-defense of Japan, less reliant on U.S. protection, inevitably raises broader strategic problems for the region as a whole.

III

The psychological dimension in the relationship between the United States and Japan is extremely important, especially on the Japanese side, and both sides have been insensitive to it. The American side has not been fully responsive to the Japanese quest for higher status and to the need to appeal to the more honorable and magnanimous side of the Japanese character when confronted with difficulties. Instead, the United States has alternated between a highly paternalistic attitude and blustering threats. The result has been to undermine the credibility of the argument that the Japanese must make concessions for the sake of good American-Japanese relations, and to stimulate Japanese resentments. The following secret telegram might have been sent by the U.S. Ambassador to Tokyo early in 1971:

> The Ambassador stresses the importance of understanding Japanese psychology, fundamentally unlike that of any Western nation. Japanese reactions to any particular set of circumstances cannot be measured, nor can Japanese actions be predicted by any Western measuring rod. . . . Should the United States expect or await agreement by the Japanese government, in the present preliminary conversations, to clear-cut commitments which would satisfy the United States government both as to principle and as to concreter detail, almost certainly the conversations will drag along indefinitely and unproductively until the Sato cabinet and its supporting elements desiring rapprochement with the United States, will come to the conclusion that the outlook for an agreement is hopeless and that the United States government is only playing for time. . . . This will result in the Sato government's being discredited and in a revulsion of anti-American feelings, and thus may, and probably will, lead to unbridled acts. . . .

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Actually the telegram was sent in early 1941 by the U.S. Ambassador to Tokyo at that time and only the word "Konoye" had been changed to "Sato."[1]

On their side, the Japanese have been short-sighted and motivated primarily by short-term goals. Also in part because of their inferiority complex vis-à-vis the United States, the Japanese side has been excessively rigid. Thus, they have failed to win the goodwill that concessions should have generated because when such concessions are finally made, they are made so gracelessly that they cease to look like concessions and begin to look like extortion.

The American side, having failed to articulate clearly where it stands, oscillating between stealth and threat, neglecting to exploit the elements of honor and sentiment in the Japanese character, slighting Japan on the grand issues of world affairs, is made to look alternatively as if it is almost entirely dependent on Japanese kindness or as if it does not care at all for the Japanese-American relationship.

Given this web of emotional complications, in addition to Japan's dependence on the United States for almost a quarter of a century, the Japanese quest for higher international status thus tends to be deflected into self-assertiveness, potentially even hostility, against the United States. The problem is made more difficult by the fact that Japan wants to be treated and considered as a world power, yet she does not quite know what she takes to be one. This is a condition which imposes a special burden on the United States. Since the Japanese have still failed to define for themselves how they envisage a greater world role for Japan, the United States must be extremely careful to avoid pushing Japan into an essentially anti-American definition of that role. There is, as we have noted, the potential for a demonstratively anti-American leadership even within the LDP, and American clumsiness and insensitivity could easily have the effect of bringing it to the surface.

This would be especially tragic, since neither side really wishes a rupture and since both sides, on a rational level, recognize the desirability of closer coöperation. Indeed, one can almost say that it is primarily the United States that can turn Japan away from the United States, since the Japanese will not do it as a matter of rational choice. Short of a dramatic rupture in

[1] John Toland, "The Rising Sun." New York: Random House, 1970, p. 106.

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the context of a sudden crisis, even the lingering tensions should not bring about a divorce, though the relationship may become poisoned by mounting antagonisms.

On our side, we must pay more careful attention to atmospherics and symbols. It is most unfortunate that President Nixon chose to announce his planned visit to Peking before going to Tokyo. The Japanese, given their sensitivity to international hierarchy, would have welcomed the American President eagerly, not only in order to erase the blemish associated with the abortion of Eisenhower's visit but also to underline the preeminence of American-Japanese ties in the Pacific. It is therefore very important that the exchange of visits between the heads of state of Japan and the United States be undertaken with the most minute attention to detail and with every effort to assure their success.

On the other hand, it is both inaccurate and unwise to stimulate in the Japanese an exaggerated sense of their power in the world and to subject them to excessive and exaggerated flattery. Japan is a major force in the world, largely because of her unusually gifted and in many ways admirable people. Yet she is not a superpower and it is doubtful that she can become one. Indeed, efforts to become one—in part stimulated by excessive expectations that she will become one—could become counterproductive, obscuring the sense of balance and restraint, as well as the sense of responsibility by which Japan should be guided as she assumes a major role in the world.

We should nurture, instead, Japanese realism. There is an ambivalent strand in the Japanese psyche: the hierarchical preoccupation and the competitive urge can easily get out of hand, even though in many practical matters the Japanese are extremely realistic. It is that realism that should be encouraged and offered real as well as emotionally satisfying outlets. It is, therefore, undesirable to encourage a sense of inevitability about Japan's acquisition of nuclear weaponry. Instead, we would be much wiser to seek to obtain for Japan a permanent seat on the Security Council of the United Nations (a position to which she has much more real claim than either France or Great Britain), the assumption of which entails real and constructive international responsibilities.

Since the Asians do not want the Japanization of Asian security, the Japanese cannot achieve it. It would be much wiser for

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the United States to encourage broader Japanese involvement in international peacekeeping—for example, in the Middle East, where the Japanese have major interests—than for us to press them to become the protectors of Korea, Taiwan and perhaps even Southeast Asia. A wider peacekeeping function, perhaps based formally on the device of individual "volunteers" coalescing outside of Japan into Japanese-U.N. units (since the SDF is constitutionally forbidden from serving outside Japan) would be an excellent way for Japan to assume a constructive and a more active global security role.

The problem of China, while a major issue in its own right, is related to the regional question. To boost Japan as the main regional power in East Asia is tantamount to stimulating Japanese-Chinese rivalry, which will undermine American-Chinese relations and complicate both internal Japanese politics and Japanese-Chinese relations. Much to be preferred would be some effort to stimulate three-way Japanese-American-Chinese consultations on the economic and social problems of the region and eventually also on political-security matters.

IV

In my judgment, the United States should not encourage Japan to "go nuclear," because the decision to do so is certain to create fissures in the Japanese body politic, and even unpredictable international consequences. No evident benefit would accrue to the United States. At the same time, active discouragement would be counterproductive, since it would simply irritate Japanese national feelings. Noninvolvement—"nuclear neutralism"—is the wisest posture for the United States at this time, especially given the Japanese inclination to defer a clear-cut decision.

However, it will become a different matter if Japan itself decides to go nuclear. That decision—if our analysis is sound—is likely to be taken in a setting which will have become somewhat unfavorable to the United States. We should bear in mind that it is not a foregone conclusion—indeed far from it—that Japan will actually go nuclear. But if it should, it actually may then be in the interest of the United States to assist the Japanese nuclear program, through direct technical assistance. For one thing, the United States will then need allies even more than before, and hence will not be in a favorable position to oppose the Japanese decision actively. Secondly, and more problem-

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atically, it can be argued that when the United States had nuclear superiority, nuclear proliferation was definitely contrary to U.S. interests; but in a less favorable setting of parity, proliferation may be advantageous to the United States by complicating the strategic and political planning of the power that then enjoys the nuclear edge.

In the meantime, the United States would be well advised to upgrade joint American-Japanese strategic-political planning and to reduce the more visible manifestations of its military presence, concentrating more on joint basing and on maintaining facilities for emergency deployment in a state of high readiness. A more direct Japanese financial contribution for maintaining the U.S. strategic deterrent, and wider Japanese participation in strategic planning also seem appropriate, perhaps through joint high-level civilian-military planning staffs.

However, an undeniable dilemma is involved in the argument here: continued U.S. military presence in Japan offends Japanese nationalist feeling and creates strains in the U.S.-Japanese relationship; but a reduced U.S. presence there would intensify Japanese insecurity, increase the need for larger Japanese armed forces and give rise to renewed fears of Japanese militarism. Under the circumstances, the best that can be done is for both the Japanese and the Americans to try to harmonize a gradual change in their military relationship with Japan's gradually increasing self-assertiveness.

In so far as Japanese security is concerned, the United States would also be wise to back the emergence of a Pacific maritime triangle based on Japan, Indonesia and Australia. The three together have certain overlapping security problems and economic interests. A Pacific maritime triangle, though not necessarily a formal alliance (and with the United States associated with it only indirectly) could provide stability and wider coöperation, without precipitating fears of Japanese domination.

V

Finally, we must recognize that the problems of security or of status or of economics in the Japanese-American relationship can no longer be handled adequately on a purely bilateral basis. The question of security will require, in the years ahead, a far greater meshing of minds on political-strategic trends in the region as a whole. This means continuing consultation concerning

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likely threats, possible contingencies and common objectives. The process cannot involve the United States and Japan alone, but must include also other interested powers, such as Australia, Korea, perhaps Indonesia and so forth. Under certain circumstances, it could also involve NATO. What is needed, therefore, is not a new alliance, but machinery to ensure such consultations, not necessarily on the basis of binding obligations so much as of common interests.

The need to transform the American-Japanese relationship into something wider and more globally constructive is even more evident in regard to the problems of economics and status. This does not mean that bilateral efforts to resolve economic difficulties are futile—quite the contrary. Much more needs to be done by both Americans and Japanese to anticipate difficulties in the very large trade between the two countries. As in the political-military field, so in economics a standing joint consultative machinery—and not only ad hoc level meetings—is very much needed, in order to anticipate likely difficulties and to develop mutually acceptable regulatory procedures. Both sides should have learned by now that ad hoc resolution of problems usually means that problems are dealt with only when they become painfully acute.

Moreover, the Japanese must learn that foreign investment in their country can be mutually beneficial and that it does not lead to foreign domination. Western Europe has benefited technologically and economically from American investment without loss of political independence. France is a good example. Moreover, the Japanese can hardly expect to step up their own foreign investment abroad without opening themselves to foreign investment. Their continuing restrictions on foreign investments are, in the final analysis, an expression of an insularism incompatible with Japan's growing international involvement.

Beyond that, the economic relationship of the two countries has to be set in a wider framework. The emergence of the Common Market highlights the fact that increasingly the three economic pillars of possible global stability and coöperation are the United States, Japan and Western Europe. Movement by stages toward a free-trade area among these larger units, as well as among some associated advanced economies, would make it easier to reduce the strains and imbalances that prevail in a more limited bilateral relationship. An international division of labor,

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which some leading economists have been urging, could then more easily emerge, permitting broader and more indirect exchanges of goods, services and products, reducing bilateral strains and imbalances. A number of Japanese have signaled their interest in such a wider arrangement; and the benefits would spill over into the political realm as well.

In a bilateral U.S.-Japanese relationship, Japan will remain the weaker and hence a somewhat uneasy partner. In a wider coöperative framework of the developed nations Japan would be in the front rank of a global effort to reorder international political and economic relations. Such a community of the developed nations would not be just a rich man's club; indeed, one of its key purposes would be to undertake a more rational and coöperative effort to help the less developed countries. It would not—or should not—become a new anti-communist alliance; indeed, by reducing temptations in Moscow or Peking to play on national rivalries and by deliberately inviting communist states into those areas of coöperation for which they are suited, the community of the developed nations would help to terminate gradually the ideological global civil war. For the American-Japanese relationship, a wider framework would encourage an internationalization of Japan which would not be tantamount to to Americanization.

A community of the developed nations is gradually emerging but more deliberate steps are needed to give the process direction and purpose. To that end, regular annual meetings of heads of state of Japan, Western Europe and the United States are desirable, as well as some stand-by consultative-planning machinery. Over time, this would help to stimulate common perspectives and programs. Three-way consultations between parliamentarians should similarly be institutionalized. In addition, more informal three-way contacts are needed among the social élites of the three entities. More active Japanese participation—personal and financial—in international corporations would also be a constructive part of the process.

Seen in a broader historical perspective, America, Western Europe and Japan are sharing a unique experience: they are in the vanguard of societies leaving the industrial age and beginning to confront the challenge of the new technetronic era. They thus confront similar problems in the attitudes of their younger people, as well as a broader transformation of values;

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they share some of the same social dilemmas; because of their wealth, they also have similar responsibilities in regard to less fortunate portions of mankind. Moreover, they are linked by a further very important similarity: they operate within a framework of democratic institutions which, though far from perfect, represents the most decent and just system of government so far devised. Taken together, the above do provide a point of departure for common and more constructive efforts.

The key point to bear in mind is that Japan is now entering the world on a massive scale. The process may either disrupt its external relations and domestic stability, or propel it into a central position in a wider pattern of global coöperation. Neither outcome is inevitable—and both the Japanese and the Americans have a vital stake in which it will be.

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SOUTH AFRICA: THE POLITICS OF FRAGMENTATION

By Neville Curtis

THE white minority régime in South Africa should not be thought of as a conservative government. It is, instead, a radical right-wing government which has successfully transformed South African society to conform to the ideology of apartheid. Apartheid is an élitist ideology advocating racial separation and the entrenchment and perpetuation of white domination. Apartheid has fragmented South Africa into racial and ethnic groups, and established an authoritarian racial hierarchy which permeates all aspects of society and concentrates political, economic and military power in the hands of the state; the entire apparatus is controlled by the Afrikaners—the dominant group among the whites, who in turn are the dominant group in the society as a whole.

Although it enjoys a virtual monopoly of power, the Nationalist government is discovering that the costs of maintaining the artificial order of the society which it has created are rising. There are significant indications of social disorder and growing opposition within South Africa which point to a conflict. Though its resolution may be delayed by increased repression, violent confrontation seems inevitable, for the mechanisms to resolve it do not exist within South African society. And the conflict may also involve many other nations.

II

In 1948 the Nationalist Party gained power with a majority of seats in Parliament but a minority of the votes cast. By 1966 it held 126 of the 166 seats and had won 58 percent of the white vote. On gaining power the Nationalists moved systematically to entrench themselves within Parliament, and to extend their power beyond it by enlarging the power of the state. In successive moves the few Colored people still on the common (white) voters' roll were removed. The white representatives of the Black people (who had consistently expressed anti-government positions) were removed. The white-dominated political groups which had Black support or were in favor of a common (nonracial) society, or majority rule, were systematically banned

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(Communist Party, 1950; the Congress of Democrats, 1962); rendered ineffective by attacks on their leadership (Liberal Party); or segregated by law (Progressive Party, 1968).

The Black political groups received similar treatment. The African National Congress and the Pan African Congress were banned (1960) and their leadership and considerable numbers of their followers jailed (there were an estimated 1,310 political prisoners in 1966);[1] the Indian Congress and organizations in the Colored community were crippled by attacks on their leadership and effectively ceased to operate. Other anti-government nonparty political groups—the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), certain sections of the press, certain sections of the church and a number of trade unions—have suffered similar attacks but have not been banned.

In the process, the government placed on the statute books legislation which gave it the power to declare organizations illegal and to make it a criminal offense to work for the objectives of these organizations; ban individuals and place them under house arrest without trial or judicial process; hold suspects and witnesses indefinitely for questioning; reverse the onus of proof in some court cases; prescribe minimum sentences for political offenses; ban publications; and make it an offense to report on certain material activities of the security police.

The security police system itself has been centralized, and reports directly to the Prime Minister. Telephone tapping, no-knock searching, wide powers of detention and questioning are allowed. The security police boast of informers in every major institution in society—church, universities, business, political parties and government. "Even if you do not see a policeman it does not mean that there is not one nearby" were the words of the present Prime Minister, John Vorster, when he was Minister of Justice.

The powers of the security police coupled with the powers which the law has granted the executive mean that any South African can lose all civil, legal or human rights. A number of allegations have been made of deaths resulting from detention and torture. The official figures show that the police force has been steadily increased in size from 20,588 men in 1948 to 34,437 in 1969. Expenditure on defense has risen from R40 million in 1959 to R325 million in 1971 (one rand equals $1.40).

[1] All statistics are official figures or are based on official figures.

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All white males spend one year in compulsory military training, and volunteer training for women has recently been introduced, as has a campaign of "preparedness" in the white schools. Blacks do not serve.

Control of communications, publications and information has been established. The radio is state-owned and has become a political mouthpiece. There are 23 different laws affecting or controlling the freedom of the press. Any publication may be banned (and 13,000 have been) or censored, as may films. Television has been prohibited—and will be state controlled when introduced.

The state intervened actively to gain control over education, and the majority of schools—Black and white—are now either state controlled or controlled through syllabi. Only the English-language white universities have maintained limited autonomy, though they are segregated by law. It must be noted that where direct control has not been established—as with the English-language press, the English and Black churches, the universities and certain of the trade unions, all of which are still sources of opposition—legislation has limited the range or effectiveness of such opposition.

This consolidation of power by direct action against the opposition, and expansion of the authority of the state, has resulted in a virtual monopoly of power in the hands of the Nationalist Party—itself the political wing of Afrikaner nationalism. The appearance of legitimacy has been maintained at all times as has the appearance of democracy. But in fact real power may no longer be located either in Parliament itself, or even in the Nationalist Party, but in the hands of perhaps a dozen men who control the army, communications, the police, the security police, the Nationalist Party and the Afrikaner church and cultural institutions. This view has publicly been expressed by both politicians and political scientists such as Dr. Alan Paton and Dr. David Welsh.

III

At the same time that the Nationalist Party has been consolidating power in its own hands and disposing of any opposition, it has also been fragmenting the people of South Africa into racial and ethnic groups and effectively segregating these from one another. The government has legislated four major "racial

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groups" and subdivided these into further "ethnic" categories. All in all, there are 20 such categories. The latest (1970) census figures show that there are 21.5 million people in South Africa, who are divided thus:

Whites. 3.8 million (English-speaking, 40 percent; Afrikaans-speaking, 60 percent).
Colored people. 2 million. These are people of mixed African and white descent and are further subdivided into seven categories, the last of which is "other colored."
Indian people. 0.62 million. These are people of Asian descent.
African people. 15.06 million. The government has divided the African people into a number of "nations," which are Xhosa (3.9m.), Zulu (4.03m.), Tswana (1.72m.), Venda (0.36m.), Sotho (1.45m.), Pedi (1.6m.), Swazi (0.49m.), Ndebele (0.41m.), Shangaan (0.74m.), other (.52m.).

The major legislative distinctions drawn are between whites and "non-whites." (The terms white and Black are preferred by most anti-government groups.) Almost every aspect of life conforms to this division. Sex and marriage across this line are prohibited by the "Immorality Act." All social amenities like buses, trains, cinemas, places of public entertainment, beaches, restaurants and all residential areas are segregated on this basis. Education is divided into the four major racial categories, and mother-tongue instruction has been introduced. South Africans have to be educated in the language of their parents, at least for their first years of schooling, and education is given in almost a dozen languages at this level. Separate "governmental institutions" have been established for each of the major Black groups, and participation in "white politics" is not allowed.

This body of racial legislation can divide and has divided families—mother from son, husband from wife—and where clear racial lines cannot be found they are arbitrated by Racial Classification Boards. Every South African carries racial identification. If nothing else, the 200 racial laws testify to the artificial nature of the order which has been imposed, as do the often severe penalties which reinforce them and the multiple breaches which occur. Further, this legislation has effectively broken the lines of communication, coöperation and understanding between the different groups. By means of the classic divide-and-rule policy the government has reinforced the centralization of power. But the policy has also sown the seeds of intergroup tension and

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conflict and seriously threatened relations not just between white and Black but between Black and Black.

The racial segments into which the people of South Africa have been divided now form a hierarchy, of which economic status provides the clearest illustration. Over the 23 years it has governed, the Nationalist Party has promoted the economic interests of the Afrikaners, who founded and support it, over every other group. It has also ensured the greater and greater allocation of resources and material wealth to members of the white group as a whole, at the direct cost of all other South Africans. As the appearance of parliamentary democracy has been maintained by the government and its supporters, so has the myth that economic development in South Africa has meant progress for all. The facts demonstrate that this assertion is not true.

It must be stressed that Blacks make up the majority of the work force. Official figures show ratios ranging from 8.56 to 1 in mining, 2.45 to 1 in manufacturing, 3.38 to 1 in construction, 1.12 to 1 in electricity, 1.25 to 1 in the railways and 3.8 to 1 in the post office. It has been shown, however, that the 15 million Africans, who make up 70 percent of the population, receive only 18.8 percent of the nation's personal cash income. Whites who constitute 17.5 percent of the population receive 73.3 percent of its income. The average income (1969) for whites works out at R95 ($133) per month, and for Africans at R7 ($9.80). This means that on average the per capita income of Africans is six percent of that of whites. Whites and Africans represent the top and bottom of the racial hierarchy, and average incomes in mining and manufacturing (which are the highest and the lowest paid sections of the economy for Africans) as shown in Table 1 will give an idea of the range of the hierarchy:

TABLE 1. 1969 AVERAGE SALARIES OR WAGES PER HEAD PER MONTH

Mining	Whites R262	Colored R64	Asians R69	Africans R48
Manufacturing	Whites R297	Colored R62	Asians R76	Africans R18

The gap between Black and white incomes has grown (corresponding to the decline in Black trade union activity); and Afrikaner income has grown at the greatest rate of all, as shown in Table 2.[2]

[2] Keith Gottschalk, NUSAS seminar paper, 1971. It should be noted that in some instances these figures are not completely comparable.

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TABLE 2

	No. of Blacks economically active	*Approx. % of Blacks unionized*	*Average Black wage as % of average white wage in secondary industry*	*Average wage of English as % of average Afrikaner wage*	*Average wage of Afrikaners*
1946	2,905,063	12.0	20.3	180	100
1960	3,881,489	3.0	18.5	125	100
1969	4,747,000	0.6	18.6	115	100

Recent studies by economists, among others Dr. Francis Wilson and Sean Gervasi, demonstrate that economic growth has not led to a more equal distribution of income. Wilson has made a detailed study of the gold mining industry and he indicates that the real income of Black miners has not increased over the last 50 years; in fact, it has declined. Wilson argues further that racial discrimination has increased with industrialization and neutralizes political consequences.

A further indication of the racial hierarchy is government spending. For example, in 1969 the state and provinces spent R238 million on education for whites and R39.5 million on African education. Expenditure per head on African education is less than one-eighth of that on white education and the gap has grown for 13 years. The Minister of Bantu (African) Education and Development pointed out that only 6.9 percent of the 1969–1970 budget, a total of R158 million, was spent directly on the nearly 15 million African people.

Two other important points concerning the economy are the large degree of state control which exists, and the potential differences which are emerging between economic and ideological priorities. The state has actively intervened to ensure non-competitive employment for what was a large group of poor whites. Today something close to 40 percent of the white adult male population is directly employed by the state, which controls rail and air travel; electricity production; steel production; almost all education; the army, navy, air force and police; radio, telephones, postal services; and the remainder of the civil service. In addition, the Afrikaner group controls a section of the private sector of the economy. The effects of this large state participation in the economy are reinforced by legislative control of employment, development and financial factors.

In the past, separation and economic domination have been parallel and twin goals, but in recent years these have been less reconcilable and have forced an evaluation of priorities. It is

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argued that the preëminence of economic priorities may result in greater equality for the Black people. But the past record of the economy should cast doubt on this assertion, if not discredit it totally.

Nevertheless there does remain a chance that the ideology of apartheid might undergo some changes of face, even if white domination is not fundamentally altered.

The role of international investment has supported the Nationalist Party program for maintaining white domination. Thus, total international investment in South Africa was R4,990 million in 1969. The major investments in South Africa are from the sterling areas (R3,074m.), the dollar area (R741m.), Western Europe (R1,065m.), international organizations (R59m.), and otherwise, including Japan (R51m.). Until the Polaroid Corporation announced its unsatisfactory "experiment" in 1970 no foreign corporation had sought to contest the racial practices significantly. South Africa has given a capital return on investment of between 17.2 percent and 20.6 percent over the last five years. The pursuit of profit has taken the representatives of the Western nations into very strange company. The corporations now have a vested interest in "law and order" and "stable government," and if conflict were to erupt in South Africa, they doubtless would align the national interests of the nations from which they come with the white minority against the interests of the majority of the South African people.

IV

The claims of the Nationalist government to maintain "law and order" and "stable government" may have impressed a number of critics, but they are clearly maintained at the cost of civil and human rights. The dimensions of the problem of enforcement illustrate this further, and point to serious and growing social disorder. Official figures show that a total of 2,848,911 alleged contraventions of legislation took place in 1969. Of these, 2,016,300 people were sent for trial and a further 170,493 people were sent for trial for crimes of violence (murder, infanticide, assault and culpable homicide). Of 6,564 alleged murders, 153 involved white people and 6,411 Black people. Of the total number of people sent for trial, 932,127, or nearly 40 percent, were involved in "technical" offenses primarily involving racial legislation such as the pass laws. This represents a figure of almost

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2,500 people per day. The average daily prison population was 90,555 in 1969–70, a figure proportionate to population six times greater than that of France and five times greater than that of Britain.

The use of violence in enforcement is difficult to document but in 1969 there were 5,537 assault complaints against the police, of which 95 percent went to court. South Africa is responsible for almost half of the known executions in the Western world. In carrying out their duties, members of the police wounded 137 people and killed 50 in 1969. Crime, violence and prison population rates are all rising steadily. Numbers of incidents of interracial violence have been recorded in African schools, between tribal groups, after railway crashes and at sports functions. The situations which give cause for greatest concern are the large urban ghettos which border on every major city and where all the conditions are present for explosions many times the dimensions of that, say, in Watts. The urban ghettos are a permanent fixture and despite government removals (almost a million people have been removed in the last decade) their populations grow. A growing number of instances have been recorded in which Black families have resisted—sometimes violently—removals of this sort.

An investigation by the Jaycees in Cape Town in 1970 found an association of violence and social disorder with "poverty and prolonged socio-economic frustration. These experiences do massive violence to one's identity and cripple one's capacity for relatively full self-realisation. . . . As each new local township has been populated during the last decade, it has been smitten by a wave of social chaos and street violence."

It should be noted that in Soweto, the biggest Black urban complex, 68 percent of the people live below the poverty line. In some rural areas 50 percent of the children die before the age of five. The government response to these situations has most often been to use force; but the fundamental causes of the disorder and conflict lie in the political and economic system, and there has been no attempt to change this. On the contrary, of the 200 racial laws which exist, 98 were legislated in the decade 1961–1971.

The preparedness of the government to resort to force gives cause for alarm in another context—the guerrillas fighting on the border of Rhodesia, the Portuguese territories and South

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West Africa (Namibia). This conflict is escalating, and both the guerrillas and the Nationalist government have given warnings of unremitting hostility. With the drastic escalation of South African defense expenditure and the commitment of most of Africa to the side of the guerrillas, the potential for this situation to expand into an international conflict gives grave cause for concern.

Further, the economic involvement of the Western nations with the interests of the white minority, and the growing Soviet and Chinese concern with Africa, threaten to expand the dimensions of such conflict. Denis Healey, the "Shadow" Foreign Secretary of the British Labour Party, said when he visited South Africa in 1970 that apartheid there is the greatest encouragement which exists to the spread of communism in the rest of Africa.

The final possible source of violence is organized resistance within South Africa. It must be a fundamental assumption that the majority of South Africans will continue to oppose apartheid. On the other hand, it is clear that the Nationalist Party is not willingly going to concede power, significantly modify apartheid or adopt policies which will fundamentally alter the present situation of white domination. The political alternatives which have been left the Black people are minimal and almost all involve collaboration. It should not be doubted that, despite the restrictions and penalties which exist, there are many loyal South Africans who see the use of violence as the only means of changing the situation; and given circumstances of growing disorder they will resort to it. Desirable as peaceful change is, it is further to be doubted whether any future course of action—any process of change—will be able to avoid at least some conflict and violence. Though certain courses may minimize it, the hatred which apartheid has created is deeply entrenched, and its authors show no signs of trying to remove its fundamental injustices.

V

There are three loci of power which can influence the course of events in South Africa: the Nationalist government and the white élite; the Black majority of South Africans; and a number of international groups and interests.

The Nationalist Party has drawn its support from the Afrikaner group. The urbanization and rise in economic status of this

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group have been pointed to as possible sources of liberalization. The emergence of a broader range of political opinion among Nationalists is to be welcomed, but the range remains a limited one; and even the most enlightened Nationalists have made suggestions which are only modifications of the more blatant aspects of apartheid rather than fundamental changes. Under the spotlight of international opinion, it has been suggested that some of the more rigid aspects of separation might be changed. But these changes are superficial.

Where economic priorities are high—for example where there is a shortage of skilled manpower—there are signs that Blacks might be allowed to enter previously restricted areas of employment. But the lack of trade unions, the surplus of Black manpower and the overriding fact of government control make it unlikely that such small economic gains will be translated into political gains.

The economy, however, is a prime area for change and the old dictum of the Afrikaner "rather poor and white than mixed and rich" is less likely to hold sway now, in conditions of affluence, than earlier. The pressure from the white élite may place economic priorities before ideological ones in certain limited circumstances, but the consistent trend of the economy to create situations of greater, rather than less, inequality, makes this type of change a lesser challenge to white domination than is often estimated.

Neither of the white opposition parties offers alternatives to apartheid which threaten the white electorate's allegiance to the Nationalist Party. The United Party favors the status quo and repeal of a limited amount of racial legislation; and the small Progressive Party favors a franchise qualified by economic (money and property) and educational qualifications. It is unlikely that the Nationalists will lose an election, and I would subscribe to the view that if they did, they would not willingly hand over power. There is a greater possibility that there might be a realignment of the parties, as both the Nationalist and United Parties might split in situations of stress. The issue of the economy, the situation of the Colored people, Black resistance or an international crisis might create such stress.

Nevertheless, any such alignment will still favor white domination, and at most create situations which might lead to further change. Other white groups—students, some churches and trade

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unions, and a section of the press—favor greater change. Though they are relatively powerless, there is a growing sensitivity to racism and a commitment to changing it, and also a growing acceptance of the fact that change will mean Black domination, and there is limited activity toward achieving this.

The overwhelming fact of white policies remains the power of the Nationalist Party and its willingness to use this power. Greater repression, dispensing with the façade of democracy, and the institution of more direct rule are likely. Ruthless action against Black and white opposition as well as growing militarism are as likely future courses as any other. Only the need to maintain international goodwill and continued progress mitigate against this to some small degree.

Apartheid has turned in on itself. A relaxation of control will mean change, but change will mean greater control and greater use of force, for the white élite fears disorder, *i.e.* uncontrolled change, almost as much as the end of white domination. Continued white domination will also mean greater conflict, more use of force.

Among the Blacks, the unnatural quiescence which characterized the late 1960s, the years after Sharpeville, is ending. The opposition to apartheid from the majority of South Africans is growing again. Either directly or by exploiting whatever advantage can be gained from the fragmentary apartheid structures, Black people are seeking change and a basis of power from which to obtain change. The Black majority might accept separation and the politics of fragmentation as a step to majority rule and the end of white domination—but only as a temporary expedient. The last three years have seen the emergence of a militant Black student organization, SASO; increased effort to revitalize the Indian National Congress; the founding of ASSECA, a group committed to change in education; growing unity among Black churches and a stress on Black theology; and more outspoken Black criticism than has been seen in many years. A coherent statement of the need for Black consciousness and for Black political initiative is emerging.

Within the fragmented apartheid institutions the ideology is being turned upon itself. The emergence of Chief Buthelezi, an articulate anti-apartheid spokesman, as leader of the Zulu people; the emergence of the Labour Party as a vocal and organized critic of the government among the Colored people; and a gen-

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eral tendency for participants in separate apartheid structures—rural and urban—to become more outspoken and to make greater demands on the government all point to growing opposition.

But again the overriding factor is the power of the Nationalists. Groups which are opposing apartheid from outside its structure are meeting with increased attacks on leadership and organization, and may well be crippled. Groups within the structure face the dreadful risk implicit in the politics of fragmentation—the exploitation of divide and rule by the Nationalists to widen intergroup differences and play on potential intergroup hostility. This is already apparent in the manner in which the racial hierachy is being used to differentiate the Colored people from the African people, and use them as a bolster for the white élite. In addition, the Nationalists still have sufficient control of these structures to reward acquiescence and subvert opposition. The successful exploitation of the separate structures is difficult, but as these provide the only evidence of the progress in "separate development" (apartheid) the Nationalists seem compelled to concede greater and greater power to them. The separate structures can never be viable independent structures but they might become effective power bases.

If Black unity can be maintained across the separate institutions—which is just what apartheid seeks to combat—such a power base might lay the foundation for a viable alternative to apartheid. But if such unity cannot be maintained, the different Black ethnic groups might be forced into situations of greater conflict. Only the white élite could benefit from this, and the Nationalists seem to be aware of this. The possibility of such multifaceted conflict is the greatest possibility of the politics of fragmentation. But it is a risk which Black groups appear to be willing to take in pursuit of change, and the power needed to obtain it. The other possibilities are acquiescence to the apartheid structures and continued white domination, or totally rebellious change. The Nationalists have more than sufficient power to deal with the latter—although the future points to their no longer having control of all the pieces in the game.

VI

I have pointed to areas where change is possible, both in terms of material circumstances and limited transition of power. With respect to all of these, international opinion and action is crucial.

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It is only a concern for international acceptability, and the often related economic advantages or consequences, which has made the white élite express concern at the harsher aspects of separation; which has placed economic priorities above immediate ideological objectives; which has forced the pace of transition in the separate structures; which will curb extremes of government action against opposition leaders and organizations; and which makes it important to adhere to, or maintain to some degree, the existence or appearance of democratic and judicial process.

In short, the dependence of the white élite and particularly the economy on international goodwill is possibly the most significant pressure which can mitigate the Nationalists' use or abuse of power. And it is that power which is central to South African politics at this point in time. However, in the past, fascination with the white political process has often led to an implicit assumption, or to action based on the assumption of the legitimacy of this process. In the international context this assumption lends great weight to the white élite. International concern should be motivated by, and exercise, an active consideration for the majority of South Africans and their situation, and the impact of international action upon these. But very often the Western nations have oriented themselves only in terms of the white élite, and the activity of overseas investors and corporations in South Africa has been the supreme example of this.

Until the Polaroid "experiment" in 1970–71, no international corporation had sought to change or challenge either the separation or the discrimination, and all profited by conforming to them. It is not unfair to call the result exploitation, and to call for the undoing of this exploitation by either withdrawal or the institution of practices of full equality. The half-measures which Polaroid took were welcome and provided a lead, but are insufficient. And there can be no justification for continued engagement short of provision of full equality—partly since in almost all instances there is no legal restraint to prevent this.

To argue for engagement on terms other than full equality is only to continue the present economic trends toward greater inequality and discrimination. Full equality means, first, recognition and encouragement of Black trade-union activity, payment of equal wages and wages which reflect reasonable rates for the job; equal access to promotion and training facilities; and full

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and equal provision for health, insurance, transport, housing, and benefits and services to both employees and dependents.

It could be misconstrued as "terrorism" for me, as a South African citizen, to advocate withdrawal—but although the decision, of course, is not for me to take, the choice seems clear—full equality or disengagement. Withdrawal would have the greater impact on the white élite, but both would promote a degree of change.

Finally, it must be stressed that the international dependence of the white élite and the economy is going to grow and not decrease, and that the white élite—by diplomacy and particularly by economic expansion—is keen to strengthen its internal position by gaining international credibility and active support. It rests with corporations, private individuals and governments to determine whether their involvement and participation in South Africa have been coöpted into this process, or whether they provide any support for the majority of South Africans in their attempts to obtain change. At this point in time most interests have been coöpted.

VII

Change in South Africa is going to be a painful process, actively resisted by the white élite. It is going to require the emergence of Black leadership and a power base from which to operate; the development of organizing and organizations; and at least limited freedom in which to exercise them.

The situation within South Africa is rising to a crisis which will either be staved off by further repression or explode into active conflict whose dimensions and impact may extend far beyond South Africa itself. A scenario of events is difficult to construct, as much depends on unforeseen crises or events at present in the making; but unless there is rapid change toward greater equality and distribution of power tragedy lies ahead. It is in the interests of the Western nations to make a far greater attempt to ensure that this tragedy is avoided, and to align their interests with those of the majority of South Africans.

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EAST GERMANY BETWEEN MOSCOW AND BONN

By Robert Gerald Livingston

SEVENTEEN months of intricate negotiation involving the four powers responsible for Germany, the two German states and the North Atlantic and Warsaw Treaty alliances have finally yielded a Berlin agreement. It is the first major East-West accord in Europe since the Austrian State Treaty in 1955 and suggests that old-fashioned diplomacy still has its virtues. The agreement's provisions, which are far better than Western foreign offices dared hope when the negotiations began, regulate the thorniest aspects of the Berlin problem, notably the access issue. But they do not solve the problem in the sense of establishing a new status for the city. Indeed, whether the agreement holds up at all depends on whether the present détente in Europe continues. Experience with Soviet policy has taught that this is not predictable. One result is, however, certain: the agreement compels the West to come fully to terms soon with the second German state. The German Democratic Republic is becoming, as Alice might put it, permanenter and permanenter.

Not only is the G.D.R. expressly included under its formal name in the Berlin treaty, the follow-on arrangements for transit traffic which it is negotiating with West Germany are to constitute an integral part of the overall agreement. The road now is open, American and West German officials agree, to talks between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries on reducing forces and at the same time or later to an East-West conference on security in Europe. Are negotiations on troop reductions feasible without direct involvement of the state whose army is rated the most efficient in the Eastern alliance? And is a security conference conceivable without participation by the one member of the Warsaw Pact which feels itself the most insecure? It hardly seems possible, likely—or even desirable. In opening the road to these projects the Berlin agreement also virtually ensures the emergence of the German Democratic Republic as a full-fledged actor in the politics of European security.

It is a little surprising that this entrance is so belated. The reasons are to be found in Berlin's vulnerability and in the Western alliance's solidarity. As long as there was no agreement guaran-

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teeing access to the city, the Federal Republic and its allies which occupy Berlin feared that to legitimize the G.D.R. internationally would be to reinforce its claims to sovereignty over the air, rail, highway and canal routes running from West Germany to Berlin through East German territory. Sufficient unto the day was the existing evil of the G.D.R.'s de facto control over these routes, which it demonstratively exploited at its pleasure to delay, harass and sometimes completely block traffic to the isolated city. Equally important, America, Britain and France, and with them Bonn's other NATO allies, have been pledged since 1954 to accept the West German government as the sole legitimate spokesman for all Germans, to support its objective of reunification and thus not to accord the G.D.R. formal recognition. They also have more or less willingly backed the West Germans in their campaign to keep the G.D.R. from gaining political responsibility and international status.

Underlying the allies' solidarity with the Federal Republic on this score has been the conviction that moves on their part to legitimize the G.D.R. would be interpreted in Bonn as prejudicing chances for reunification and might give birth to a new German nationalistic backlash that could undo the democratic system in West Germany and lead Bonn to combine with Moscow in policies inimical to the alliance. Most allies, especially the United States, therefore publicly endorsed the official West German thesis of the 1950s and early 1960s that the division of Germany was inherently unstable, hence the primary cause of division and tension in Europe. These assessments weighed overwhelmingly in Western calculations until recently.

Chancellor Willy Brandt's Social Democratic-Liberal (SPD-FDP) government, which has made the German national question central to its *Ostpolitik,* has now fundamentally altered previous policy toward East Berlin. At the same time as the G.D.R. is becoming politically consolidated, the régime is well entrenched and its people may be developing a sense of identification with their state. Its ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) apparently encountered little trouble last spring in replacing veteran leader Walter Ulbricht with Erich Honecker, thus successfully passing that most difficult test for a communist régime, the transfer of political power. But still lacking a national base—in this sense it is a nationless state—the G.D.R. remains vulnerable to influence from the West, which focuses with peculiar in-

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tensity through the lens of the common nationality that East Germans share with their countrymen in the Federal Republic.

II

The Grand Coalition of Kiesinger's Christian Democrats (CDU) and Brandt's Social Democrats, which assumed office in late 1966, already had begun to revise previous attitudes toward the G.D.R. by including it as an entity in policy toward Eastern Europe instead of ignoring it as predecessor administrations had done. The striking changes came with the Brandt Scheel administration in 1969. The innovative and extraordinarily sophisticated minds behind the new departure have been Herbert Wehner, the SPD's shrewd *Bundestag* floor leader, and Egon Bahr, Brandt's long-time personal adviser on Eastern policy matters and now State Secretary in his Chancellery. The radical break[1] with the policies of previous administrations can be found in the Brandt government's declared willingness to: (1) accept the G.D.R. as a state and the SED as its effective ruler; (2) treat with the SED leaders on the basis of full equality; (3) respect what was formerly called the "demarcation line" between East and West Germany as an inviolable frontier; (4) abandon previous claims that the Federal Republic alone is entitled to speak for all Germans; (5) conclude a binding treaty with the G.D.R. regulating mutual relations.

Where has Brandt stopped? Responding to opposition charges that national goals have been put aside, the Government says that it still adheres to the concept of one German nation, a concept that is also embodied in the G.D.R.'s constitution, thus keeping alive the emotional, cultural and perhaps eventually the political basis for unity of the "two German states." It maintains that this preserves the right of self-determination for Germans and thus the means of one day altering the status quo.

And, finally, it stresses even more than its predecessors that Four-Power (American, French, British and Soviet) responsibility for Germany, which has constituted the basis for the Berlin agreement, symbolizes that there is as yet no final settlement of the German problem, and, Bahr has argued, actually precludes West Germany from accepting, even if it should want to, the permanent division of the country.

Refusing, then, to accord the G.D.R. full recognition, Brandt's

[1] Helmut Schmidt, "Germany in the Era of Negotiations," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1970, describes certain elements of this change.

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government has sought to draw a distinction that is subtle but politically vital for its present domestic position and future policy toward East Berlin. It maintains that the Federal Republic's relations with the G.D.R. are not the same as those with foreign countries but of a "special" nature, since the G.D.R. is not "foreign" to West Germany. If the G.D.R. will accept the distinction and sign satisfactory agreements with the Federal Republic on that basis, Bonn is willing to cease opposing G.D.R. relations with third countries and to agree to its membership in the United Nations. So far the Federal Republic has been successful in convincing other countries to delay recognition of the G.D.R. until the two Germanys have come to an agreement, and in withstanding pressures for early admission of both to the United Nations. But for success to last, the West Germans must be able to point to concrete progress toward settling their differences with the G.D.R. Otherwise third countries will not be long deterred. Of the 29 states that now accord East Berlin full recognition, more than half are non-communist. And public pressure for recognition is building steadily even in NATO countries such as France, Britain, the Netherlands, and Denmark.

Brandt's government isn't saying much about its long-term objectives toward East Germany. Calling upon Germans to face at last the bitter truth that the idea of a unitary German state enjoys virtually no support abroad, the Chancellor has relegated unification to a future so distant as virtually to renounce it as a practical policy objective. Among the West German public, too, there is today little discussion of the projects and schemes for bringing the West and East Germany closer together—the joint commissions, confederations, loose federations and internationally supervised free elections—which professors and politicians proposed so plentifully until just a few years ago.

Brandt prefers to focus on the short term: a treaty that will regulate "coexistence" (*ein Nebeneinander*) between the two German states and will lay the basis for what can only be translated as a future "togetherness" (*ein Miteinander*) between them. Interpreted, these phrases seem to mean establishing a working relationship and hoping it can be used first to ameliorate conditions of life for East Germans and later to halt the steady divergence that has marked the development of the East and West German societies and political structures over the past quarter-century. One should perhaps not speculate beyond these

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declared aims. However, the communists surmise that Brandt and his associates also hope, through the working relationship, to develop new communities of East-West German interest, accelerate already evident trends toward embourgeoisification in East German society, moderate the SED's political behavior, and promote political pluralism in the G.D.R. (For the East German Communist Party, of course, such objectives—all unstated by Bonn—are equivalent to an effort to subvert its rule.)

It is self-evident that Bonn's new policy toward East Germany runs a high risk of perpetuating the very partition it seeks to attenuate. To accept Honecker's régime is to enhance its international status and help its domestic consolidation—a process that is already far advanced.

III

Honecker's apparently uncontested and untroubled takeover of power from Ulbricht last May underscores East Germany's stability and the fact that the SED régime has been in power longer—23 years—than any German government since the fall of the monarchy. For more than a decade, the G.D.R. has been more stable than other communist states: there has been no overt unrest of significance since 1953 and no known infighting among the Party leaders since Ulbricht rid himself of a rival faction in 1958.

The SED's new First Secretary himself typifies this continuity and stability as well as the now indigenous nature of the régime he heads. Fifty-nine years old and a communist since childhood —he joined the Young Pioneers at ten, the Party at 17—he became SED heir-presumptive as early as 1958, when Ulbricht made him a Politburo member. Like his predecessor, a sober, methodical and energetic manager of Party organization men, he has long watched over the armed forces and security services for the SED, handled its organizational matters and is reported to have prepared and executed its riskiest political project so far —erection of the Wall in 1961. He has been placing his people in key positions within the Party and military for over a decade, many of them officials who helped him run the communist youth organization as far back as 1946.

Tough, hard-working and experienced, this generation in their fifties or early sixties has matured in the G.D.R. and its ruling Party. Their cause is perfecting, consolidating and making

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both institutions run efficiently. Honecker, who was imprisoned in a Brandenburg penitentiary during the entire 12 years of Nazi rule and has spent little time abroad except for two years of political schooling in Moscow 15 years ago, operates within the framework of the East German state. He lacks the Comintern background which, it sometimes seemed, led Ulbricht to look upon the G.D.R. as the nucleus of a larger communist Germany and to aspire to influence leftists in the Federal Republic.

Under Ulbricht, Honecker and Prime Minister Willi Stoph, the SED has entrenched itself solidly since the Wall, developing into what is the archetype of a post-revolutionary communist régime as described by Richard Lowenthal: a machine strongly rational in running the economy and a highly organized government, conservative in the predictable regularity of its bureaucratic procedures, administrative rules and law; but yet authoritarian in its readiness to dispense with legal guarantees when it feels threatened from below and in its willingness to tolerate only those limited elements of pluralism which it can keep under tutelary control. At home, the régime's stability rests on three factors: (1) a socioeconomic structure that differs totally from that of the Federal Republic; (2) the unique modernized nature of the SED; and (3) an impressive economic performance, which helps the Party legitimate its rule.

The G.D.R.'s imposed revolution has restratified society, abolishing or bringing under Party control all traditional German institutions capable of commanding a separate loyalty from East Germans or linking them with their countrymen in the West. Paradoxically, however, it has not at the same time destroyed traditional German—or better, Prussian—attitudes and patterns of authoritarian political behavior. Readiness to accept discipline, respect for constituted authority, and apathy toward politics have greatly assisted the communists to rule. Potential foci of opposition are lacking in G.D.R. society in any case. The literary and humanistic intelligentsia—the fount of dissidence in Russian and most East European countries—have never played a political role of that sort in Germany and do not stand high in East Germans' esteem. The managerial-technocratic élite are as apolitical as Albert Speer was in his time and cannot be expected to challenge the Party's primacy individually, much less collectively.

East German society, is, however, characterized by a high de-

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gree of social equality and of mobility, offering to personalities attuned to the demands of a technological age and industrialized communist society wide access to higher education and rapid career advancement. Since 1961 the managerial-technical élite produced by this system has come to accept and share with the Party an orientation of values toward performance and efficiency. Important, too, in giving this élite a stake in the system were East Germany's economic reforms introduced in 1963 and promoted by Ulbricht himself. East Germany has become unique among communist societies in its capacity to diffuse modern technology, maintain close coöperation between industrial and political élites, and tolerate a limited pluralism in the economic sphere without noticeable effect on the political structure. It is the model of technocratic conservatism in the communist world.

Nowhere among communist countries—except perhaps in the Soviet Union—does the Party play so prominent a role in guiding and controlling society and the economy. The SED has been successful in combining ideological orthodoxy with economic reform, centralized controls with material and career incentives, and managerial-technocratic expertise with continuing political indoctrination and rigid Party discipline. Abandoning the terror and totalitarian methods of the 1950s and early 1960s—although the Wall still stands as a repulsive symbol that these methods can, if necessary, be applied—the SED has developed a highly sophisticated system of "line" authority, formal staffs, and informal coöperation with enterprise managers that enables it to run the industrialized East German economy without diminishing Party control. It has coöpted and advanced the managers and technicians, rewarding them but granting them little political voice. Its leadership is far better educated and more science-oriented than that of other communist parties. With a membership of nearly two million in a total population of 17 million—a larger share than in any other communist country—the SED has also been able over the past decade to bring an increasing number of citizens into the political process.

With the population generally, the SED's chief means of legitimation remains its performance in running the economy so as to keep living standards rising more rapidly than in other communist countries. Despite setbacks in the last two or three years, growth over the past decade has been respectable for an economy that was already highly industrialized to begin with:

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between 1960 and 1969, the gross national product in real terms grew 4.5 percent annually, which was only a shade below the annual expansion in West Germany (4.8 percent). The average East German's living standard today is far ahead of that elsewhere in Eastern Europe: perhaps a third higher than in Hungary or Czechoslovakia and certainly twice as high as in the Soviet Union. In personal consumption, social welfare and education the G.D.R. also maintains its traditional lead. Simultaneously, it has been able not only to fulfill heavy export obligations to the Soviet Union but also to increase investments, so that today at about 23 percent of GNP, the East German investment ratio is nearly at the West German level but with a greater share going to industry. Their economy's performance nourishes East Germans' sense of pride and superiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the G.D.R.'s eastern neighbors, thus promoting their identification with their state.

Distinctive social patterns, efficient Party control, and a rising living standard have advanced a process whereby East Germans' previous hostility toward the régime changed first into passive acceptance and now is moving toward positive loyalty and a sense of a separate East German national identity. How far the process has gone, no one can really say. The régime will not permit its citizens' loyalty to be put to a true test. Some Western observers take the popular acclaim for Willy Brandt when he visited Erfurt in 1970 as evidence that the SED cannot count on East Germans' allegiance. All that can be said with reasonable certainty is that East Germans generally accept the G.D.R. as a separate state for the foreseeable future, approve of its social order and most aspects of its economic system, and have developed a sense of distinctiveness from both West Germany and their Slavic neighbors.

But the tie of common German nationality still retains a dynamic political potential: the Party discovered to its discomfort when it polled workers recently that 71 percent considered "Germany" rather than the G.D.R. as their fatherland. The lack of a national base will remain the greatest weakness of the G.D.R. as long as the concept of the nation-state remains the prime determinant of political attitudes in Europe, the more so since Brandt has revitalized the concept of a single German nation.

IV

Although the SED régime has a firmer internal base for its

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rule than has commonly been realized in the West, it is also true that linkages with the Soviet Union remain the chief guarantee of its durability and stability. Because the process of East German "nation-building" is incomplete and the pull of a common German nationality is still strong, the SED's leaders continue to feel insecure and to regard the closest possible integration with the Soviet Union as a vital self-interest for their state. They have made a deliberate policy decision to intensify that relationship in order to increase all possible fields of political, ideological and economic interaction. Ulbricht's objective, and it seems to be Honecker's as well, has been to make East Germany indispensable to the Soviets and thus to maximize its influence not only in Moscow but also in the Eastern bloc's regional organizations, COMECON and the Warsaw Pact.

For a Soviet Union whose first foreign policy priority, in times of détente as of tension, remains cohesion of its East European power sphere, the stakes in the G.D.R. are high. East Germany anchors Soviet hegemony in East Europe, as was evidenced in the military action against Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in the Polish upheavals in 1956 and perhaps again in December 1970. Although Soviet military planning may be underway for the troop cutbacks which Brezhnev has declared he is willing to discuss, it is well to remember that Moscow has considered forward deployment of 20 or more Soviet divisions in the G.D.R. essential to its military security system since the Second World War. A fundamental alteration in that deployment would be surprising. Brezhnev's offer may still be genuine enough, of course. He and his Politburo evidently have concluded that the West will not credit their talk of détente in Europe unless they also talk of troop cuts. They might decide that, with the G.D.R. consolidated, the Soviet Union's military and political positions no longer require as many as the 300,000 or more Soviet troops and 800 combat aircraft presently stationed west of the Oder.

Politically, the Kremlin has been able to count upon the consistent and outspoken support of East Berlin against polycentric tendencies in the communist movement, whether of the Maoist, West European (especially Italian communist) and East European revisionist, or Jugoslav and Rumanian nationalist varieties. In both the Warsaw Pact and COMECON, the G.D.R. acts as a centripetal force reinforcing alliance cohesion. What East German deviations there have been have taken the form of prefer-

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ences for a tighter bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union. Diminished Soviet political and ideological authority in the communist world has served to confer a special role upon the G.D.R. as a staunch supporter of Soviet policies.

Over the past decade, too, the G.D.R. has become an increasing economic asset to the Soviet Union. Each has long been the other's largest foreign trade partner, East Germany accounting in 1969 for 15.3 percent of total Soviet turnover, while Soviet trade represented 41.2 percent of the G.D.R.'s total. East Germany supplies the Soviet Union with high technology output from its specialized industries: machinery, machine tools, precision and optical instruments, and a large variety of chemical and electronic products. During the past few years it has also been called upon to provide investment credits for Russian extractive industries. At the same time, because it lacks raw materials, including coal, iron and petroleum, the G.D.R. constitutes a significant market for Soviet exports of these items. In certain product fields the G.D.R. has set out to develop a symbiotic relationship with the Soviet Union. Their 1971–1975 trade agreement reflects new patterns of closer integration, notably an apparently significant political decision to make the East German economy more dependent upon Soviet machinery.

These strategic, political and economic advantages make it unlikely indeed that the Soviet Union will dispense with the G.D.R. or willingly see it weakened. The relationship between Moscow and East Berlin is no longer a one-way street, however, the G.D.R. no longer a satellite but a junior partner, at least in European matters. The greater mutuality of the relationship opens up opportunities for East German influence in the Kremlin. And this influence is directed toward keeping the territorial, ideological and political lines of division in Europe as distinct as possible. To blur them is to undermine the rationale for a G.D.R. separateness that must override an underlying bond of common nationality with West Germans. The instinctive East German approach thus has been to stress to Moscow the dangers of coexistence and insist on a rigid doctrinaire stance in dealings with the West, thus reinforcing residual ideological components in Soviet foreign policy.

As the Soviet-West German treaty of 1970 and the recent Berlin agreement suggest, G.D.R. influence in Moscow is not sufficient to deter the Kremlin when broader policy considerations

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dictate an emphasis on reconciliation and diminishing tensions between East and West. Neither the treaty, nor the agreement, nor closer relations between Bonn and Moscow are to East Berlin's liking. They bring the G.D.R. under new pressures. Greater stability and greater influence in Moscow, however, put the G.D.R. in a position to mitigate these pressures and to win tangible political benefits for East Berlin from the new set of international relationships that now seems to be developing in Europe.

V

Inclusion of the German Democratic Republic in the Berlin agreement underlines what West Germany's new policy, the G.D.R.'s stability, and Soviet interests have made inevitable. As early as 1955, when the Geneva conferences on Germany failed and the Soviet Union thereupon signed a treaty with the G.D.R. affirming its sovereignty, it became clear that Moscow had opted for two states in Germany—a choice which West Germany and its allies have been powerless to alter. Perhaps sensing this, Secretary Dulles, who in 1958 contemplated acknowledging the East German controls on access routes to Berlin, and President Kennedy, who was in 1962 and 1963 willing to countenance their participation in a Berlin access authority and their signature on the nuclear test ban and other arms-control agreements, foresaw an international role for the G.D.R.

Western statesmen have shrunk from pursuing these lines of thought too far, however, chiefly because they have feared a reaction in West Germany that might undermine its stability and its loyalty to the alliance. Perhaps such fears were always exaggerated. In any case, Brandt has been able to carry off his new approach toward the G.D.R. without provoking any such backlash so far.

The partition of Germany—a state of affairs which has been the rule not the exception in that country's history—has since 1945 coincided with a high degree of stability in both German states and in the European balance. The present reduced level of tension must cast doubt on previous policy assumptions that the partition of the country is *the* cause of tension, that it is necessarily unstable and unnatural.

Brandt's government has displayed realism and much political courage in questioning some of these assumptions and in facing up to the fact of two German states. It recognizes too that the

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G.D.R.'s full international emergence, including membership in the United Nations, cannot be forestalled much longer. It is only asking that its friends and allies bear with it and not themselves accelerate this process until the two Germanys establish a treaty relationship confirming the "special" nature of their relations. Synchronizing U.S. policy toward the G.D.R. with this request by a trusted and trustworthy ally has been no real problem so far. Nor is it likely to become one in the immediate future, notwithstanding recent urgings by many distinguished Americans that the United Nations include the two Germanys along with the two Koreas and two Vietnams.

Bonn's realism extends to acknowledging the incompatibility of a unitary Germany with the demands of European security. Equally incompatible are the exclusion of the G.D.R. régime, which is attributable to Western alliance policy, and the isolation of the East German people, for which the SED régime is responsible. A new pattern of East-West relationships in Europe could scarcely be sustained unless the G.D.R. is accorded a participatory role in developing it. For East Germany, cold-war confrontations are neither outmoded nor inexpedient. It alone among European states has an interest in prolonging tensions. It has revived them often enough, and its obstructive potential remains considerable. If, however, the G.D.R. régime becomes actively involved in the East-West negotiations on European security problems that now impend, it may well gain a different and clearer perception of its interest than that which isolation has bred. Preparations for a European Security Conference, and for troop reduction talks, as well as the eventual colloquies themselves, need therefore to provide for G.D.R. participation. One may hope that this can be accomplished in a way that takes account of Bonn's position on the special nature of its relations with East Berlin. A formal declaration by West Germany, prior to the meetings, reiterating its position might suffice. So might a formal reference by the Four Powers, similar to that in the preamble to their Berlin agreement, to continuing quadripartite rights and responsibilities.

The SED régime continues to isolate its people from international life and from broader and freer exchanges with Western countries because it fears the internal effects of such exchanges, particularly those with West Germans. But the barriers which it has erected to them are a medieval anachronism in the

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center of modern Europe. The problem before the West is to create conditions under which Honecker's régime could feel confident that dismantlement of the barriers would not jeopardize its stability. Probably the only way for the West to remove insecurities in East Berlin is to end the continuous challenges to the G.D.R.'s sovereignty and to treat it internationally on the same basis as the Federal Republic. It can then give priority to encouraging participation by East Germans in Europe-wide enterprises dealing with the many problems—from water pollution to mass tourism and from urban blight to technical education for industrial and post-industrial societies—with which European countries must deal individually in any case but could better cope with collectively. Honecker and his associates must be brought to see that a wide participation by East Germans in such projects will yield the G.D.R. greater benefits and more real security than the rigidities, tension and isolation upon which it has had to rely so far. Then the skills, talents and energies which East Germans possess in no less measure than their fellow countrymen west of the Elbe can be enlisted in Europe's cause.

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THE PRESIDENT AND THE MILITARY

By Morton H. Halperin

ALL Presidents are dependent on the permanent bureaucracies of government inherited from their predecessors. A President must have the information and analysis of options which the bureaucracies provide in order to anticipate problems and make educated choices. He must, in most cases, also have the coöperation of the bureaucracies to turn his decisions into governmental action. A bureaucracy can effectively defuse a presidential decision by refusing to support it with influential members of Congress or to implement it faithfully.

The President's dependence on the bureaucracy and his limited freedom to manœuvre are acute in all areas. The military, however, poses a unique set of problems for him. These arise in part from the limitations upon the President when he is seeking military advice. When the National Security Council or other presidential sessions are convened to discuss high-level foreign and national security matters, the President has a great deal of influence on the selection of all those who will attend, except the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who must be chosen from a small group of senior career military officers. Compare also the President's ability to appoint noncareer people to subcabinet and ambassadorial posts with the limitations on his range of selection for appointments to senior military positions or overseas military commands.

One dilemma for the President is finding alternative sources of military advice. The military, for example, has a virtual monopoly on providing information to the President about the readiness and capabilities of U.S. or even allied forces. Other groups and individuals can provide advice on many "military" questions, but their access to information is limited. The President may call for judgments from his Secretary of Defense, but the Secretary's analysis must rely on the basic factual material and field evaluations provided by the military.

Judgments about the likely effectiveness of American combat operations are also the exclusive province of the military. In assessing the potential effects of a diplomatic move, the President can turn not only to career Foreign Service Officers, but also to businessmen, academics and intelligence specialists in other

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agencies. On the other hand, if he wishes to know how many American divisions would be necessary to defend Laos against a Chinese attack, the legitimacy of advice from groups other than the military is distinctly reduced. The military's influence on the information and evaluation of options which reach the President is further enhanced by the important role it plays in the preparation of national intelligence estimates.

Yet another source of leverage for the military is the prestige and influence that military leaders have enjoyed, at least in the past, with leading figures in Congress. Until quite recently, this influence limited presidential effectiveness with Congress and the general public. Even now, military influence continues to be strong with the leaders of the Armed Services Committees and appropriations subcommittees. Legislation clearly gives the military the right to inform congressional committees directly of their differences with administration policy, when asked. Senior military officers frequently exercise that right. In addition, military views on matters of major concern to the services often become known to the press. Thus, Presidents have shied away from decisions that they believed the military would take to the Congress and the public, and have frequently felt obliged to negotiate with the military.

For example, both Presidents Truman and Eisenhower carried on extensive negotiations with the military to secure its support for defense reorganization programs which appeared to have little chance of getting through Congress without military acquiescence. Later Presidents have shied away from defense reorganizations requiring congressional approval, at least in part because of the difficulty of gaining military concurrence, or congressional action without the concurrence. The backing of the military has also been vital to Presidents in other important programs. Truman, for example, relied heavily on the military to endorse his Korean War policies, especially in his disagreement with General Douglas MacArthur over limiting the war. MacArthur, who then commanded the U.N. forces in Korea, wanted to expand the war to China and to use nuclear weapons. The Joint Chiefs were not in favor of the expansion and Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and a much decorated World War II hero, strengthened Truman's position enormously when he stated publicly that MacArthur's proposal would lead to "the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time."

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The political influence of the military has been substantially reduced in the last few years. The fact that the Joint Chiefs favor a particular proposal is no longer a guarantee of congressional support and may in some cases be counterproductive. For example, the Joint Chiefs were not asked by the Nixon administration to play a major role in defending the Safeguard ABM. Nevertheless, the fact that the Joint Chiefs still wield influence with certain members of Congress and some parts of the public may inhibit the President, particularly if he fears a right-wing attack or needs a two-thirds vote to get a treaty through the Senate.

The implementation of presidential decisions by the military works both for and against the Chief Executive. The military tradition of discipline, efficiency and a clearly delineated chain of command increases the probability that precise orders will be observed and carried out with dispatch. However, the fact that the military implements decisions according to standard procedures may cause presidential orders to be misconstrued through oversimplification. The Joint Chiefs will defer to the field commander and not monitor his compliance carefully. Moreover, Presidents find it difficult to develop alternate means to secure implementation of decisions in the domain of the military. For example, the President may use special envoys in place of career Foreign Service Officers to carry out delicate negotiations while he can hardly send a retired businessman to land American forces in Lebanon or to command a nuclear missile-carrying submarine.

Presidents also have great difficulty convincing the military to create new capabilities, which they may need in the future but which might tend to alter the traditional role of a particular branch. The services emphasize the forces which conform to their notion of the essence of their role and resist capabilities which involve interservice coöperation (*e.g.* airlift), noncombat roles (*e.g.* advisers), and élite forces (*e.g.* Green Berets). At least until recently, they have also resisted the maintenance of combat-ready nonnuclear forces.

II

This is not to suggest that the President's problems with the military are greater than, for example, those with the Department of Agriculture or other agencies with strong links to do-

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mestic constituencies and congressional committees. Nor is it to suggest that the information and advice given the President by the military has over the years been less valuable than the advice of others. The point is rather that within the foreign policy field the greatest limitations on the President's freedom of action tend to come from the military. None of our Presidents has been content with his relations with the military.

In fact, Presidents have used a number of devices to overcome limitations on their power, to get the information and advice they want and to find support for implementing their decisions. Presidential strategies have varied, depending on the type of issue and depending on whether they were seeking: (1) information or options, (2) political support or (3) faithful implementation.

Their techniques include the following:

(1) *Reorganizations.* The Nixon National Security Council system and the appointment of the President's Blue Ribbon Panel on Defense Reorganization (Fitzhugh Panel) suggest a return to the emphasis on reorganization which tended to dominate thinking in the early postwar period and, indeed, through 1960. Reorganization efforts within the Pentagon have aimed at securing coördinated military advice, rather than separate advice from each service. Presidents have, in general, pressed the Joint Chiefs to transcend service biases and to come up with agreed positions based on a unified perspective. Eisenhower was particularly adverse to JCS splits. But the success of these efforts has been relatively limited. Most observers conclude that JCS papers still tend to reflect particular service views, either by way of deference or compromise, rather than the unified military judgment of a "true" Joint Staff. Secretaries of Defense have not looked upon the Joint Staff as part of their own staff.

The reorganization of the National Security Council system beginning in 1969 appears to have been designed to bring to bear a variety of different views on military problems. The evaluation of alternate military forces is centered in the Council's Verification Panel. This group first considered the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and then the prospects and problems of mutual force reductions in Europe, thereby going beyond traditional military and intelligence channels. The Defense Program Review Committee was designed to apply expertise to a review of budget decisions from the Budget Bureau and the

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President's economic advisers, as well as the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The NSC system itself was designed to take into account the views of the State Department and other government agencies about military commitments, bases, overseas departments and military assistance. At the same time, these efforts assured the military of orderly consideration of its views, reflecting the judgment that the military is more willing to participate faithfully in the implementation of a decision where it has been overruled if it feels that military views have been fully taken into account.

(2) *Military adviser in the White House.* President Franklin Roosevelt relied heavily on Admiral William Leahy as the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief. Truman for a brief period continued to use Leahy and then, on a part-time basis, relied on General Eisenhower for advice on budget issues, while Eisenhower was President of Columbia University. Truman later turned to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

Eisenhower, his own military adviser in the White House, had only a junior military officer in the person of Colonel Andrew Goodpaster who functioned in effect as a staff secretary, collecting and summarizing for the President intelligence materials from the State Department and the CIA, as well as the military.

Kennedy, after the Bay of Pigs operation, brought General Maxwell Taylor into the White House as the military representative of the President, and Taylor advised the President on a broad range of issues involving all aspects of national security policy. When Taylor moved over to become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, a JCS liaison office was created in the White House, working primarily with the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs.

President Johnson relied primarily on other mechanisms but did use General Taylor as a White House consultant after his return from Vietnam. Taylor functioned in relation to the Vietnam issue, providing an alternate source of advice and information to the President on options open to him in Vietnam operations and negotiations.

President Nixon recalled General Goodpaster briefly during the transition period and the very early days of his administration, but since then has not had a senior military adviser in the White House. Henry Kissinger's deputy is an army major-general. He ensures, along with the JCS liaison office, that Kissinger

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and the President are aware of JCS concerns, but he does not serve as an alternate source of military advice.

(3) *A civilian adviser in the White House.* There has been a growing trend in the postwar period toward presidential reliance on White House staff assistance in both domestic and national security policy. In the National Security field, civilian assistance has been used not only as a source of additional information, advice and options, but also as an aid to the President in seeing that his decisions are carried through.

Truman tended to rely on his cabinet officers and the uniformed military, but there were episodic interventions by civilians in the White House. Under Truman, Clark Clifford became heavily involved in the negotiations leading to the Defense Unification Act and the National Security Council system. Later he contributed to the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission and the continued control of atomic weapons by the Commission. Averell Harriman, who became Truman's national security adviser just before the Korean War, functioned briefly during the early stages of the war as a spokesman for the President's position; his tasks included a visit to General MacArthur to explain the President's policies to him and seek his compliance.

Eisenhower had no single national security adviser in the White House. His Assistants for National Security Council Affairs were involved only in the very limited number of issues that were handled in the rather stylized machinery of the National Security Council system as then constituted. Eisenhower brought in several advisers for specific issues, including Nelson Rockefeller, but these advisers tended to interact and overlap with Secretary of State Dulles rather than with the Department of Defense. They were responsible for some new initiatives, such as Eisenhower's "open skies" proposal in 1954, but the instances are few.

The regularization and institutionalization of a civilian adviser in the White House on national security matters came with President Kennedy's appointment of McGeorge Bundy. Bundy, following the Bay of Pigs fiasco, moved to increase the independence of the White House in securing information by arranging to get a good deal of the raw material directly from the field, including State, Defense and CIA cable traffic. Bundy also assumed primary responsibility for briefing the President. Despite the expanded role which involved them in many foreign policy

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matters with military implications, neither Bundy nor Walt Rostow, Johnson's adviser for national security affairs, were heavily engaged in Defense budget matters. Under President Nixon, Henry Kissinger has been as active in Defense Department matters as he is in those for which the State Department has primary responsibility. Nixon appears to rely upon Kissinger as an alternative source of information and options on the broad range of military and national security matters, and as a channel for various kinds of military advice.

(4) *Reliance on the Secretary of Defense.* Truman and Eisenhower tended to rely on their Secretaries of Defense primarily to secure the implementation of their decisions, particularly Defense budget decisions. They expected the Secretaries to bear the weight of military objections to ceilings on defense spending and to force the services to develop forces within those ceilings. Even in this role the Defense Secretaries were of limited value to the President since they tended to become spokesmen for the military desire for increased spending.

The appointment of Robert S. McNamara brought to fruition a trend which had been developing gradually and had accelerated during the brief tenure of Secretary Thomas Gates. This called for the Secretary of Defense to become in effect the principal military adviser to the President, superseding the Joint Chiefs. Over time Kennedy and Johnson, at least until the Vietnam war accelerated in late 1965, tended to look to the Secretary of Defense for advice on commitments, bases, overseas deployments and military aid, as well as budget decisions. The Secretary's job included absorbing the advice tendered by the military and combining that in his recommendations to the President. Both Kennedy and Johnson did, of course, continue to meet with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in formal sessions of the National Security Council and in other meetings, but by and large they received military judgments and advice through the filter of the Secretary of Defense. As the Vietnam war heated up, JCS Chairman General Earle Wheeler was included in Johnson's regular Tuesday lunches and began to act as an independent vehicle for reporting JCS views to the President, at least on the range of issues discussed at those meetings. Defense Secretary Laird has continued the tradition of taking positions on substantive issues of military policy and operations, as well as defense budget issues, although the President seems to regard him simply

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as a second source of advice on military questions. The Secretary and the Joint Chiefs have a co-equal role in the National Security Council and in all of its subordinate institutions.

(5) *Reliance on the Secretary of State.* No President has given the Secretary of State a dominant role in decisions regarding combat operations or the defense budget. Truman did call on General Marshall—when he was Secretary of State—for support in keeping the Defense budget down, and Nixon has brought the Secretary's staff into the Defense budget process through the Defense Program Review Committee. However, on issues concerning commitments, bases, overseas deployments and military aid, Truman tended to rely largely on Acheson's judgment, and Eisenhower depended to a large extent on Dulles. Secretary Rusk played a major role in these issues along with Secretary McNamara.

(6) *Reliance on scientists.* Although scientists have occasionally been used to evaluate combat operations, by and large their role has been limited to issues reflected in the Defense budget. Eisenhower depended, particularly in the later years of his administration, on the chief scientist in the Pentagon (the Director of Defense Research and Engineering) and on his science advisers. Kennedy also looked to his science adviser, Jerome Weisner, for alternate advice on the Defense budget, as well as on arms-control matters, particularly relating to the nuclear testing issue. The role of the science advisers seems to have declined precipitously under Johnson and Nixon, with their energies going largely to non-Defense matters.

(7) *Reliance on the Bureau of the Budget.* The role of the Budget Bureau (now Office of Management and Budget) in Defense decisions has been very limited. Truman and Eisenhower relied upon the Budget Director to help set a ceiling on Defense spending, but the Bureau did not get involved in deciding how that money would be spent. Under Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson it became a matter of tradition that the Budget Director would have to appeal Secretarial decisions on the Defense budget to the President, the reverse of the situation in all other departments. Press reports suggested that initially Nixon had reversed this process, but he now appears to have returned to this traditional pattern. The Budget Director sits on the Defense Program Review Committee, but the extent of Budget Bureau influence is difficult to determine.

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(8) *Ad hoc techniques.* Presidents have used a number of ad hoc or special techniques to secure information and options on military questions. One technique frequently used during the Truman and Eisenhower periods was the President-appointed commission. Nixon's Fitzhugh Panel may mark a return to the use of this technique, although it has thus far been limited to organizational rather than substantive questions.

Occasionally, Presidents have sent special representatives into the field to investigate military questions. Kennedy, for example, sent an old friend and military officer to the camp preparing the Cuban guerrillas for the Bay of Pigs operations, and Richard Nixon sent British guerrilla war expert Brigadier General Thompson to Vietnam for an independent assessment.

Now and then a President has been fortunate enough to have the concurrence of the military on a particular policy, without having to bargain. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed expansion of the Korean War and felt that General MacArthur had indeed been insubordinate was of critical importance to Truman in securing public acceptance of this policy. However, in most cases, the President has been forced to bargain for the public support of the Joint Chiefs. Truman had to accept the case for German rearmament in order to gain JCS approval to send American forces to Europe. Kennedy and his Secretary of Defense engaged in long hours of bargaining with the Joint Chiefs before they were able to devise an acceptable safeguard program of standby preparations for nuclear testing that made it possible for the Joint Chiefs to give their reluctant support to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Johnson felt obliged to have the Joint Chiefs of Staff on board before he would order the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam in 1968.

In some cases, the President has sought to use the prestige and power of his office to accomplish his objectives in the face of military opposition. This tactic has a better chance of success when the decisions involve only executive department action; when the Chiefs are split; and particularly when the decisions do not require the use of armed forces in combat operations. But it can be done in other cases. For example, on the matter of civilian control of atomic weapons and the creation of a civilian-dominated Atomic Energy Commission, Truman appealed to the public and Congress over the objections of the military, and was able to win. Eisenhower in the same way (although less

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successfully) enlisted the support of the American business community in his effort to reorganize the Defense Department against the judgment of the military.

Presidents have had the greatest success in bypassing the military on Defense budget limitations, because military demands are essentially open-ended and always have to be overruled. However, the appeal to fiscal conservatism and alternative demands for resources have also tended to check defense expenditures.

III

Techniques used to improve the information and options reaching the President can also be applied to the implementation of decisions. For example, civilian advisers in the White House have been used to monitor compliance with presidential decisions, and other Presidents have tended to rely on the Secretary of Defense to see that their decisions were carried out.

In addition, Presidents have sometimes resorted to selecting military officers who they felt shared their views and therefore would act to implement them properly. The most dramatic case came in 1953 when Eisenhower replaced all of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appointed Admiral Radford, a known supporter of his policy of massive nuclear retaliation, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and chose service chiefs who by and large were prepared to comply. After the Cuban missile crisis, Admiral George Anderson, who had not coöperated fully with the President, was not reappointed to the post of Chief of Naval Operations. However, there are severe limits to the value of such actions: General Ridgway and later General Taylor, the Army Chiefs of Staff appointed by Eisenhower, resisted the reduction in the size of the Army and the Administration's reliance on massive nuclear retaliation. When their views were ignored they resigned and protested publicly. In response to Admiral Anderson's reassignment as Ambassador to Portugal, Congress legislated statutory terms for the members of the Joint Chiefs.

Another technique that has been used to increase compliance with presidential decisions is the creation of new organizations which reflect new desires. The most successful such effort was to create within the Navy a Special Projects Office to monitor the Polaris program and to alter promotion procedures so that command of a Polaris submarine would permit promotion to senior grades. The least successful effort was Kennedy's attempt in the

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early 1960s to give the military a greater flexibility in dealing with counterinsurgency operations by creating the Green Berets.

IV

The decline of the prestige of the military over the past several years has given President Nixon and his successors greater freedom to determine how advice from the military reaches them, and to accept or reject that advice. The experience of the postwar period suggests two basic changes which the President could institute now that would increase his leverage vis-à-vis the military—one involving the channel by which he receives advice from senior military officers and the other concerning the role of civilian advisers.

The experience of the last 25 years suggests that the effort to reorganize the Pentagon and then to demand "unified" military advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been a failure. As noted above, most observers who have had the opportunity to view the product of the Joint Chiefs would argue that unified JCS papers reflect either a compromise among the services, a form of log-rolling in which the proposals of all services are endorsed, or deference to the service or field commander most concerned. As long as the function of the Joint Staff is to come up with a paper that will be endorsed by all of the Chiefs, there does not appear to be any way to alter the situation fundamentally, although some progress has been made in the last several years in increasing the flexibility and independence of the Joint Staff.

More radical changes must be effected if the President is to get good military advice. The key to improving the situation is to separate the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff from the Service Chiefs. The President and the Secretary of Defense would in this case solicit the separate views of each of the Service Chiefs and of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and where appropriate, the views of the relevant unified and specified commanders (*e.g.* commanders in Europe and Asia and the head of the Strategic Air Command). These latter views might be channeled to the Secretary through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The Chairman would, in turn, be the officer in the line of command through the President and the Secretary of Defense to the commanders (bypassing the Service Chiefs) for carrying out operations in the field.

The basic rationale behind this change in procedure is that

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the Service Chiefs and the unified and specified commands constitute the highest level at which reliable (first-hand) information and advice are available. The Joint Staff, when it needs information, must solicit either the service staffs in Washington or the field commanders. In fact, JCS information and advice presented to the President and the Secretary usually come from the services and the subordinate service commands in the field. For example, most of the positions taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on questions relating to Vietnam simply involved a JCS endorsement of the recommendations of General Westmoreland or General Abrams, the army commanders in Vietnam, and Admiral Sharp, Commander in Chief of the Pacific, who had particular responsibility for the bombing operations.

On questions of requirements for overseas bases, to take another example, the Joint Chiefs in most cases simply endorse the position of the Service which utilizes the base. On budget issues, the Chiefs tend to endorse all of the programs desired by each of the services. When forced to choose on an issue of policy the Chiefs compromise among the different Service positions rather than attempting to develop a position based on a unified military point of view.

Under the proposed change of procedure the President and the Secretary of Defense would be made aware of differing positions which might otherwise be compromised. In addition this would leave the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Joint Staff free from the job of developing a compromise position and therefore able to present the Secretary of Defense with a military judgment separate from the interests of the Services. If this process is to succeed the President and the Secretary will have to choose a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs with whom they can work. Then, if the system is developed properly, the Chairman and the Joint Staff would come to be seen as part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, providing him and the President with military advice which could be weighed against the advice of the operators—the Service Chiefs and the unified and specified commanders. The influence of the Chairman would come from his record of persuasiveness with the President and the Secretary of Defense. They will take his judgments seriously if his choice is shown to be based on a broader range of considerations than the advice of the Service Chiefs.

Such a procedure would increase the probability that imagina-

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tive and innovative proposals would reach the President. It would also make it more likely that the President would become aware of the wide diversity of military opinions on a question and not act on an erroneous assumption that there was a unified view.

One of the few instances on record in which the President did seek separate opinions from the several Chiefs came in 1961 when President Kennedy was contemplating an invasion of Laos. Partly because of the Bay of Pigs episode in which the doubts of individual Chiefs about the military feasibility of the landing in Cuba never reached him, Kennedy asked each Chief separately for his views in writing and then met with them as a group. He discovered by this process that each one had a slightly different position on what should be done, what troops should be committed, and what the likely outcome of American intervention would be. Receiving this conflicting advice, it was harder for Kennedy to make a decision to intervene but it also meant that he did not make a decision under a mistaken impression that there was a unified military view either for or against the intervention.

The proposed procedure would also increase presidential flexibility in accepting or rejecting military advice because he would no longer be confronted with a unanimous but misleading statement of JCS views. He would be able to choose among service and command viewpoints rather than having to develop a new position which in essence overrules all of the military, in as much as JCS opinions now represent all the services.

In order to increase the President's freedom to choose and the likelihood that he will get faithful implementation and political support for his actions, a procedure should be developed which provides for military access to the President on issues of importance to the military. Access should be provided not only for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, but also for the Service Chiefs and the unified commanders most concerned. When he finds it necessary to overrule the military, the President should justify his decision on broad political grounds; he should be seen doing so personally; and he should do so in writing with a clear memorandum stating his position. All of these acts would increase military willingness to go along with presidential decisions and to implement them faithfully.

The military takes seriously the President's role as Com-

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mander in Chief and also recognizes that he has broader responsibility concerned with both domestic and international political situations. They are much more amenable to being overruled on these grounds than to being told that their military judgment is questioned. (For this reason the military resented McNamara's reliance on civilians, particularly in the Office of Systems Analysis, for judgments on what they took to be purely military questions, *i.e.* statements of military requirements.) They also implement decisions faithfully when assured that their position has been heard by the President and it has not been lost in the filter of Secretary of Defense memoranda.

Securing separate advice from the Service Chiefs and other military commanders will require that the President, or at least his White House staff, spend more time digesting the separate positions. However, this seems a price worth paying to increase the flow of new ideas or doubts about proposed courses of action to the White House.

Military compliance with presidential decisions would also be enhanced by avoiding the practice of using the military to seek public support for presidential decisions. The value of such action has become considerably reduced in recent years, and such use of the military tends to legitimize and increase the importance of their opposition when they choose to oppose policy.

V

Implicit in the new procedures as suggested is a reduced role for the Secretary of Defense from that which he assumed in the 1960s. His scope would also be affected by another proposed change—that decision-making on matters concerning Defense budgets and the use of military force be moved outside of the Pentagon and into a broader arena involving officials from the White House and other agencies.

The Nixon administration has moved rather significantly, at least in form and to some extent in substance, to change the locus of decisions. The creation of the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) brings into existence for the first time a forum in which detailed contingency planning for the actual use of military force is carried out beyond the Pentagon. WSAG is chaired by the President's Assistant for National Security and includes senior State Department and CIA officials as well as civilian and military representatives of the Pentagon. It provides

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a forum where the military, diplomatic and intelligence evaluations of likely use of American military forces can be brought together in a systematic way, something which was not done in the past. This institution needs to be strengthened, probably with the addition of some White House staff assigned specifically to this task.

A second institution of significance is the Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC), which is also chaired by the President's Assistant for National Security and includes representatives not only from State but also from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Council of Economic Advisers and the Office of Management and Budget. The implications of this institution are enormous. If it is functioning effectively, decisions not only on the total size of the Defense budget but also on the major Defense programs will be made outside the Pentagon in an interagency forum where White House influence is dominant. The President would be receiving advice on Defense budget issues from several different perspectives. While the institution has been created, it does not appear yet to have either the staff or the necessary top level direction to get into a wide range of Defense issues.

For this purpose and also to make WSAG more effective, the President's Assistant for National Security probably needs a Senior Deputy who would take some of the responsibility for White House direction for budget and combat decisions, and who would be explicitly charged with bringing to bear the broader concerns of the President.

The procedures suggested here in no sense imply a downgrading of military advice. Instead they are designed to assure that the President receives the full range of the existing military opinions rather than what filters through a JCS compromise procedure or a Secretary of Defense responsible for presenting military views to the President. They also aim to give the President critical commentary on military proposals from civilian officials with a different and somewhat broader range of responsibilities. In the end, good decisions will depend on the wisdom and judgment of the President. What he decides, however, is greatly influenced by the information presented to him, as well as by his sense of freedom to choose regardless of strong military and other bureaucratic pressures.

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POLLUTION: PRECEDENT AND PROSPECT

By Charles Cheney Humpstone

THE same environmental concerns that have found public and political voice in the United States over the past five years have emerged in other countries and governments and in international organizations as well. For the most part, however, international action has not yet taken an effective form. The organizations and individuals who have attempted to identify aspects of pollution that have international effects have done so with varying success. Their efforts are characteristic of our own examination of pollution problems: two conflicting definitions of pollution and correspondingly conflicting approaches to pollution control repeatedly emerge. A dispute continues between the absolute duty to release nothing harmful and the relative duty to do no more harm than is reasonable under the circumstances.

To eliminate all forms of pollution would be expensive, and would require curtailing pleasures or profits to which we have become accustomed. But advocacy of this approach does not raise a new issue; it continues a traditional struggle within Anglo-American law. The adversaries typically are, on one side, a manufacturer who operates a factory that produces a useful product and furnishes employment but gives off dust, smells, noise or filth, and, on the other, a complaining neighbor, or downstream landowner. The manufacturer argues that he has as much right to use the air or the stream as a repository for waste as the neighbor has to breathe the air or drink water from the stream.

Judicial citations of Latin maxims have the historical charm of telling us that men have been arguing a particular point since Lancastrian or even Roman antiquity. In the kinds of disputes we have described, the recurrent maxim has been: *Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.* "Use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another."

In the mid-eighteenth century, Sir William Blackstone quoted the maxim as the foundation of the law of nuisance. He gave a series of illustrations: "To build a house so close to another's that rainwater from your roof spills onto his, is to commit a nui-

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sance." So is keeping hogs so near another's house "that the stench of them incommodes him and makes the air unwholesome." A tanner's or tallow chandler's trade must be operated in a remote place. A smelting house for lead cannot be so close to another's land that its vapors and smoke kill his corn and grass, or damage his cattle. One may not "corrupt or poison a water-course by erecting a dye-house or a lime pit for the use of trade in the upper part of the stream."

Blackstone said that the courts would prevent or provide compensation for any act, in itself lawful, that necessarily tended to damage the property of another. As for the person responsible, "it is incumbent upon him to find some other place to do that act where it will be less offensive." He found authority for the remedies not only in the maxim and the many cases citing it, but in Christianity itself: "So closely does the law of England enforce that excellent rule of gospel morality of 'doing to others as we would they should do unto ourselves'."

The law, however, was never so simple. Could I not cook my food lest smoke from my stove blow in my neighbor's face? Judges before and after Blackstone tended to disregard the maxim where the landowner was using his land in a common and socially useful way, and to invoke it when the use was careless, unproductive, intended to injure another or otherwise sufficiently unlike the use to which neighboring land was being put to make trouble among neighbors. As population density increased, such troubles were likely to multiply.

In 1607, an English court had written:

> One John Ronkett was indicted in pais for that he had made candles within the vill of Bury, whereby he had caused such a noisome smell that it was to the nuisance of the inhabitants of said vill, and dangerous by reason of infection.
>
> The indictment was held insufficient by all the Court. For candles are a necessary commodity, without which people cannot well live, and though it be noisome in smell, still since it is needful for the commonwealth, it shall be suffered. . . .

The report concluded with an assurance that a town government could prohibit candle factories from certain parts of the town, but that until the government imposed such a prohibition, the factory owner was only required to be careful.

By 1751, however, judges were saying that a bad-smelling factory had *no* right to operate where it chose; no matter how useful its product, it only had the right to operate where it did not of-

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fend neighbors. A court said, "the very existence of the nuisance depends upon the number of houses and concourse of people."

Although the origins and rationale of the law of nuisance remain somewhat tangled, nuisance may be defined as any unreasonable interference with an owner's or tenant's enjoyment of land. The interference may be intentional or negligent or it may be conduct that is abnormal or only out of place in its surroundings. What is "normal" for an area depends upon the use to which the surrounding land is being put. A site that is appropriate for a factory at a time when it is remote from any dwellings ceases to be so when a town grows around it. Some courts have been troubled that the landowner could be deprived of the right to use his land for its accustomed purpose by newly arrived persons who could have avoided the annoyance they complain of by choosing some other place to live. One judge, for instance, ruled that a factory that had dumped waste into a stream for a long time without being challenged had thereby acquired a permanent right to do so. His decision rested on much the same principle that gives a trespasser who is permitted to cut across another's land to reach his own for several decades an easement to do so forever. The most judicially popular view, however, has been that noise or smells or harmful effluents only can be released so long as they do not interfere with another's use of land.

This common law doctrine has implications for international pollution abatement. So long as the "concourse of people" worldwide was doubling every thousand years and numbered less than half a billion (which is where it was 70 years before Blackstone was born), the entrepreneur with a factory that produced an unwholesome effluent could reasonably be asked to locate where he would not offend his neighbors. But within 70 years after Blackstone's death the world population had doubled again. The thousand-year doubling period had shortened to 200 years. It has continued to shrink. The last doubling took about 35 years. We number between three and four billion now and can expect to become twice as numerous within the next 30 years.

The increase in human consumption of energy in all forms is an indication of the rate of change in the level of man's activity. In a primitive society man consumes annually the energy equivalent of approximately 220 pounds of coal per person. The worldwide average per capita energy consumption during 1970 was the equivalent of two metric tons of coal. In the United

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States it was 11 tons. The United States consumed the equivalent of 2.2 billion tons that year; the world as a whole, 7.5 billion. Within 30 years, U.S. consumption is expected to be 6 billion and the world's, 32 billion tons.

While man's numbers double, his material demands and output more than triple. The waste by-products of this productivity increase at the same rate. The global consequences mount even where, for want of a neighbor, an emission does not provoke a local complaint. Within 30 years man will be contributing twice as much fixed nitrogen to the biosphere each year as the biosphere produces and consumes in its natural processes. He is already adding sulphur to the soil and oceans in a greater amount than is used in the world's natural cycle of plant growth and decay.

Such a rate of discharge has the effect of making neighbors of us all. There is no longer any location from which a discharge can go unnoticed. Applying Blackstone's law of nuisance, there is no longer any "other place to do that act where it will be less offensive."

II

Another series of Anglo-Saxon courtroom struggles growing out of the law of trespass has contributed support to the arguments for a strategy of prohibiting damaging releases. The cases have involved escaping animals and, like the nuisance cases, suggest that the judicial view of the comparative social utility of escaping substances, and of the damage they do, originally emphasizes the need to safeguard the economic base of the society and later is altered by the increasing importance of preserving social order in a more crowded community. The early law tended to impose liability where real economic harm was likely to result, and none where there was a theoretically wrongful act but no real injury. Judicial treatment of trespass to land was an example. Some animals were likely to damage the crop or land of another if they wandered onto it. The courts protected landowners from the incursions of these animals, cattle, horses, sheep, hogs and flocks of barnyard fowl, by making the keeper of the herd or flock responsible for the animals' trespass, whether or not he was negligent in allowing them to wander. Dogs and cats, on the other hand, were unlikely to do harm to land or crops, and, in fact, were useful defenses against predator species. The

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consequence was that a special doctrine exempted the owners of dogs and cats from liability for their animals' trespasses to land.

Even when the case involved injury to persons or livestock instead of to land, the basic policy remained the same. If a ferocious animal, either a captive wild animal or a domestic animal known for its propensity to attack, bit or gored an animal or person, the owner of the attacking animal was liable even though its escape or attack took place through no fault of his. However, if a generally harmless domestic animal (including a dog that had not previously displayed a savage temperament) injured a person or animal, his owner was not liable unless he had been careless. The distinctions made economic sense in an agricultural community, and they furnish a vocabulary with which to describe the gradations in perceptions of social utility that has come to make the refining of petroleum feeding a tabby to one judge but rearing a tiger to another.

The wild animal cases and the nuisance cases converged in *Rylands v. Fletcher,* an English case decided in 1866. The trial court found that the defendant had carefully built and filled a reservoir without learning that there was an abandoned mine shaft under it. The water burst from the reservoir into the mine below, flowed through horizontal tunnels, and flooded the plaintiff's coal mine under adjacent property. The appellate court had to decide whether building the reservoir had made its owner liable for the damage done by the flooding. They declared that:

> it seems but reasonable and just that the neighbor, who has brought something on his own property which was not naturally there, harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own property, but which he knows to be mischievous if it gets on his neighbor's, should be obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does not succeed in confining it to his own property. But for his act in bringing it there, no mischief could have accrued, and it seems but just that he should at his peril keep it there, so that no mischief may accrue, or answer for the natural and anticipated consequences. And upon authority, this we think is established to be the law, whether the things so brought be beasts, or water, or filth, or stenches.

The House of Lords affirmed the case in somewhat more guarded terms.

Fletcher's success did not lay the question to rest, although English courts follow the case in current air pollution cases. Some courts in the United States have been unwilling to reach the same result when the action about which the neighbor complains has a greater apparent social utility than the activities

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with which it interferes. In one case, oil from a refinery and storage facility soaked into the ground, percolated onto neighboring property and poisoned a well. The court conceded that if the percolating matter had been "filth or other deleterious matter," the owner would have been under an absolute obligation to confine it successfully, but because the matter in question was "a product which has become one of the prime necessities of modern life," public policy justified absolution of the owner unless he had been careless in letting the oil spill. A court deciding a similar case, in another state, reached the opposite result after describing the material escaping from a petroleum refinery as "oil, refuse, and poisonous substances." The result, in each case, hinged on the court's view of the social utility of the substance.

III

These judicial expressions of public policy (another way of saying popular custom) may be as easily applied to the matter or energy that we may consider to be global environmental hazards as to local phenomena, once we recognize that a particular release is potentially harmful.

A bad smell and a savage animal have in common the quality that we recoil from either as soon as we are aware of its presence. There is a large category of adverse circumstance, however, by which we are not inspired to immediate corrective action, that we may deplore but to which we reconcile ourselves. We accept a level of irritation against which our annoyance is not high enough to support effective remedial effort. The class is made up of activities that we believe have some social utility and that produce only slight irritation. With respect to some of these activities, such as the crying of our neighbors' baby that awakens us, our perception that the injury is minor and should be endured is not likely to change. About many more of them, however, our perceptions may change, either because we change our aesthetic standards or because what we have believed to be a harmless irritant turns out to be a serious poison by reason of an increase in its volume or our knowledge. We have been exposed to automobile exhausts, and for 70 years have known that they contain poisons. We have assumed, however, that the amounts of poisons involved were too small to matter. It is only within the last few years that we have begun to worry about the effects of these amounts of carbon monoxide and lead on our health.

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The dynamics of change in the levels of production of the major *known* poisons has made the argument for containing them easy. They are lethal in certain quantities; if they are accumulating, it is only a question of time before a level is reached at which injury will occur. Once I am convinced that I am being poisoned, it seems more sensible to stop the poisoning altogether than only to reduce the dose. That same feeling, however, does not arise with respect to substances or circumstances that we still think either completely harmless or harmful to only an insignificant degree. Carbon monoxide is now an easy target for the reformer, but commercial fertilizer is not.

The argument that we should not permit any even supposedly benign substances to move from our land, to percolate under, or mix with the air or water over, or surrounding, our neighbor's, must rest on an assessment of the damage they will do. Biologically, there is no doubt that the biosphere can absorb and digest very large quantities of many human effluents. The doubt, on a global scale, is how large these quantities can be and of what effluents. It is not clear how long it will take to resolve the doubt. There is at least a good chance that the doubt may not be resolved until after the quantity that can be absorbed has been exceeded, with perhaps disastrous results. Unfortunately technology cannot yet tell us what or where the damage will be. That range of uncertainty leaves those of us who are advocates of a policy prohibiting the bringing of any unwanted matter or energy upon our neighbors' land, with a barrier to pass. We must know them "to be mischievous" before we can rely upon the principle "established to be the law whether the things so brought be beasts or water or filth or stenches."

We propose to cross this barrier upon two assertions. The first is that substances that do not occur in nature have not been part of the environmental background to which natural selection has adapted living species. We should suspect of such substances, if they are not inert, that they will cause changes that will alter the selection process with respect to some species. The second assertion is that although substances that do occur in nature and are biologically active have taken part in evolutionary change, evolution has adapted living species to them only up to the levels that appear in nature. These levels vary depending on such natural fluctuations as amounts of rainfall or of volcanic activity. If the contributions to the environment from human sources are

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greater than the natural variations of these substances, then these contributions can be expected to cause biological change. With respect to both kinds of substances, unforeseeable and uncontrollable biological changes resulting from human activity should be considered harmful. Not potentially harmful, or prima facie harmful, but presently harmful, on some scale or for some reason not yet known to us. We have precedent enough, from irrigation to insect eradication, to say that every large-scale human activity that involves physical change to the earth's surface or to matter has produced side effects that have markedly upset the natural balance, but that we typically do not recognize the harm for a very long time. We assert that all those human activities that release waste matter by reason of man's extraordinary proliferation and productivity are likely to be taking place on a scale that is causing harm to portions of the biosphere that we require to continue their natural functions. We are now prepared to build a remedial strategy based on this assertion. Once the harmfulness is imputed, we are back with Blackstone and the maxim. The duty of containment becomes not a new exercise in social engineering but familiar, customary, one of the oldest legal duties we owe our neighbors.

A no-release strategy not only has firm historic roots in our law, it holds more promise for international effectiveness than any partial release strategy. The reasons are not only biological but also economic and diplomatic.

The international alternatives to a no-release strategy suffer from three faults. They contemplate regional rather than uniform standards; they require agreement on what is an acceptable level of pollution; and they contemplate repeatedly changing regulations.

Consider the first of these faults: imposing standards by region rather than worldwide by activity. If a regional agreement imposes a requirement that the release of more than a certain concentration of material into the air is prohibited, one of several results must follow: the plant that would otherwise release a greater amount must close down, move away or raise its capital and operating costs to meet the standard. A competitor in a less scrupulous region may, thereafter, charge a lower price and make a greater profit. The resulting effects on costs and prices will encourage plant construction in many unregulated portions of the world and an operation without proper emission con-

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trols, increasing, rather than reducing, the global effluent release.

With respect to the second fault, adoption of a partial release strategy would require negotiation on issues upon which no political representatives could agree. To begin with, it would require multinational agreement on the concentration of a pollutant in a regional air or watershed that would be acceptable for a given multinational region. Once the concentration had been determined, the total amount of effluent that could be released per day per source without exceeding the concentration could be calculated, but participants would then have to negotiate an agreement upon what portion of a given amount of effluent each nation should be allowed to contribute to its region. Such agreements are implausible because to fix the emission quota of each of a group of countries, at any given state of control technology, would be to fix their productive output relative to one another.

If national quotas are not assigned, and instead a regionwide inventory is agreed upon, the regulatory effort that must follow would impose an even more cumbersome diplomatic task, negotiating plant-by-plant emission quotas in an international forum.

In either case the contemplated quotas would be subject to the third fault: repeated changes in standards. As pressure mounts for additional productivity in a region, the emission controls on existing plants must be made increasingly effective to permit construction of more plants if an agreed-upon total emission inventory is not to be exceeded. Of all the circumstances attending anti-pollution regulation, the most offensive to regulated industries has been imposition of partial control standards at a time when the industries know that future standards will be of a greater but indeterminate severity.

A manufacturer is told that the smoke from his chimney must consist of no more than one percent sulphur dioxide two years hence, but he is also made aware that after he has learned how to achieve that standard, the regulatory authority will consider what further reductions may be desirable. That approach can be applied easily to successive models of automobiles, but as applied to permanent industrial installations, it is like amputating a little at a time.

A control device available this year that will reduce sulphur dioxide emissions to one percent of a plant's stack gases will add roughly one-fifth to the cost of a new plant. A manager installs

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one at his peril. If the sulphur dioxide emission standard becomes more stringent at the end of two years, because a more effective control device has become available, he must junk his first device and buy the new one. The competitor who evades the requirement until the new standard becomes applicable pays a lower total cost.

A non-release goal, on the other hand (even if it is approached gradually), is internationally uniform and does not require knowledge of, or international agreement on, the maximum permissible amounts of effluents. The long-range goal is known from the start. Interim standards for successive reductions in future emission rates may be fixed prospectively, on the basis of current forecasts.

For individually recoverable, dangerous substances like mercury, interim standards may be direct regulations, making scheduled but increasingly rigorous demands on the industry. With respect to most substances, however, the purpose of regulatory standards might better be served by a schedule of effluent taxes imposing progressively higher annual levies on the release of specified quantities of waste material into air or water. In some industries a combination of regulation and tax may be desirable. What must be present in all cases, however, are an international industry-wide standard, a fixed period for complete termination of waste release, and a schedule of graduated, progressively more demanding standards settled in advance to cover the period until the no-release goal is achieved.

Progressive interim requirements enforced through taxation lose the quality of amputation by degrees. In an industry in which the existing state of control technology is sufficiently advanced to allow immediate construction of complete controls, the sooner they are constructed the lower the total of the effluent taxes the operator will have to pay. If the operator chooses to install controls that are less than complete, but that remove more pollutant than current standards demand, he can foresee what duration of tax-free operation the investment will permit.

In industries in which complete control is beyond the reach of existing technology, the time period before complete containment will be required may be somewhat longer, say 15 to 20 years. The effect of the graduated tax will be to encourage early investment in research and development. In every industry construction of a nonpolluting or low-polluting new plant is less

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expensive than installing control equipment upon an existing plant. Every new facility built before complete control technology is developed will be more expensive to convert than one designed around an effective control technology.

In the early years of the tax, while it is still low, and before complete control is possible, it may be more economical for a manufacturer to invest in research and development and pay the tax. As the tax grows heavier, there will be increasing incentive to invest in the partially effective interim controls that have been developed as a result of earlier research efforts.

IV

If this analysis of the advantages of a no-release goal as a guide for international remedial efforts is correct, it remains to be seen what action should be taken, and by whom, to begin to put the principle into effect. The United Nations 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment offers a possible opportunity for action, so does the Organization for Economic Coöperation and Development (OECD). But the steps described below could be begun through one or more of the existing international organizations or through ad hoc multilateral deliberations. They are more likely to bear fruit in the near future if they are urged simultaneously through a number of channels.

One or more national governments (our own, for example) must undertake to show the major industrial countries that pollution abatement will have an important effect on costs for every industry whose products are sold in international commerce. If the United States is going to take the lead, it should begin by estimating the costs of pollution abatement, per unit of output, industry-by-industry, for each of the dozen or so industries that are both responsible for the bulk of the world's nonagricultural and nonmunicipal waste effluents and sell their products in an international market. These estimates must include both control costs to domestic producers in the United States and to producers in other countries responsible for most of the production of each industry.

The U.S. air and water pollution control agencies have prepared preliminary estimates of those costs for producers in the United States. These estimates, with refinement and augmentation, together with forecasts of the emission controls that the United States expects to have in effect by late 1972, could be the

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basis for initiating negotiations. With these estimates, the United States could begin to interest governments in determining for themselves whether representatives of the designated industries within their countries would be more willing to accept demanding emission standards by late 1972 if they could be assured that their foreign competitors would have to pay the costs of meeting the same standards.

The immediate goal of the action should not be for the OECD or the 1972 U.N. Conference to issue emission standards. Members of the OECD Environment Committee or delegates to Stockholm would have neither the authority, the information nor the time to arrive at standards. They could, however, agree upon a timetable for a series of multilateral negotiations to arrive at immediate, medium-range and long-range emission standards and tax schedules for each of a series of industries. The standards, once agreed to, must be incorporated into multilateral treaties or conventions obliging signatory governments to place the standards and tax schedules before their respective legislatures for enactment into domestic legislation.

The first generation of signatories almost certainly would be made up of only the most industrialized nations, the governments that are now under domestic pressure to reduce pollution. But their actions would, in global terms, regulate that portion of world production which accounts for very nearly all significant amounts of the effluents of man's commercial activity. Initially developing countries would not be likely to join because their economies do not yet produce sufficient quantites of pollutants to cause public discomfort or health problems, and because their difficulty in obtaining capital financing for industrial development makes them, for now, unable to afford the additional costs of pollution control. However, because the political forces for effective pollution abatement may be expected to grow in such countries at roughly the same rate as investment in industrial plants, the developing countries may be expected to join the conventions covering their industries as those industries mature. In the long run, pollution control in any country or group of countries is going to find political support in proportion to the degree of discomfort or danger that the public perceives. The greater the intensity of industrial development in any country, the greater the public's perception of danger and discomfort is likely to be.

It should be emphasized that international action is required

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as urgently for economic reasons as for biological ones. Discussions of the international aspects of environmental pollution tend to emphasize the global distribution of some pollutants or the local consequences of concentrations of pollutants that originate in one country and do harm in another. The economic consequences of pollution abatement, however, are likely to be the aspect of environmental change that will have the most immediate and serious international repercussions.

The most important economic consequences of pollution control are likely to be the differences in cost of production between goods produced under demanding pollution controls and those produced free of such controls. These differences have been estimated to range between five and 20 percent depending on the industry and the process. They will affect the sales and profits of competitors and are likely to result in offsetting taxes and subsidies that may, in turn, provoke retaliatory counter taxes and subsidies.

The creation of machinery to permit the establishment of international emission standards would remove an important roadblock now obstructing the development of effective national controls. Suppose, for example, that the cost of reducing effluents from a paper mill by 95 percent adds 15 percent to the cost of the paper produced in that mill. So long as the United States and the Canadian and Swedish governments try unilaterally to impose these standards, paper manufacturers in each country will say, quite rightly, that the cost of effluent controls will place them at a competitive disadvantage internationally and will lobby against the imposition of such controls by their national legislatures. At the same time, these manufacturers are increasingly sensitive to rising public concern over the discharges from their plants, and upon the effect that adverse publicity may eventually have upon the markets for their products.

If a mechanism could be developed for adopting effluent standards multilaterally, so that competitors in different jurisdictions would bear similar control costs, the manufacturers' resistance to increased effluent controls in their own countries would diminish. It would be likely, instead, to change to support for imposing similar controls on other industries, both on those with which their products compete and for those with which the controlled industry competes for capital.

An economic strategy has another strength. It allows use of

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stick as well as carrot. If pollution control costs in one country put its products at a price disadvantage in the domestic markets of other countries, retaliatory sanctions are available.

The possibility of retaliatory duties and subsidies and the difficulty of accurately assessing the per unit cost of an abatement process should incline the industrial countries to prefer the joint adoption of equal emission requirements over border tax and counter-tax. Regarding retaliatory border taxes against non-participating countries, preferential treatment for developing countries should be contemplated from the beginning.

The countries that cannot afford no-release are the countries that are doing only a very small fraction of the damage. However, where a specialized commercial opportunity is made available to emigrant industrial capital by a country not accepting international emission standards, discriminatory taxes might be invoked against the product benefiting from the permissive government's inaction, by all adherents to the convention governing the industry producing it.

A more intractable problem will arise where pollution abatement by developed countries has health and welfare repercussions for developing countries. Although domestic use of DDT has been declining rapidly for several years, the United States was, in 1970, still the world's largest producer of DDT. The largest customers for this DDT were the Agency for International Development and the World Health Organization. A unilateral termination of DDT production in the United States would cause an abrupt rise in malaria and decline in agricultural productivity in developing countries being supplied by these agencies. Here the interests of the affected countries appear to be opposite and there seems less chance for joint action.

Pollution control based on mutually shared international concern for the global environment, in other words, is likely to come very late. For this reason, the enormous flows of nitrates and pesticides from agricultural activity and the doubling and redoubling volumes of inadequately treated sewage from human dwellings will probably not find meaningful solution until local trauma have provoked effective independent national action. For the multitude of poisons generated by industrial activity, however, the international interdependence arising out of trading relationships may soon compel an effective international control program oriented toward complete, not partial, containment.

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KOREA AND THE EMERGING ASIAN POWER BALANCE

By Pyong-choon Hahm

EVEN before the Nixon Doctrine was enunciated in the summer of 1969, the international power alignments in East Asia had already been undergoing a fundamental change. The phenomenal growth of Japanese industrial might was clearly making itself felt throughout the world. The polite Japanese did not have to force themselves to be querulous in compelling the world to sit up and take notice of this new Asian industrial state. Their economy was enough of a "miracle" to attract everyone's attention. Indeed, they did everything in their power to belittle their own economic achievement. It was the prodigious yearly jump in their international trade surplus which advertised their truly embarrassing riches almost against their wish.

It is an interesting fact of world history that this conclusive demonstration of explosive Japanese economic power has coincided in the United States with the budding mood of self-doubt caused largely by its inability to win a decisive military victory in Vietnam.

The changing international power configuration affecting Asia, however, was not entirely due to Japan's remarkable economic growth, nor was it wholly explainable in terms of the relative decline of American economic and military power. To be sure, the principal damage inflicted upon the United States by the Vietnamese war was economic. The deteriorating balance of international trade and the domestic inflation has been among the most significant liabilities of the frustrating war in Indochina. But the Vietnamese war was destined to have a much wider significance than the economic difficulty for the United States. It signified in essence the end of the cold war. The United States suddenly discovered itself deprived of the loyal support of most of its allies for the first time since 1945. The cold war, which had been characterized by bipolar power alignments with strong intra-bloc cohesion, was definitely coming to an end by the time the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war was reaching its climax.

The fact that most of the West European allies not only

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refused to coöperate with the United States in its anti-communist war, but often harshly criticized it for its involvement there, was as much an indication of the innate political pluralism of the West as a reaction to the damaged monolithic unity of the East. The increasing restiveness among the NATO members was in fact a reflection of the impaired bloc solidarity of the communist world. Just as America was afflicted with de Gaulle's France, so did Russia have her own Mao's China. As the Sino-Soviet conflict steadily and ominously intensified, the impression of communist disunity, and even of fragmentation, has grown so strong as to render the dissension and frictions among the Western allies quite insignificant by comparison.

Even as late as 1967 when China appeared to be tearing herself apart in an ideological frenzy called the Great Cultural Revolution, the world refused to take the Sino-Soviet disputes very seriously. China was still considered a protégé of the Soviet Union, without whose patronage China could hardly sustain herself as an autonomous political entity. Quite a few observers in the non-communist world were deeply skeptical of the ability of the communist régime to govern the most populous state with one of the oldest political cultures on earth. The predominance of the Soviet Union in what appeared to be a monolithic bloc so overshadowed this gigantic Asian experiment in Marxism that the Cultural Revolution seemed to be yet another proof of the political incompetence of the Chinese communist élites in the absence of close Soviet tutelage. But then, in a year or two, the same combination of events in the much intensified form of a Sino-Soviet border war and gradual restoration of domestic order in China gave evidence not only of the viability of the Chinese communist system but its resilience in the face of hostile pressure from the second most powerful nation on this planet. The result was the greatly enhanced stature of communist China in the world power arena. It became no longer realistic to ignore the régime on the Chinese mainland which appeared solidly in power both domestically and internationally. The sudden willingness on the part of the Chinese communist élites to claim their place in the international community only expedited the process of recognition of the nation's political stature by non-communist states which were relieved to find her willing to coexist with them. The political and economic advantages to be derived from their interaction with China were of course quickly perceived by the new members of the Peking fan club.

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II

In the global power strategy of the United States, the advantages to be gained by establishing some form of rapprochement with communist China were simply too many and too great to be ignored. Aside from the immediate sense of relief resulting from any reduction in the tension built up during the past two decades between the two countries, any leverage which the United States might derive from the rapprochement with communist China in its dealings with the Soviet Union and Japan was certainly welcome. If some measure of "checks and balances" were to inhibit Russian adventurism and expansionism in the Middle East, the Indian Ocean and Latin America, an attempt at improved relations with communist China would be such a sensible and wise proposition as to require no special justification. The speed with which the Four Powers in Europe could reach an agreement on Berlin since the announcement of the projected trip of President Nixon to Peking seems to bear out the practical advantages of a new Sino-American détente. As the Soviet Union expects that tension with communist China will increase in the future, in no small part as a result of Washington's approach to Peking, it would be most imprudent for Russia not to secure her European front as soon as possible. A moderate amount of Sino-Soviet tension and hostility plainly helps the United States by making the Soviet Union, the one power which possesses the actual resources to pose a serious military threat, much more tractable.

On the other hand, it is equally apparent that a full-scale war between the two communist giants would not be in the interest of the United States. The destruction of communist China as a serious rival of the Soviet Union and the absorption of the one by the other would so undermine U.S. security interests as to be utterly unacceptable. This is, of course, not to mention the risk of a global nuclear holocaust such a war would entail.

Ever since the beginning of 1970, there has gradually emerged a noticeable tendency in communist China's foreign policy toward wider contacts with the non-communist world. Treading as it did on the heels of the Cultural Revolution, the world was at first skeptical of China's new affability. Inasmuch as the conventional ideological rhetoric persisted, it was all the more difficult for the world to grasp China's real intentions. Moreover, the predominance of the People's Liberation Army in the

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period subsequent to the Cultural Revolution further contributed to the world skepticism. But the army seems to have been persuaded of the value of friendly public opinion, especially in the non-communist world. It was not difficult for the Chinese élites, for example, to comprehend that a timely public statement by the U.S. Secretary of State that the Sino-Soviet war was not in the interests of the United States would be worth a few dozen army divisions on its side against Russia. This was especially true in the face of a perennial Chinese fear of tacit American acquiescence, if not outright collusion, in a Soviet military subjugation of China.

In the case of the Vietnamese war the value of public opinion in the non-communist world sympathetic to communist North Vietnam has been fully demonstrated, this time against the United States. What has frustrated a decisive military victory by the United States in Indochina has not been its military inferiority but hostile public opinion at home and on the part of its European allies. Had the Indochinese war taken place a century ago with a similar disparity in military might, no one would have had any difficulty in predicting a quick and decisive military victory for the United States over North Vietnam.

The growth of Japanese economic power, on the other hand, has signaled a need for constructing an international order that would permit room for Japan to play a more independent and influential role. Japan has come to chafe increasingly in the role of a military base for the United States on the far side of the Pacific Ocean. The seemingly unlimited access to the U.S. domestic market enjoyed by Japan for the past two decades and a half has suddenly turned into an economic nightmare for the United States. A generous giver of economic aid and a promoter of free trade has turned into a disadvantaged champion fighting with one arm tied behind his back against a strong challenger. There is now serious economic competition, if not war, across the Pacific Ocean. The United States clearly intends either to blunt the thrust of the Japanese economic challenge or to divert it to other markets of the world. From now on, Japan will be more on her own in the international power arena as well as the economic market. She will have to do her share of maintaining "checks and balances" against the major powers of the world, including the United States.

But the United States cannot help but wish that Japan would

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do most of the checking and balancing against communist China and the Soviet Union while those two Asian neighbors would in turn check and balance Japan. They could surely take more of the brunt of Japanese economic expansion by granting Japan more access to their natural resources and markets.

Faced with this prospect, the Soviet Union is perhaps more ready than China to play the game of checks and balances against Japan. It has more power and, perhaps, more self-discipline. It feels powerful enough, and therefore confident enough, not only to withstand the Japanese challenge but also to profit by coöperating with Japan economically. At a minimum, the Soviet Union wishes to prevent Japan from amalgamating her prodigious managerial skills and scientific technologies with the vast labor pool of mainland China. More immediately, the Soviet Union desires to draw Japan away from China, keeping the two Asian powers checking and balancing each other as much as possible. The more pressure there is on communist China from Japan, the less pressure there will be on the Soviet Union from China and Japan. Ideally, Russia would find it most advantageous if America, Japan and communist China—all three—checked and balanced one another rather furiously, affording her the greatest room for manœuvrability.

III

Logical, and even mechanical, elegance is the virtue as well as the vice of an international balance-of-power system. If the game is played with cool rationality and chivalrous gallantry, it could even become a gentlemanly sport. Unfortunately, international balance-of-power games have not always been played with finesse and sportsmanship. This has been especially true in the case of the three powers immediately surrounding the Korean peninsula. At the turn of the present century, even without the modern complications of differing ideologies, one could not easily find a combination of three nations with more dissimilar cultural and political backgrounds and yet with such a singular identity of political purpose. Superficially, China and Japan shared the same Confucian culture and common racial characteristics. But in many ways Japan has had more in common with Europe than with China. Perhaps this dissimilarity is more obvious to the Asian eye than to the European. The difference between China and Japan is best typified by the greatly

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differing manners in which the two cultures have responded to the imperialistic Occident. The uniqueness of Russian culture, on the other hand, needs no elaboration here.

It is essentially the lack of a cultural consensus as to the acceptable mode in which the balance of power is to be maintained among the Asian powers (the Soviet Union, China and Japan) that makes the prospect of international peace and stability in East Asia rather bleak. In order for a delicate and sophisticated game such as that of the balance of power to be played with a reasonably satisfactory result for the players as well as the spectators, the players must have a set of rules on which there is some common agreement. If there is no consensus on the validity of the rules and no willingness to abide by them, a game would invariably deteriorate into a "dirty fight." Even within the so-called Western state system which had taken centuries to work out a set of commonly accepted practices, the game has broken down often enough to bring despair to lovers of peace.

But the members of the Western state system have had much more in common in terms of history and culture than the three Asian powers. International law, which has been considered a salvation by many, is also a set of authoritative decisions that has grown out of the power interactions among the members of the Western state system. It is enough to point out that two of the three Asian powers are not particularly willing to respect this system of law either by virtue of their ideology or ethnocentric worldview.

The Asian powers, however, have several things in common. Aside from their geographic proximity, they are united in their suspicion and fear of one another. During the past century, each has had reasons to denounce the aggressiveness and malevolence of the other. The Japanese have difficulty in forgiving the Russians for their entrance into World War II in its last days in violation of their nonaggression pact of 1941. On the other hand, Chinese and Russians see no need to condone Japan's militaristic rampage on the Asian continent. The Sino-Soviet border disputes, of course, still continue.

It is the sad fate of Korea to be stuck in the midst of these three powers, continuously victimized by their dehumanizing and destructive violence. One hears Japanese describe the Korean peninsula as a dagger pointed at Japan's heart or a pistol aimed at her head. At the same time, Chinese and Russians re-

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gard it as a bridge over which Japanese militarism has exploded all over the Asian continent. Thus, the peninsula has always been described as a chronic source of international conflict and military violence. And yet, Korea by herself has never been a threat to anyone. She becomes a threatening dagger or pistol aimed at Japan only if she falls into the hands of China or Russia. By the same token, it is as a bridge for the Japanese military that Korea has been a menace to China or Russia. The Korean people have never threatened their neighbors; they have always wished merely to be left alone. Indeed, it was her smallness and military weakness that made her a source of trouble in East Asia at the beginning of the present century. Korea was a threat to world peace 70 years ago because of her thorough-going pacifism and aversion to military violence.

Korea's big neighbors attempted to neutralize the threat posed by others by each securing for itself a predominance there. Each of the three endeavored to keep the other two out while consolidating its own paramountcy there. The disadvantage of this approach to Asian peace was that paramountcy was attainable only at the cost of war, with devastating consequences for the inhabitants of the peninsula. But, however preposterous such an approach to Asian peace may sound today, it was precisely the approach adopted successfully by Japan with American public approval under President Theodore Roosevelt. Korea's colonization by Japan in 1910 after five years of protectorateship was justified in terms of world peace and a more stable order in East Asia. This was "the final solution" of the Korean question—the elimination of a Korea which was not powerful enough to defend her independence by placing her firmly under Japanese imperialist rule. By letting herself become a perennial battleground for her powerful neighbors, Korea courted her own political demise as an independent nation. Korea was no more to be a source of violence and international disorder. But having turned Korea into a "bridge," Japanese militarism soon went to work to transform the worst of Chinese and Russian fears into a reality.

Not that other approaches to peace never occurred to Koreans. International neutrality was the first to be tried and as a result Korea was ravaged by the guns and the bayonets of her neighbors. Unless a state has sufficient military capability to guarantee its own neutrality, its neutrality is entirely at the mercy of its more

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powerful neighbors. Inasmuch as the ambition of Korea's neighbors was to secure supremacy in Korea to the exclusion of others, a declaration of neutrality was simply ignored whenever they decided to contest each other's claim by force of arms. As soon as Japan fancied that the influence of either China or Russia in Korea was becoming "excessive," she undertook to counteract it by increasing her own influence. This in turn triggered counteractions by China and Russia, giving rise to a spiral of intervention and conflict.

On the other hand, being separated by a body of water from Korea, Japan constantly felt herself at a strategic disadvantage vis-à-vis China and Russia, who had overland access to the peninsula. In order to compensate for this disadvantage, Japan endeavored to have some prior foothold on the peninsula. China and Russia, of course, were not inclined to recognize such a prior foothold as legitimate.

Another approach tried by Koreans with equally disastrous consequences to themselves was the dangerous game of playing the three powers off against one another. The failure to play this age-old game with any degree of finesse may have been due to an innate clumsiness of the Korean people. But the real reason seems to have been again the weakness of the Korean polity. The game only intensified the mutual distrust and belligerence among the three powers and encouraged the fear that Korea might at any time undermine the position of one in the peninsula by snuggling up to one of the others.

Moreover, the game helped Koreans to earn a reputation among their neighbors for being tricky and deceitful, thus reinforcing their desire to extinguish Korea's political independence. Having learned the truth the hard way—that political weakness is an international sin and that power politics as played by a nation which lacks power is at best international treachery and at worst an invitation to political calamity—Koreans are not likely to get their fingers burned again by indulging in the games of neutrality, big-power rivalry or neighborly protection.

IV

What, then, is the Korean approach to political survival and peace in East Asia? The first principle is Korea's nonalignment, especially in the military sense, with any of the three immediately surrounding powers. This principle is easier to expound than

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to practice. There is no question that Korea must maintain normal and amicable relations with all three of her neighbors. This is essential for her survival and for peace in East Asia. But a strong alignment with any one of them would immediately be interpreted as inimical by the other two. Intensification of tension and hostility would promptly follow. Korea would again become a source of instability and war.

A very important corollary of this principle of Korea's nonalignment with the Asian powers is her very close special relationship to the United States. To put it more bluntly, a close alignment with the United States is the only practicable way for Korea to remain nonaligned with any of her immediate neighbors. When Korea was first drawn very reluctantly into the international power process in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, she immediately found herself relying on the United States as a power that could give her leverage against her neighbors. The United States was unique in that it was far enough away from Korea to have a friendly relationship, relatively free of tension and strain, between the two countries, but was involved enough in the Asian affairs to be a Pacific power. Korea was too small to be a threat to the United States while the latter had no territorial interest in the Korean peninsula. These qualities enabled Koreans to use the United States as a means to break out of the suffocating geopolitical encirclement by the three Asian powers. The United States was in an ideal position to play the role of peacemaker, or referee, on the Korean peninsula, keeping the Asian powers from coming to blows.

But America at the turn of the present century had her own reason for declining the role of referee on the peninsula. She had good reasons to fear involvement in Asian power politics, one of the most important being her territorial interest in the Philippines at the time. By cultural heritage and ethnic inclination, the United States wished to keep Asia at a cautious distance. Even the role of referee, if played too aggressively, could embroil the United States in Asian conflicts especially when there was no consensual acceptance of such a role by the Asian powers. When America, upon the cessation of the Russo-Japanese War, threw her weight behind Japanese hegemony in Korea, the subsequent fate of Korea and Asian peace seemed authoritatively settled.

It is not necessary to describe the train of events that led to the

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division of the Korean peninsula into two zones of military occupation at the end of the Pacific war and the subsequent U.S. involvement in the Korean War under the aegis of the United Nations. In the two decades following the Korean War, the United States has played the role of an opponent of one of the Asian powers, communist China. Now the United States is endeavoring to redefine the Asian power structure as well as its own role in it.

It is in the interests of the United States and of Asian peace that the United States now accept the role of an active referee on the Korean peninsula. It is clear that a new set of rules of the game for the Asian power balance must be hammered out with active American participation. And it should not be diffcult for the United States to persuade the Asian powers to accept its new role of referee.

It is a stark reality of Asian power politics that China and Russia would prefer the American presence on the Korean peninsula to the Japanese. Given a choice between Japanese militarism and American militarism, the Chinese and Russians would choose the latter any time. On the other hand, the American troops on Korean soil are there as much for the defense of Japan as for the Republic of Korea and the United States. The Chinese communist élites are realistic enough to know that the American military presence in South Korea is in fact impeding the pace of Japanese rearmament by giving the Japanese people a greater sense of security from the continental powers. Chou En-lai must realize that one sure way to speed up Japanese remilitarization is to have the American troops in South Korea withdrawn precipitously.

Moreover, if the U.S. role of referee is to be effective, it has to endow its presence in South Korea with realistic components of military power and wealth. To be sure, the military strength need not be great, and substitution is possible between the two components. It is not a mindless exhibition of paranoia on the part of communist China to denounce Japanese militarism for having already gained a foothold in the Republic of Korea in view of the fact of the rapidly diminishing American military presence there and the outstripping of the American economic presence by the Japanese. It is one thing for China to be wary of American presence in South Korea but it is entirely another to be confronted with a Japanese economic ascendancy which com-

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pletely dwarfs the American economic interests in the peninsula. If any country should insist that American troops remain on the Korean soil, it should be communist China.

If the U.S. presence in South Korea, even in the present form of 42,000 troops, were to be a protective and impartial shield for each of the three Asian powers against the aggressive intentions of the other two, the Asian powers should be willing to accept the American role for the sake of peace in Asia. There seems to be no other alternative. The strategic importance of an independent and stable Korea for Asian peace cannot be overemphasized. A peaceful Korea is a linchpin for a stable Asian balance of power. The Asian powers are all too preoccupied with relative power advantages on the Korean peninsula to leave the linchpin alone. Only the United States has enough detached interest in South Korea to help keep the linchpin functioning properly.

One of the highest policy objectives of the Republic of Korea today is the prevention of another war on the Korean peninsula. It is on the basis of this objective that the Republic of Korea has been working toward the easing of tensions with her three big neighbors. She has been willing to risk the formalization of the division of the nation by taking the initiative in contacts with North Korea in spite of North Korea's continuing revolutionary commitment to its "war of national liberation" and military provocations. She has made it very clear that, if the only means for achieving national reunification is another fratricidal war on the Korean peninsula, she is prepared to defer national reunification indefinitely. This has involved a serious political sacrifice on the part of the Republic of Korea because the issue of national reunification is such a nationalistic imperative that any appearance of procrastination in trying to achieve it is liable to provoke charges of national betrayal. But she is convinced that the only legitimate, or even "patriotic," means for reunification is a peaceful one. She has publicly renounced force as an instrument of national reunification.

Given the revolutionary commitment of North Korea in its "war of fatherland liberation," the policy of peaceful unification of the Republic of Korea has put her on the defensive against the North. But it has been a consistent foreign policy of the Republic of Korea during the past decade to ensure peace on the Korean peninsula by deterring North Korea's war of national liberation. Every foreign policy move of the Republic of Korea

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has been designed so as to pressure North Korea into abandoning its avowed method of war. From her stand on the involvement of the United Nations to the Red Cross negotiations, the policies of the Republic of Korea have aimed to increase the prospect of peace on the peninsula.

It is sincerely hoped that the United States will be coldly realistic in redefining its participation in the newly emerging power equilibrium in East Asia. It is understandable that the United States does not wish to be a belligerent again in that part of the world. But its desire for peace in East Asia cannot be fulfilled by retreating completely from Asia. America is a Pacific power regardless of her desires. Whatever happens in East Asia is bound to affect her immediately and profoundly. A war there would be brought to America against her wish. Therefore, whatever form U.S. participation in the East Asian power balance may take, it must be for the sake of increasing the probability for peace.

The chances for peace in East Asia, however, will be diminished without American involvement in South Korea as a force to keep Korea's neighbors from warring against one another. If the newly emerging power system which must revolve around the Korean peninsula is to maintain itself, the participants must come to an agreement on the common rules of the game within which the participant roles are defined. Unless the United States succeeds in convincing the other three participants to consent to its role as a referee on the Korean peninsula, neither the power balance nor peace in East Asia is a realistic possibility.

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RECONSIDERATIONS

THE END OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC

By Sir John Wheeler-Bennett

THE most remarkable thing about the Weimar Republic is not that it existed for only fifteen years but that it ever survived the circumstances of its nativity. Never was the idea of a republican form of government less welcome. The birthpangs of the ill-fated French Third Republic in 1870 were at least suffered to the accompaniment of demonstrations of enthusiasm, but the natal processes in November 1918 of what came to be known as the Weimar Republic were not only lacking in acclaim but were attended by more "bad fairies" than darkened any of Grimm's gruesome tales. Some there were, however, who pursued the dangerous illusion that a change of régime would ensure a "soft peace" from the Allies—and especially the Americans. This insincere opportunism brought into the ranks of the supporters of the Republic many who would otherwise have been among its strong opponents.

Inimicality, reluctance and lack of enthusiasm were among the "evil spirits" with which the infant Weimar Republic had to contend, but these were not all. From the first it was tagged with two terrible indictments which rendered it vulnerable to attack from all quarters. In the first place, because the Provisional Government was largely composed of Socialists at the outset —the right and left wings of the Social Democratic Party—it came to be held responsible for the stab-in-the-back which, by undermining the loyalty of the home front, had betrayed the front-line soldiers and rendered defeat in the field inevitable. This in turn engendered the complementary myth that Germany had not been defeated by the Allies but only by the machinations of her own traitors.

The second indictment was that this new democratic form of government, so alien and unsuited to the German political way of thinking, had been forced upon Germany by the victorious Allies, led by President Woodrow Wilson, whose demands for the abolition of the monarchy and the substitution of a democratic republic were held by many in Germany to have been welcomed all too warmly and implemented all too pliantly by the Social Democrats.

To all Germans the Weimar Republic soon became identified with the acceptance and execution of the crushing terms of peace imposed upon Germany by her former enemies and present conquerors. It was the "Men of November" and their system who were widely held to be responsible for the humiliations of the Treaty of Versailles. From a struggling, impoverished and resentful Germany the cry went up: *Anathema sint.*

Thus the Weimar Republic—initially hailed as a means of saving Germany's skin after a lost war—rapidly became unwanted and unacclaimed, despised and denigrated, the target of armed attack from the extreme Left and the extreme Right. Under such unfavorable auspices the chances of the Republic for survival, let alone success, appeared slim indeed.

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II

Having set off to as bad a start as any in recorded history, the Weimar Republic seemed to justify all of the presentiments and gloomy prognostications which were so manifold. Miraculously, however, it did survive, though it cannot be said, except for the halcyon if deceptive period between 1924 and 1929, that it flourished. Not until it had somewhat bloodily suppressed the two Spartacist uprisings and had reduced the Kapp *Putsch* to a thing of ridicule could the writ of the republican government of Friedrich Ebert be said to run; but thereafter the Republic was not seriously assailed by armed assault either from the Left or from the Right, though this did not prevent it from being savaged from within.

Yet there was always a sense of impermanency surrounding the Republic, as if a kind of apology were being offered for some act of expediency which would be expiated as soon as possible. The possibility of a restoration of the monarchy was ever present in the back of the minds of the founding fathers, to some a hope, to some a consolation, to some a source of fear, and this was nowhere more apparent than in the Weimar Constitution itself which was designed to facilitate the transition from republican to monarchical government should this prove feasible.

In spirit, moreover, the Weimar Assembly was far from being a revolutionary body. Well knowing that, for the moment, nothing could be done against the will of the victors, the founders of the new Reich looked forward to a day when Germany should have regained her strength. Provided that their future possibilities were not restricted, such parties as the Center, the Bavarian Peoples' Party and the Democrats (and to some extent the Social Democrats) were prepared to resign themselves for the moment to the fait accompli. What they really feared—and this anxiety they shared in common with the High Command of the Army—was the disunion and partition of the Fatherland. The object of their immediate and ardent desire was to recoup those territorial losses, which they knew to be inevitable, by compensatory additions in the union of Austria, and possibly of the Sudetenland, for they knew well that nothing would be irretrievably lost to them as long as a large and populated territory formed a German unitary state.

Nowhere was this more clearly demonstrated than in the contemporary writings of Friedrich Naumann, calling for a "strong German unity such as had already been delineated on August 4, 1914," and concluding with an appeal to his "brother Germans in Alsace, Bohemia and Austria" to participate in this unity. Though their aims were not achieved until after the fall of the Republic and its replacement by the Third Reich, the aims themselves were being adumbrated and encouraged from the earliest days in Weimar.

It was a remarkable tribute to Bismarck—and also a most revealing commentary on the German political character—that the Germany unity which he achieved by military triumph should survive and even be strengthened by military defeat. His two guiding principles, German unity and State power, were those which inspired the large majority of the deputies to the National Assembly. What they achieved was not like the German Empire after 1815, a *Staatenbund* (a federation of States) nor, like the Second

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Reich, a *Bundestaat* (a federal State); it was a superficially decentralized unitary state and an infinitely closer approximation to Bismarck's ideal than that statesman could have dared to hope for.

III

The history of the Weimar Republic falls more or less distinctly into four periods, each dominated by a "hero" or "non-hero." The first of these periods, which may be called the period of Precarious Existence, begins with the proclamation of the Republic on November 9, 1918, and continues through the suppression of the two Spartacist risings of January and March 1919 to the successful liquidation of the Kapp *Putsch* in March 1920. Its "hero" is Friedrich Ebert, the saddler's son who rose to lead the Social Democratic Party to its tragic destiny of power.

Ebert has been much criticized by the hindsighted school of historians for taking his first major action, the making of a deal with the High Command. While it is true that by his historic "telephone alliance" with Gröner on the night of November 9–10, Ebert set the revolution along lines which were ultimately to lead to its undoing, he could not at that moment have known this. What he did know was that there was a very real threat of insurrection in the streets of Berlin and that his only hope of maintaining law and order and the tenuous authority of his government appeared to lie in the coöperation of the military, themselves in a precarious condition and anxious to secure the support of the government of the day. The government needed force, the Army needed authority. Both recalled with fear and horror the happenings in Russia, then less than two years distant.

The second period of the Weimar Republic—that of Obstinate Resistance—extended from 1920 to 1923. It had two "heroes" of a very different nature: one, Hans von Seeckt, a Prussian general of the strongest national and patriotic tendencies; the other, Walther Rathenau, a Jew of intellectual though no less patriotic proclivities. Between them they represented much of what was most at stake at that time in the Weimar Republic.

Though separated intellectually and socially by a wide gulf, their approach to the Republic was relatively the same. Von Seeckt, the Prussian military aristocrat, unfaltering in his allegiance to the monarchic principle, and Rathenau, the head of the immensely rich and profitable AEG, the cultivated man-of-the-world, tremendously proud of his permitted association with the Kaiser and his court, and as different in his Jewishness from those semitic members of the Social Democratic and Independent Socialist Parties as it is possible to be, had both been originally antagonistic to the idea and principle of a republic.

The futility of the Kapp *Putsch* and the demonstrated ability of the Reich government to liquidate it, had established the fact that the Republic, whatever its detractors might think of it, had acquired an indefinite lease on life. If, therefore, they wished to serve Germany and so effect its rehabilitation in the status of a European power, they must do so by working *through* the Republic and not *against* it.

Thus the Weimar Republic entered upon a period during which its internal fortunes were increasingly in the safe custody of General von Seeckt and

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the Reichswehr and its external affairs were conducted with great ability by Walther Rathenau—but for all too brief a period. The fact that the reparation issue reached an impasse was more the fault of the French than the Germans in the earlier part of this period of Obstinate Resistance. Rathenau's negotiations with Loucheur were conducted in a spirit of genuine desire for a settlement, and it was only after he had been replaced by less capable men that the matter became one of mutual intransigence resulting in the inflation of the mark and the nugatory occupation of the Ruhr Basin.

Von Seeckt during this period became the guardian of the Reich, suppressing firmly a series of communist risings, though unfortunately adopting an ambivalent attitude toward the Nazi Beerhall *Putsch*. He utilized the extraordinary emergency powers vested in him by the cabinet with wisdom, restraint and impartiality and relinquished them without hesitation when the emergency had passed. Simultaneously he planned and executed the clandestine rearmament of the Reichswehr.

Both Rathenau and von Seeckt pursued their own negotiations with Russia and achieved, each in his own sphere, remarkable success. By the signature of the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922, under the noses of the European powers assembled at the Genoa Conference, Rathenau achieved a diplomatic coup of the first water; while, through his secret contacts with the Red Army, von Seeckt achieved a degree of coöperation in his program of rearmament which was to prove of the greatest possible assistance. Though Germany made little progress toward an agreement with the Western Allies, in the East she had achieved a measure of recognition and mutual assistance with Soviet Russia which was to prove an effective weapon in her future dealings with the West.[1]

It seemed as if the fortunes of the Weimar Republic had reached their nadir during this period of uncompromising intransigency. As a result of the failure (or refusal) of the Germans and the Allies to reach any basis of agreement on reparation payments a major crisis developed. On January 9, 1923, the Reparation Commission declared Germany to be in default on her deliveries of coal and two days later French and Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr Basin by way of sanctions and to enforce coal production. Ebert replied by proclaiming a general cessation of all work throughout the Ruhr, adding that Germany would be unable to make payments of any kind until the occupying troops had been withdrawn. In consequence, the Reparation Commission declared Germany to be in general default (January 26) and the French and Belgian governments made it known that they would continue to occupy the Ruhr until reparation payments were resumed. A seemingly unresolvable deadlock ensued.

Meantime an economic and financial crisis had gripped Germany. At the beginning of the year, when the first French and Belgian troops entered the Ruhr, the mark stood at 50,000 to the pound sterling. By the end of Jan-

[1] The efforts of both General von Seeckt and Walther Rathenau rendered them targets for assassination by the extremists of the Right. Rathenau was gunned down by Nationalist gunmen on June 24, 1922 as he drove to his office in the Wilhelmstrasse, and a little over a year later, in September 1923, an attempt to murder von Seeckt was discovered and frustrated.

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uary the pound was worth 250,000 marks and continued to rise catastrophically. By June it was worth half a million marks; by July one and a half million; by August 20 million; and thereafter it virtually disappeared as a serious medium of exchange. "We no longer have a choice between capitulation and chaos," lamented Dr. von Rosenberg, Rathenau's successor as Foreign Minister. "The alternative now is chaos with honor or chaos without honor."

It was at this moment in August 1923 that the tide turned for a variety of reasons. In the first place the leading actors in the European melodrama suddenly changed. In Germany, Gustav Stresemann became Chancellor and Foreign Minister; in France, Edouard Herriot replaced Raymond Poincaré; and Ramsay MacDonald gave Britain its first experience of a Labour Government. Coincidentally came the realization in Berlin and in Paris that the Ruhr deadlock must be broken and that passive resistance was ruinous in its results as was the futile French attempt "to dig coal with bayonets."

To Stresemann's credit be it said that, faced with the threat of complete chaos in the Ruhr, he took the first step to break the deadlock. The printers had declared a strike and the bank-note presses failed to produce; there was no money to be had even in its debased and depreciated condition. As an alternative to the virtual inevitability of civil war and the overthrow of the Republic by the forces of the extreme Right or the extreme Left, Stresemann advised Ebert on September 26 to declare a cessation of Passive Resistance. Though the response of the French government was neither as immediate nor as forthcoming as Stresemann had hoped, his action had, in effect, changed the course not only of German but of European history. By his momentous decision he had taken the first step along the road on which the great milestones were the Dawes Plan, the Locarno Treaties, the entry of Germany into the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Young Plan, the Hague Agreement and—his greatest ambition—the final evacuation of the Rhineland by Allied troops, the consummation of which he was not destined to see.

At one stroke he had brought to an abrupt conclusion the calamitous period of Obstinate Resistance and had opened the door to the period of Reconciliation which was to give the Weimar Republic its few bright moments of halcyon success.

IV

One of the most important aspects of the period of Fulfillment was that it coincided with the first steps of the United States—tentative and halting though they might be—to emerge from its carapace of isolation and to make a return to Europe. On December 29, 1922, the American Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, in a speech to the American Historical Association at New Haven, had sketched out a plan for the solution of the reparation problem by means of a commission composed of men of the highest financial authority, prestige and experience in their respective countries who would approach the problem from the expert as distinct from the political point of view and produce a practical plan for working out the amount to be paid by Germany and also the method of payment. On such a commis-

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sion, said Mr. Hughes, "I have no doubt that distinguished Americans would be prepared to serve."

It was some ten months later (October 13, 1923) that the British government, anxious to capitalize on the Stresemann decision to abandon passive resistance and disappointed at the failure of the French to respond to it, asked the American government whether it was prepared to stand by Mr. Hughes' informal proposal. The reply was favorable and by the end of the year an international commission under the chairmanship of General Charles G. Dawes had been appointed. By the beginning of April 1924 they had presented their report to the Reparation Commission and, on August 30, to an international conference in London adopted what became known to history as the Dawes Plan.

The essential characteristic of the Plan was that for the first time it had considered the reparation problem not, as heretofore, from the aspect of the Allies "squeezing Germany till the pips squeak," but on the more realistic basis of Germany's capacity to pay. It was not claimed by the Dawes Committee that the fruits of its labors constituted a final solution of the reparation problem. It marked a penultimate not an ultimate phase. But the adoption of the Plan had two results of outstanding importance. It had rehabilitated Germany in the eyes of the world because Stresemann had demonstrated her willingness to meet her financial obligations and it was hoped in all quarters—and not unjustifiably—that this would be followed by a similar readiness to fulfill her political liabilities under the Treaty of Versailles.

Secondly, the adoption of the Dawes Plan reëstablished American confidence in Europe, as a result of which the international financial situation improved appreciably and the European states began to fund the loans which they had received from Great Britain and the United States during the war.

Within Germany herself the moment of crisis and despair eased immeasurably. The authority of the government of the Republic, of which General von Seeckt had been the guardian and trustee during this critical period, emerged greatly enhanced. Moreover, thanks to the confidence and hope engendered by the adoption of the Dawes Plan and the financial wizardry of Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, the viability of the mark was reëstablished and the economic condition of the country progressed with astounding—and, to some, alarming—rapidity from abject poverty to gross affluence, albeit of a somewhat artificial nature.

There followed the spectacularly successful career of Gustav Stresemann as diplomatist and statesman. The conclusion of the Locarno Treaties in October 1925—in the negotiation of which he had played so vital a part—coincided with the evacuation of the First Zone of Occupation and it was Stresemann's great hope that the renewed sense of security consequent in both Western and Eastern Europe as a result of these agreements, and of the friendly conversation which followed at Thoiry between Aristide Briand and himself, would result in the acceleration of the evacuation of the two remaining Zones and a far-reaching reappraisal of the disarmament issue by similar methods as those of the Dawes Plan. In the achievement of both these aims he was disappointed, but as a result of the Locarno Pact Germany

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was ultimately admitted (after the preliminary fiasco of March 1926) to the League of Nations and to a permanent seat on its Council.

The unexpected expansion of the Kellogg-Briand Pact for the outlawry of war from its original conception as a Franco-American gesture to a serious (or semi-serious) international instrument, provided Stresemann with a further opportunity to demonstrate Germany's desire to be regarded as a bona fide member of the world comity of nations. German acceptance of the principle of the outlawry of aggression as an instrument of national policy was among the first to be received by the joint sponsors and Stresemann made an impressive appearance at the somewhat farcical ceremony of signature at the Quai d'Orsay on August 27, 1928,[2] which, though heralded as the nativity of a nominal war-less world, in reality ushered in a period in which aggression stalked nakedly across Europe, Asia and Africa more unashamedly than at any previous time in modern history.

However, in the conversations which now took place in Paris Stresemann was informed in no uncertain terms that the question of further evacuation of the Rhineland prior to the end of the statutory period fixed by the Treaty of Versailles was inextricably bound up with the final settlement of the reparation problem. It was also made clear that the same was true of any reëxamination of the disarmament issue.

There were increasingly numerous indications that such a final settlement was of pressing urgency and the euphoric climate of ideas which followed the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact was adjudged auspicious for its advocacy. The condition of the Reich budget and of the general economic life of Germany, which had blossomed into such illusory prosperity in the post-Locarno years, was now far from healthy. There were certain dangerous tendencies in the conduct of the government's finances which alarmed such enlightened and experienced observers as Parker Gilbert, the Agent-General for Reparation Payments appointed under the Dawes Plan. A constantly mounting level of central, state and municipal governmental expenditure and borrowings coincided with increasing evidence of over-expansion and over-estimation of internal activity and with growing signs of tension in economic life, to which the increased expenditure had given an artificial stimulus.

Attention to these danger signals was drawn by the Agent-General in his annual reports. He also stressed repeatedly the need of a review by the powers concerned of the whole reparation problem with the object of reaching a "final settlement." By the close of 1928 Mr. Gilbert's advice had been taken and agreement had been reached that the Reparation Commission should appoint experts from the five creditor countries, together with those from Germany and the United States. The committee thus constituted met under the chairmanship of Owen D. Young and by June 7, 1929, it presented its report in the shape of what has become known to history as the Young Plan. The Plan was a highly intricate and complicated document which in effect provided for German payments until 1988, at which time the matter of reparations was to be regarded as closed.

At the first of the Hague Conferences, summoned in August 1929, to con-

[2] Stresemann was thus the first German Foreign Minister to visit Paris since Bismarck. Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau never got beyond Versailles.

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sider the Young Plan, Gustav Stresemann fought the final battle of his life for the evacuation of the Rhineland. He was dying, and in order to achieve his heart's desire he may well have assented to additional burdens being placed on the German economy which he knew it would be impossible for it to bear. He did not live to see the full attainment of his ambition, for he died on October 3, 1929. But he knew that it was virtually assured. In a joint note, dated August 30 and addressed to him personally by the British, French and Belgian Foreign Ministers, it was declared that the evacuation of the Second Zone would begin during the month of September, and of the Third Zone after the ratification of the Young Plan by the German and French governments. This was finally achieved on May 17, 1930; it was the last act of the Era of Stresemann.

V

The hero (or non-hero) of the last period of the history of the Weimar Republic—which may be called the period of Fatalistic Desperation—was Heinrich Brüning, who dominated the German political scene from the spring of 1930, when he was appointed Chancellor, until his dismissal in the early summer of 1932.

Coincidentally with the death of Stresemann the fortunes of the Weimar Republic seemed to shudder and crumble. The Young Plan was accepted by Germany with the greatest reluctance and the battle in the Reichstag for its ratification disclosed the bitterest cleavage within the German body politic. The Communists joined with the Nationalists and the new political phenomenon of the National Socialists in attacking the government for accepting the Young Plan, and the aged President of the Reich, Marshal von Hindenburg (whom the votes of the Right had brought to office as Ebert's successor in 1925) for supporting his Ministers. Finally the battle for ratification was won and the Chancellor, that historically accident-prone Social Democratic leader Hermann Müller, who had courageously signed the Treaty of Versailles, was adjudged guilty by many of his countrymen of having betrayed his country a second time in forcing the acceptance of a Plan which condemned Germany to pay reparations for another 60 years. Both the Right and the Left plotted to bring him down together with his coalition of Social Democrats, the Center Party and the German Peoples' Party.

Nor was the Republic threatened by political strife only. The economic cyclone which had struck the American economy in October 1929 made its way slowly across the Atlantic to wreak disaster upon the countries of Europe. Comparatively healthy economies, such as those of Britain and France, found difficulty in withstanding the storm, but that of Germany, to the deficiencies of which Parker Gilbert had so frequently and forcefully drawn attention, was rocked upon its foundations. Confidence in the mark waned and with it the credibility of the Republic's government. Fear spread that a second depression, with all the horrors of inflation so vividly in the minds of even young Germans, menaced the Reich. Even men of practical common sense and high ideals, in view of the evident malaise in Germany, began to search the political pharmacoepia for remedial means which might lie, if necessary, a little outside the Constitution—or at best just within it.

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In addition, there was a general disenchantment among the young and rising generation with the whole political party system. The fault here lay largely with the caucuses of all parties which had steadfastly refused to admit youth into their ranks. The National Assembly elected in 1920 had contained none of the young front-fighters and it was not until the election of 1924 that this important element of national life attained representation. Even then, however, no attempt was made to interest or enlist the youth of the country in party organizations, until the Communists and the National Socialist Party made youth one of their principal targets—and with great success.

It was at this critical juncture in German history that the "Field-grey Eminence" of the Reichswehr, General Kurt von Schleicher, a man who so admirably justified his name—in English, Schleicher is "creeper"—a man who had already betrayed many benefactors and friends and would betray many more before his murder at the hands of Adolf Hitler, began his search for a Chancellor who might beguile the President, control the Right, restrain the Left and persuade the parties immediately right of center to combine their efforts in order to maintain law and order and restore the economic fortunes of the Reich. The important aspect of von Schleicher's political planning was that the salvation of the Reich should be brought about without the aid of the Social Democrats, who were anathema equally to the President, the army and the Right.

His choice fell upon Heinrich Brüning.

VI

Heinrich Brüning was at that time 44 years old, a young man if judged either from the standards of German political leaders or world statesmen. His career had been rapid, and he had been early marked out for office. Of a very sensitive nature, he was at once a romantic and a paladin, a dreamer of dreams and a man of courage. A devout Catholic, he came of a middle-class Westphalian family, and, a delicate, shy and brilliant young man, he was about to complete his doctoral thesis at the University of Bonn when the outbreak of the war destroyed the sheltered life which till then had been his. The glamor of war appealed to him; the paladin and the romantic in him merged into one and sent him unhesitatingly to volunteer. To his dismay he was rejected for defective eyesight, and returned disheartened to complete his doctoral thesis. The subject of his choice had been the comparative study of private and state ownership of railroads, and the thesis disclosed a remarkable knowledge of the British railway system. A brilliant degree in economics was his reward, but still he hankered for the opportunity to fight for the Fatherland. He volunteered again. The inroads of war upon the manpower of Germany had made the medical authorities less particular and Brüning was accepted. It was May 1915 and he was then 29.

His first sojourn at the front was brief. He was wounded almost immediately and invalided home. His recovery completed, he trained for a commission, specializing as a machine gunner, and returned to the front line as a lieutenant in time to take part in the great battles of '16 and '17, in the offensive of March 1918, and in the bitter retreat in the summer of the

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same year. Brüning was a good soldier and a capable officer. Whether as adjutant or in active command, he displayed a natural ability and a cool courage which belied his studious appearance. His machine-gun squadron achieved a notoriety and fame wherever it was engaged, and was cited on more than one occasion for "unparalleled heroism;" Brüning himself received the Iron Cross (First Class). In the last phases of the struggle he was constantly in action, his company forming part of the famous "Winterfeldt Group"—a formation of units picked for their fighting qualities and their endurance—and with them he participated in the revolutionary actions around Aix-la-Chapelle and Herbesthal, his squadron remaining loyal amid the surrounding hordes of mutineers. What his men thought of him may be gauged by the fact that when Soldiers' Councils were formed on the orders of G.H.Q., he was unanimously elected as his squadron's representative.

His war experiences had wrought a great change in Brüning. Much of the romanticism of youth had been burned out of his soul and in its place there was a certain mysticism of comradeship. He had learned to command men, and to earn their respect and loyalty; and he himself had come to know the spiritual satisfaction of following a leader in whom he had confidence. Military discipline in its finest sense appealed to him and he carried out of the war an abiding devotion to duty and public service.

In the chaos of the revolution Brüning gradually developed for himself a political credo. His religion and his upbringing influenced his decisions, and he found himself inclined to the life of a civilian rather than that of a member of the Free Corps. Though respectful of the Republican Constitution, there was enough of the "realist-romantic" left in him, as well as his Catholic beliefs, to make him regret the disappearance of the monarchy, with its wealth of traditions and its welding force of unity. To the end he remained a conservative and a monarchist at heart.

Brüning's interest lay in politics and social work. Chance threw him in the path of Stegerwald, the leader of the Catholic Trade Unions and at that time Prussian Minister for Social Welfare. Brüning became secretary to the Minister and a member of the Center Party; he also became an expert on trade union affairs. His genius for organization found full scope, and was used with great effect at the critical period of the Ruhr occupation. With headquarters just outside the "frontier," Brüning forged and wielded the weapon of Passive Resistance with such excellent results that the machinery of occupation was paralyzed and such advantages as accrued were rendered sterile.

In the election of 1924 he entered the Reichstag on the Center Party list in Silesia, and at once achieved a reputation as an expert in economics and finance. His speeches in the budget debates commanded respect and admiration even from his bitterest opponents, for it was obvious that this tall, slight figure, with the thin lips and nose, the receding hair and clear, blue eyes twinkling through gold-rimmed spectacles, knew what he was talking about. He soon came under von Schleicher's notice, and his relations with the Reichswehr, established and maintained through his friendship with von Willisen, the good genius of the Reichswehr, grew rapidly cordial. His personal efforts, both with the Reichstag and the Army, facilitated the passage of the military budget of 1928–29, and when in December 1929 he became

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leader of the parliamentary group of the Center Party, von Schleicher hesitated no longer.

But Brüning was not easily persuaded. He was loyal to Hermann Müller, whose friend he was, and would enter no cabal to bring him down. He did make it clear to the Chancellor, however, that the Center Party would only support the government in its struggle for the ratification of the Young Plan on condition that the more urgent of the many necessary financial reforms were presented to the Reichstag at the same time.

In the meantime von Schleicher arranged for Brüning to be received by the Marshal. They made a strange contrast. Eighty-three faced forty-four; the gigantic military bulk of the President confronted the slight, studious figure of the statesman; the Field Marshal looked into the eyes of the company commander. Brüning was deeply moved. Here before him was that great figure which had been an object of veneration to every German soldier. He was surprised at how little the Marshal showed his age. His eyes were clear and blue, and his skin as smooth and ruddy as a child's. He looked, as he sat behind the great work-table with the sunlight of early spring shining on him through the windows, a grand and lonely figure. Brüning was touched by his evident sincerity; both his admiration and his affection were aroused.

They talked of the war days, and the Marshal spoke with high praise of the Winterfeldt Group. The years seemed to slip away and it was as if they were only two soldiers comparing their experiences. Von Hindenburg began to think of Brüning less as a Catholic party leader and more as an ex-officer. The basis of a strange comradeship was gradually forming.

From the war they passed to politics and von Hindenburg gave full expression to his disgust and disappointment. Suddenly he began to weep, those facile tears of old age, and with that historic gesture which had begun, and ended, so many of his relationships, he clasped Brüning's hand in both his own: "So many have forsaken me; give me your word that now, at the end of my life, you will not desert me." And Brüning told him that the Center Party would always support him so long as he remained loyal to the Constitution.

Müller continued his struggle in the Reichstag and eventually won it on March 13, 1930, when the President signed the Bill of Ratification, but in the course of the battle he had lost much authority in parliament and had again brought the fury of the Right against von Hindenburg, thereby earning the Marshal's cordial dislike.

On March 27 Müller gave his resignation to von Hindenburg.[3] On the following day Brüning accepted the mandate to form a government of his own friends[4], a cabinet which should be above party alignments, loyal only to him-

[3] Hermann Müller was the last Social Democrat to lead a national government in Germany until the appointment of Willy Brandt as *Bundeskanzler* in 1969.

[4] In this the Brüning cabinet was unique in being 100 percent *Kanzlertreu*. Virtually all previous governments of the Reich had been party coalitions, remarkable for the degree of the disloyalty and lack of support accorded by the party caucuses in the Reichstag to their representatives in the cabinet. The Brüning cabinet rested for support on the Center, the German and Bavarian People's Parties, the Economic Party and to some unpledged extent the Social Democrats, but these groups were not represented as such in

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self and, like himself, pledged to support the President as long as he remained true to the Constitution. In return he demanded the unqualified support of the President in his attempts to cope with the financial and economic crisis which he forecast as continuing for at least three or four years.

"Yes, yes," was the Marshal's reply. "You shall be my last Chancellor and I will never give you up, but you must make those fellows in the Reichstag come to heel." And soon he was agreeing with old Oldenburg-Januschau, the veteran Conservative leader, that "Brüning is the best Chancellor since Bismarck."

VII

Brüning came to office at a homeric moment in German history, though there were few who recognized its true tragic significance. Though he himself saw further than most of his countrymen and certainly than most of those in Europe and America, he did not see far enough. He failed to gauge accurately the pace of the historical events with which he was contending; he failed to estimate the abysmal villainy of the Nazis and the growth of their grip upon the imagination of the German people, and he failed to convince the statesmen of the world of the consequences which would attend his own failure. Curiously enough he was a better statesman than a politician but he was not conspicuously successful as either—though largely not through his own fault.

The essential problem with which the new Chancellor was faced was simple to define but hideously complex to deal with. The immediate task was to cure the ailing German economy. This necessitated a most extreme treatment in the shape of reforms and taxes and sacrifices more drastic than the German people had ever endured before. To make this treatment the more palatable, the more endurable, Brüning sought to give his countrymen compensation in the sphere of foreign affairs by bringing off diplomatic successes in the fields of reparation and disarmament which should at once expand the ego of the German people and afford them economic relief.[5]

What he sought, in effect, was the abandonment of the Young Plan schedule of payments, which extended into the distant future of the eighties, and to replace it by an agreement for a final settlement of reparation on the basis of "the clean slate." At the same time Brüning hoped that this termination of the provisions of Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles might be accompanied by some declaration mitigating the stark accusation of war guilt contained in the preamble to these articles.

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the cabinet. Within the cabinet and the Reichstag Brüning could depend on the old comradeship of his fellow ex-officers, for example Treviranus, the dashing naval lieutenant-commander and Bredt, the company commander, both of whom with Brüning had entered the Reichstag in the election of 1924 and would never allow their common bond of union as holders of the Iron Cross to be submerged in the controversies of party politics. Another who gave him unswerving fealty was General Wilhelm Groener, whose presence in the cabinet was, for various reasons, a source of annoyance and embarrassment to Marshal von Hindenburg.

[5] In his memoirs ("Memoiren, 1918–1935," Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1971) Brüning reverses this order of the relation between his home and foreign policies, saying that his main aim was to obtain Treaty revision and that harsh economic measures were necessary for this purpose. This, however, was not the argument presented at the time.

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In the field of armaments Brüning essayed the abandonment of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles, with its provision for the compulsory disarmament of Germany as a preliminary to the voluntary disarmament of the other great powers. Since it was obvious that the great powers had no intention of reducing their armaments to the level imposed upon Germany in the Treaty, it was Brüning's thought that a new start should be made at the forthcoming General Disarmament Conference at Geneva with the adoption of an agreed scale, down to which the former Allied powers would reduce their armaments and up to which Germany would increase hers.

So much for Brüning's hopes. At the outset his position was very strong. The President was his active supporter, and that little group—Otto Meissner, Oskar von Hindenburg (the President's son) and Kurt von Schleicher—known as *The Camarilla* (so reminiscent of *The Hydra* of Wilhelm II's day)—who controlled Hindenburg's thinking, saw to it that he "thought right." Moreover the Reichswehr, under the influence of von Schleicher, was among his allies. Thus encouraged, he embarked upon a drastic and not uncourageous course of action.

Brüning presented his first proposals for coping with the economic crisis to the Reichstag in June and when a month later the dilatory tactics of the political parties had resulted in no decisions having been taken and, by reason of the delay, the economic conditions of the country daily worsened, the Chancellor advised President von Hindenburg to invoke the provisions of Article 48 of the Constitution and promulgate the necessary measures by decree. This the President did.

Article 48 also provided that presidential decrees must be at once submitted to the Reichstag and withdrawn if it so demanded and this the Reichstag did, by refusing the decree a two-thirds majority by eight votes. Brüning promptly asked the President to dissolve the Reichstag and, as soon as this was done, reissued the decree. In the general election which followed the Nazi Party obtained 18 percent of the votes cast and 107 seats in the new Reichstag (as against 12 in the old) becoming the second largest political party in Germany. The communists also made big gains.

Brüning has been much criticized for these two drastic decisions and has been accused, by his use of the decree powers of Article 48, of undermining the democratic foundations of the Constitution, thereby paving the way for the "phoney" democratic claims of Hitler that he too had governed under the provisions of Article 48. It is also said that he erred in requesting the dissolution of the Reichstag which resulted in so spectacular a success for the Nazis.

It would appear that both these criticisms are largely based on hindsight and leave out of consideration the situation as it then existed. What else could the Chancellor have done? The economic condition of the Reich was such that it demanded drastic remedial measures. Indeed, if Brüning is to be criticized at all it is for his failure to prescribe a sufficiently rigorous remedy (for example, the July decree had budgeted for 1,600,000 unemployed and six months later the figure was well over four million). There was no indication, either, that the Reichstag would abandon its irresponsibly dilatory tactics which had brought German parliamentary institutions into

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disrepute and had driven many men who were certainly not revolutionary by nature to seek in desperation the less reputable and more heady nostrums of the radicals of the Right and of the Left. Moreover time was of the essence.

There is no doubt that in requesting a dissolution of the Reichstag Brüning's political intelligence was at fault. He underestimated the potential strength of both the National Socialists and of the communists. Yet again, faced with a parliament which would neither pass his budget nor ratify his decree, what else could he do? What he did see, and more clearly than most, was that the sands of life for the German economy were running out far more quickly than even he had originally anticipated and that to halt the flow demanded the most draconian of measures. He took them.

But it cannot be denied that the general election of September 1930 was a vitally important climacteric in the history of the Weimar Republic. From that moment onwards Brüning was engaged in a race against time in which he knew he was competing against the Nazis. What he did not know, or even suspect, was that he was also competing against General von Schleicher, who, with the emergence of the Nazi Party as the second largest in the Reichstag, began the intrigues with Hitler which were ultimately to lead to his own murder. A first step was to undermine Brüning's standing with the aged President and this he set about doing.

Faced with the challenge he so fully recognized, Brüning displayed a dynamic vitality. He flung himself into the battle for German democracy with immense energy though his views and his methods were not entirely orthodox. One thing was patently clear: the whole German people were in revolt against the Treaty of Versailles. At the September elections almost every party went to the polls with Treaty revision in its program. To the German electorate it seemed that Stresemann's Policy of Reconciliation had proved barren of success, and there arose a low but menacing rumble in favor of a Policy of Repudiation. Brüning, in his conduct of foreign relations, linked this with the absolute necessity of giving his countrymen some quid pro quo for the economic sacrifices and burdens which he was demanding of them, and he also added the argument that if he failed and was compelled to resign, he would be succeeded by the policies of Adolf Hitler who would certainly be less nice in his conduct of Germany's external relations.

But fail he did both at home and abroad. When the ghastly summer of 1931—during which the Chancellor toured Europe in a vain attempt to awaken understanding of the catastrophe with which Europe was faced in Germany—had shaded into autumn, the Brüning government had become the most unpopular ever known in Germany and he himself was universally known as the *Hungerkanzler*. His only successes were the brief "lift" afforded by the Hoover moratorium and that his decrees were now ratified by the Reichstag. This, however, was only because of the support of the Social Democrats whose fears were now thoroughly aroused by threats of a dictatorship of the Right. In London, Paris and Geneva during the years 1931–32 Brüning's attempts to obtain treaty revision in the fields of reparations and disarmament were unsympathetically received. He found no bacon to bring home.

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And at home the situation was daily worsening. Civil violence was on the increase between Nazis and Communists. The Nazis were gaining popular support in many directions. Their appeals to the masses in terms of promises grew more and more reckless and all-embracing. Brüning had explored the possibility of admitting them to his government as a tactical gambit, hoping that a taste of responsibility would make them less presumptuous, but he recoiled when their terms for coöperation were made known. Later he made a frontal attack on them in a series of emergency decrees issued between March 1931 and April 1932.

Now, however, Brüning centered all his hopes on persuading von Hindenburg to stand for reëlection to the presidency in 1932 and then to getting him reëlected. There was no other alternative to Hitler.

In his political thinking in these momentous days Brüning disclosed himself as a democrat but not necessarily a republican. He was by nature a romantic and a monarchist and if the only means of preserving the constitutional form of government in Germany was by jettisoning the Republic he was prepared to regard it as expendable. He visualized, as the only way of checking and harnessing the wave of Nazi success, the restoration of the German monarchy, not in the framework of 1914, not even on the basis of the "Revolution from Above" of October 1918, but as a constitutional monarchy on the British model, with Hindenburg as *Reichsverweser* until his death and then the accession of the eldest son of the German Crown Prince.[6]

It is remarkable that, in the secret soundings which he took on the acceptability of his idea among party leaders in the Reichstag, Brüning received support not only from the parties of the Center and Right-of-Center (neither the Nazis nor the communists were, of course, consulted) as might be expected, but also from the Social Democrats and the Catholic Trade Unions who were now panic-stricken at the prospect of a Nazi dictatorship.

Brüning's scheme for a monarchist restoration was shattered on the rocks of von Hindenburg's rigidity, conscience and senility.[7] The Marshal's sense of guilt concerning his part in the Kaiser's decision to go into exile in November 1918 had always been heavy upon him and Wilhelm II had seen to it that its burden was in no way lightened. He was therefore not inimical to the basic idea of restoring the monarchy; but for him there could be no question of *constitutional* monarchy. There must, above all, be no emasculation of the royal prerogative. Hindenburg's thinking went back even be-

[6] In his memoirs Brüning seems to imply that the constitutional changes which he had in mind would have been more reactionary than I have stated. It is possible that his desire to establish himself as a good German nationalist affected his assessment of the past.

[7] It is not without interest that Brüning's monarchist romanticism was apparent also in his forward-planning in foreign affairs. Had his attempts to gain mitigation for Germany in reparation and disarmament proved successful, he had intended to inspire the summoning of an international conference which should consider Treaty revision on a major scale, including, among other items, provision for a political truce for ten years; an agreement with Poland over the Corridor; the encouragement of common enterprise between German and French industry and an agreement for international coöperation in a system of European electrification. Brüning was convinced that his plan held the key to the economic and political stabilization of Europe, and in searching for a sponsor he turned to one who to him was the remaining figure of outstanding and compelling dignity, the *roi-chevalier*, Albert of the Belgians.

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yond the imperial constitution of 1871 to the concept of the reëstablishment of the warrior-state as it had existed in Prussia before 1848. Thus Brüning's plan foundered.

Nevertheless the Chancellor pressed forward with his battle to get von Hindenburg reëlected and he succeeded in doing so, almost single-handed but at considerable cost to himself. For, whereas in 1925 the Marshal had been elected as the candidate of the Right, in 1932 he was in every sense the candidate of the moderate elements of the Center and Left, and his erstwhile supporters of the Right campaigned against him in support of Hitler. The campaign had been a bitter one and von Hindenburg had been subjected to vile insults from the Nationalists—his own people—who were allied with the Nazis. Even the German Crown Prince denounced him and campaigned for Hitler.

Stung and wounded by this vilification, the Marshal vented his resentment on his Chancellor, who had done so much to win the victory for him. He became all the more receptive of the whispered advice of his son Oskar and of Otto Meissner, both egged on by the inveterate intriguer Kurt von Schleicher, who now dreamed of harnessing the strength of the National Socialist Party to the chariot of a presidential government which should rule the country without the Reichstag.

The President liked the idea and accepted von Schleicher's view that Brüning was not the man to lead such a government. On May 29, 1932, the Chancellor came to convey the congratulations of the cabinet to the Marshal on his reëlection. He might have been forgiven for expecting a word of gratitude but it was speedily made clear to him that he had lost the confidence and the favor of the President. He resigned with his cabinet on the following day, and as he left the audience chamber he heard von Hindenburg mutter, "Now I can have a cabinet of my friends."

VIII

The end of the Brüning government may be said to be the end of the Weimar Republic, for the pale transitory administrations of Franz von Papen and Kurt von Schleicher which filled the penultimate gap between Brüning's resignation on May 30, 1932, and the appointment of Hitler as *Reichskanzler* on January 28, 1933, were certainly not representative of any type of government envisaged under the Weimar Constitution. Brüning's last public act, and among his most controversial, was taken on March 23, in connection with the passage of the Enabling Act.

The general election of March 5, 1933, had given Hitler and his coalition government of Nazis and Nationalists only a 51 percent majority. Subsequently the Communist Party was outlawed and some 26 Social Democrat deputies were either arrested or terrorized into flight and hiding, thus giving the *Führer* a possible two-thirds majority for any legislation he might be pleased to enact. The Chancellor proposed to enact emergency legislation for a period of four years which would transfer the power of legislation from the Reichstag to the government of the Reich which would be even empowered to change the Constitution if it saw fit in order to legalize such measures as might otherwise be held as unconstitutional. A nominal safeguard,

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one which appealed to legalists rather than to apprehensive men of good will, was contained in the Enabling Act, namely that the rights and powers of the President should remain untouched, but this provision was virtually nullified by vesting in the Chancellor the principal presidential prerogative, that of rectifying legislation, in order, it was explained, "to relieve the President of unnecessary work."

The government could count on a simple majority in the Reichstag, but Hitler desired a two-thirds majority to give the Enabling Bill full legal flavor and this he could not obtain without the votes of the Center Party. The decision as to how the Center should give its voice was debated and voted upon in party caucus but the leader of the Party could override the vote. His was the final responsibility. The leader of the Party, at this juncture, was not Heinrich Brüning but a wily cleric, Monseigneur Ludwig Kaas, and though Brüning undoubtedly exercised immense prestige and influence, it was Kaas who was the boss.

The discussions within the *Zentrum* were centered upon the provisions for safeguarding the presidential prerogatives and in endeavoring to gain from Hitler an assurance that he would respect the President's power of veto. This assurance Hitler gave in verbal form, but Kaas and Brüning demanded, as the price of the Center Party vote, a written confirmation of this promise before the vote was cast. This too the Chancellor promised; a letter to this effect should reach Kaas before the final voting.

On the morning of the fatal session in which the vote should be taken (March 23, 1933), no letter had arrived. Inquiries were made, an apology was forthcoming and a further promise that the letter would arrive in time. It did not do so and the Center Party caucus, summoned in hasty and secret session, debated their action. Kaas advocated a "yes" vote for the Bill, placing reliance upon the Chancellor's verbal promise and the renewed assurance that its written confirmation was on the way. He was supported by the right wing of the Party, which also voiced a definite fear, which they had good reason to entertain, of what would happen if the Bill failed to pass. Brüning steadfastly and vehemently opposed any such action. "No letter, no vote" was his argument and he received the support of the left wing of the Party.[8] The final decision to vote in favor of the Bill was taken by Kaas, who cast it. Only the Social Democrats voted against the Bill, after a magnificently courageous speech by Otto Wels.

The promised letter from Hitler never arrived, but a few days later (March 28) Brüning received a letter from the Marshal telling him that Hitler had assured him "that, even without being formally obliged by the Constitution, he will not use the powers conferred on him by the Enabling Act without having first consulted me." When he left Germany in May 1934 this was the only document Brüning carried with him.

Much criticism of Brüning has centered on this decision of the Center Party. Should he not have done more to make his opposition to the vote decisive? Should he not have spoken in the Reichstag and there challenged

[8] It is of interest that of the deputies who supported Brüning in this inner party conflict were some who never left Germany and who survived to take part in the plot against Hitler of July 20, 1944, paying for their complicity with their lives.

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the authority of Monseigneur Kaas to speak for a united party? Again these strictures smack of hindsight. It must be remembered that at this moment it was not known, though it may have been suspected, that one of the first acts of the new government would be to order the compulsory dissolution of all political parties but their own, and it was therefore essential to preserve both party discipline and party unity. Though Brüning might have made his gesture it would have availed nothing except to have created for history a better image for himself and for the Center Party, as it did for the Social Democrats. Under the prevailing *Zeitgeist*—however wrong this may have been in his concept—it was hoped to exercise restraint on Hitler's government through the President, through the Nationalist representatives in the coalition and through individual intervention. This may seem to be excessively naïve, even purposely self-delusory, but it was a blindness which affected many.

IX

I suppose I knew Heinrich Brüning as well as any Englishman. We met shortly after he had been elected leader of the Center Party's *Reichstagsfraktion* and before he was appointed Chancellor. Thenceforward our relations were on the basis of close friendship. When I was in Berlin during his chancellorship, as I was very frequently, I saw him nearly every evening, when I would walk across from the Kaiserhof Hotel to the side door of the *Reichskanzlei*, and in our subsequent talks he always spoke very freely. I heard him speak in the Reichstag and at political meetings in his own Silesian constituency. I travelled back with him on the *Europa* from Southampton on June 9, 1931 (after his abortive talks with Ramsay MacDonald at Chequers) when the American Ambassador, Frederick Sackett, told him that there was nothing to be hoped for from President Hoover.[9] On the following morning I watched the frustration by the police of an attempt to assassinate the Chancellor as he stepped ashore at Bremerhaven.

After Brüning's dismissal from office I visited him more than once in St. Hedwiga's hospital, whither he had gone into retreat, and, as the political atmosphere "hotted up" after Hitler's advent to power, I once drove him across Berlin one stifling summer afternoon in 1933 from one hiding place to another, on which occasion his composure was considerably greater than mine! When, a year later, the danger signals had become too clear for him to remain in Germany, I was one of the group of English friends who arranged his escape across the Dutch frontier.

Thereafter I saw him in nearly all his places of exile. He visited me in my family home in Kent and in my London apartment, and we met in the homes of his other English friends; in Switzerland and America, in Lugano, New York and at Harvard University. Always he spoke frankly, sometimes self-critically and always curiously without rancor.

When I was writing my life of Marshal von Hindenburg[10] I made full use

[9] Some ten days later, on June 29, President Hoover changed his mind and made his proposal for a year's moratorium on payment of reparation and Allied debts. His decision was much influenced by the information which Brüning had given to the British and American Ministers at Chequers and which had been relayed to Washington.

[10] "Hindenburg: the Wooden Titan," Toronto: Macmillan Co., 1936, p. 338–395 (Reissue by St. Martin's Press, N.Y., 1967).

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of all that Brüning had told me in our many talks both when he was in office and afterwards, and I sent him for his approval the proofs of that part of the book which concerned his chancellorship. This he gave unhesitatingly and asked me to make only one alteration. He thought I had been too unkind to Kurt von Schleicher! I replied that to me this was impossible and in the interests of history I could not modify what I had written—and I didn't. I may add that nothing of what I wrote about Brüning and his government 35 years ago has been disproved by the subsequent publication of the relevant documents and studies since the war. As a result of my intimate knowledge, gleaned over a period of some 15 years (for I did not see him after 1943 though we corresponded for some years after that), I held Brüning in both admiration and affection. I considered him a man of courage and deeply honest, if not always of entirely wise judgment—as, for example, in the matter of the German-Austrian *Zollunion* which, though well conceived, was clumsily handled. I held him to be a man of sufficient political integrity not to allow his religion to impede his patriotism, and this was more than clear from his dealings with the Vatican through the Papal Nuncio (then Monseigneur Pacelli), who endeavored to bulldoze him into making a concordat in terms which he considered too unfavorable to Germany. Though superficially cold and shy, he was a man of warmth and friendship, with an unexpectedly delightful and even frivolous sense of humor.

It is because of my long and close friendship with Heinrich Brüning that I must confess to considerable regret and disappointment concerning his recently published memoirs. Though they are to some degree an improvement on his first autobiographical fragment published some 24 years ago,[11] these recollections portray their author as unappealing, patronizing and petulant, with a strong inclination to be "too clever by half," and a pronounced tendency to place the onus of blame for his ultimate failure on every one but himself.

His bravery and his intellectual integrity are made apparent but these qualities are accompanied by a whiff of lofty superciliousness which is exceedingly unattractive—though I am glad to find that he is no kinder to von Schleicher than I was.

"The picture of Brüning which emerges from his memoirs," a British critic has written, "is of an honest, courageous but intellectually arrogant and limited man, who was never able to adapt his political beliefs to the realities of twentieth-century industrial Germany."[12] With this judgment I am reluctantly but inevitably driven to agree. It is rarely that an artist paints a self-portrait with more warts than those with which God has endowed him, but Brüning has succeeded in doing this and so successfully that one is almost impelled to defend him against himself.

For this is not the man I knew; not the man whom I saw in moments of acute crisis and of searing self-examination; not the man of whom I wrote admiringly 35 years ago. This is not the man for whom I would have claimed the words of Theodore Roosevelt: "We stand at Armageddon and we battle for the Lord."

[11] Heinrich Brüning, "Ein Brief," *Deutsche Rundschau,* July 1947.

[12] Anthony Nicholls in a review to appear in *English Historical Review.*

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What, then, is the explanation? I have no specific answer save the passage of time and the corroding process of rationalization in exile. Brüning began to dictate his memoirs to my secretary in my flat in London during the summer of 1934, after his escape from Germany. I have no idea when he finished them.

But the change in his personality was apparent within a few years of his leaving his Fatherland. He developed a persecution mania which, very understandably, derived from the attempts of the Gestapo to assassinate him. I know, of my own knowledge, of two such attempts, one in Holland and one in Switzerland, and I am credibly informed that there were several others. This danger, acting upon an intellect which was by nature suspicious and apprehensive, produced a state of *angst* which manifested itself in speaking in a subdued voice, which was often very hard to hear, and in constantly looking over his shoulder lest he be overheard.[13]

When war came this obsession increased and in addition Brüning found himself torn by the internal conflicts which assailed all patriotic German exiles. While bitterly anti-Nazi, he was fearful of what a victory for the Allies would mean for Germany. He would in no way lend himself in support of the activities of other German refugees in America, nor would he respond to the blandishments of Adam von Trott zu Solz. For this aloofness he was much criticized by Americans and also by his fellow exiles. But he was unmoved by their criticism. He kept himself purposely uncompromised in the belief (or at least the hope) that at the conclusion of the war he would be able to assist his country to a mitigation of the severe terms which he believed would be imposed on her, and for this reason he was fundamentally opposed to the doctrine of unconditional surrender.

The course of history frustrated Brüning's hopes and justified his fears. When he returned to Germany in 1951, as a Professor of History at Cologne University, it was to find himself virtually unremembered in his native land and to be recalled by those who did remember his name as the "Hunger Chancellor." Nor was the rise to power of Konrad Adenauer a favorable circumstance for him. The two had never been on friendly terms. Brüning left Germany for the United States for the last time in 1955, a saddened and a disappointed man and for the last years of his life lived an increasingly hermit-like existence in his Vermont retreat. From all accounts he reverted during the latter period to early extremes of nationalist—almost chauvinistic—sentiments. He even developed a degree of anti-semitism, telling a mutual friend of ours that it was impossible for his memoirs to appear in America because all the publishing houses were owned or dominated by Jews! In the same way he became estranged from me (though not I from him) because in my postwar writings[14] I had criticized the German military caste, whose memory he revered more and more deeply as sacrosanct.

It is this change of mien and thinking which offers to me the only explana-

[13] Count Kessler writes in his diary of meeting Brüning in Paris in July 1935: "He is here incognito and gave me the impression of distinct wariness, almost anxiety." (Count Harry Kessler, "The Diaries of a Cosmopolitan, 1918–1937." London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971, p. 472.)

[14] Notably in "The Nemesis of Power; the German Army in Politics, 1918–1945": London, Macmillan, 1964; New York, St. Martin's Press, 1964.

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tion for the tone and *Stimmung* of Brüning's memoirs. For to me it is still an article of faith that the tragedy of Brüning is the tragedy of Weimar. He wished to do so much, he was allowed to accomplish so little. He was fated to be the undertaker rather than the physician. In his desire to carry on the Policy of Reconciliation he was no less eager than Rathenau and Stresemann, yet it was his role to initiate the Policy of Repudiation. There was no greater believer in German parliamentary institutions than he, yet under the irresistible pressure of events it was he who struck the first blow at their foundations. None desired more passionately the welfare and happiness of the German people, yet he became known as the "Hunger Chancellor," and was forced to impose upon them the most crushing of burdens. It would have been hard to find a greater German patriot, yet he was hounded from office and from his country for "lack of patriotism." He played the game according to the rules and failed, but to his less scrupulous successors was conceded all that he had sought to achieve—and more. One fundamental error Brüning committed at the outset. He trusted President von Hindenburg.

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with the assistance of William Diebold, Jr., Economics; Fritz Stern, Western Europe; Henry L. Roberts, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union; John C. Campbell, Middle East, North Africa; Lewis C. Austin, Asia; Robert D. Crassweller, Latin America; Frank Wolf, Africa.

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RIDING THE STORM, 1956–1959. By HAROLD MACMILLAN. New York: Harper and Row, 1971, 786 p. $15.00.

The analogies to Churchill multiply. This is the fourth volume of the author's memoirs. Like his great predecessor, Macmillan was determined not to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire. He managed to heal the wounds inflicted on Anglo-American amity by the Suez crisis, worked to strengthen NATO and the Commonwealth and took a principled stand against the Soviets. What emerges is the portrait of a courageous and sensitive statesman.

ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. By GRAHAM T. ALLISON. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971, 338 p. $8.95 (Paper, $4.50).

While the author's penchant for model-building at times verges on the esoteric, his "explanation" of the Cuban missile crisis is the most thorough and sophisticated monograph on this subject to date.

WORLDLY GOODS. By JAMES GOLLIN. New York: Random House, 1971, 531 p. $8.95.

A painstakingly researched account of the Vatican's financial policy. While the Church has been a superb money manager—increasing the value of its portfolio even during the Depression—its officials in general have placed Christian charity first.

WORD POLITICS: VERBAL STRATEGY AMONG THE SUPERPOWERS. By THOMAS M. FRANCK AND EDWARD WEISBAND. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, 176 p. $5.95.

A fine analysis of the role of rhetoric in world politics. The authors argue that words may be as important as actions in the foreign policy calculations of states. Good case studies provide excellent empirical illustrations.

THE DISSOLUTION OF POWER: A SOCIOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND POLITICS. By SILVIU BRUCAN. New York: Knopf, 1971, 388 p. $10.00.

A Rumanian scholar concludes that "the UN must be given the authority to plan, to make decisions, and to enforce them—or it will disappear altogether."

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POLITICAL TRIALS. Edited by Theodore L. Becker. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971, 255 p. $7.50.

A selection of 11 political trials in different political and national settings. Fascinating and valuable material, but an analytical conclusion to the book would have been most welcome.

THE WARSAW PACT: CASE STUDIES IN COMMUNIST CONFLICT RESOLUTION. By Robin Alison Remington. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1971, 268 p. $10.00.

An interesting analysis of the manner in which the Soviet Union uses the Pact to contain intra-bloc conflict. In the concluding chapter, the author suggests that "great power crisis management in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 had a depressing sameness."

PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE AND FREEDOM. By Noam Chomsky. New York: Pantheon Books, 1971, 111 p. $4.95.

Three lectures in honor of Bertrand Russell. The concluding lecture becomes in fact the author's own credo on recent American foreign policy.

NATIONAL LIBERATION: REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD. Edited by Norman Miller and Roderick Aya. New York: Free Press, 1971, 307 p. $8.00.

Eight essays on revolutionary movements in different third world countries. The quality of the contributions is uniformly high.

UP AND DOWN AND AROUND: A PUBLISHER RECOLLECTS THE TIME OF HIS LIFE. By Cass Canfield. New York: Harper's Magazine Press, 1971, 272 p. $8.95.

Not profound, and not purporting to be, this book has humanity, warmth and charm. "What makes a good publisher" is particularly good reading. The memoirs of an optimist.

HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION. By Antony Alcock. New York: Octagon Books, 1971, 384 p. $15.00.

A first-rate scholarly monograph, though the author does not pay sufficient attention to the ILO's financial problems, particularly in its relationship to the United States.

THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Anthony D'Amato. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971, 286 p. $9.50.

The most sensible and imaginative study to date on this elusive subject.

THE LAW OF GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS. By Charles Henry Alexandrowicz. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971, 195 p. $8.00.

A definitive monograph on the international legal provisions governing postal communications, radio transmissions, civil aviation, satellite communications and maritime transport.

MEN, IDEAS AND POLITICS. By Peter F. Drucker. New York: Harper and Row, 1971, 278 p. $6.95.

A number of previously published articles. The two economic essays are fine, the others rather dated and unexciting.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

THE MYTH OF THE GUERRILLA. By J. Bowyer Bell. New York: Knopf, 1971, 285 p. $7.95.

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A debunking study contrasting the myth and the reality of the guerrilla fighter. The author claims that the romantic vision of the proud man on the hillside is generally false, that in truth he is more likely to be a cold and frightened boy never far away from prison or death. The author gives good case studies drawn from different settings to support his theme. (Sponsored by Harvard's Center for International Affairs.)

365 DAYS. By Ronald J. Glasser. New York: Braziller, 1971, 292 p. $6.95.

The Vietnam war from a doctor's point of view. Cold statistics become burnt and bleeding twenty-year old boys beyond help. An anguished though muted cry of protest.

MULTICRISES. By Jonathan Trumbull Howe. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1971, 412 p. $12.50.

A naval man argues for a stronger navy. He maintains that Soviet naval expansion and British naval contraction have made the United States vulnerable, especially when simultaneous crises erupt.

PLAYING SOLDIER: A DIATRIBE. By Frank Getlein. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971, 168 p. $5.95.

The universal appeal of war, the author asserts, is in its game quality: "War is hell, said Sherman, who was in a good position to know, but there is a long tradition in life and letters that chooses hell over heaven because it's a livelier place. The games are better down there."

BACKS TO THE WALL. By Leonard Mosley. New York: Random House, 1971, 430 p. $10.00.

A deeply moving portrait of London under German aerial siege. The essence of the city is captured by the following comment by a Londoner: "We have not starved. We have not been herded into gas ovens. We have seen our beloved London stand up and take it."

THE X-CRAFT RAID. By Thomas Gallagher. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971, 170 p. $5.95.

The story—well told—of the British midget submarines which put the impregnable German battleship *Tirpitz* out of action in World War II.

HOW THEY WON THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC. By Edwin P. Hoyt. New York: Weybright and Talley, 1970, 554 p. $9.95.

The undisputed hero of this fast-paced, eminently readable history of the American naval forces in the Pacific during World War II is Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. Even though the author's attitude toward his subject verges on the worshipful, the battle accounts do make the Admiral seem larger than life.

THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. By Graham Jones. New York: Oxford University Press (for the International Council of Scientific Unions), 1971, 174 p. $6.95 (Paper, $3.50).

A fine and objective assessment of the ways in which modern science and technology can help to promote social and economic growth in poor but developing countries. The author's broad conclusion is that aid and trade may be more helpful than research.

ARMIIA I POLITIKA V STRANAKH AZII I AFRIKI. By G. I. Mirskii. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1970, 348 p. Rubles 1.51.

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This is the first Soviet book on the role of the military in the developing countries, by a leading expert in the Middle East who heads a research department in the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. A theoretical section and 20 case studies of Asian and African countries avoid facile schematizations but show concern about the likelihood of the officers becoming a military bureaucracy rather than introducing changes beneficial to other social groups.

SECRET SENTRIES IN SPACE. By Philip J. Klass. New York: Random House, 1971, 236 p. $7.95.

The thesis of this informative book is that reconnaissance and surveillance satellites have been and can continue to be a powerful force for peace.

NAGASAKI: THE NECESSARY BOMB? By Joseph Laurance Marx. New York: Macmillan, 1971, 239 p. $6.95.

An inside view of the Japanese government just before V-J Day. The author maintains that the Nagasaki bomb gave the military in Japan a chance to save face and an excuse to accept Hirohito's wish to surrender.

PROBLEME DER INTERNATIONALEN ABRÜSTUNG. By Erhard Forndran. Frankfurt/Main: Metzner (for the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik), 1970, 450 p. DM. 80.

A detailed study of nuclear arms control negotiations between 1962 and 1968, by a German scholar.

LEGAL LIMITS ON THE USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. By Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1970, 332 p. $10.00.

This carefully researched monograph provides a valuable legal guide for all those who wish to curtail the manufacture and prevent the use of chemical and biological weapons.

General: Economic and Social

SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S. ENTERPRISES. By Raymond Vernon. New York: Basic Books, 1971, 326 p. $8.50.

Many people have been waiting for this book, the principal product of a major research effort at Harvard. Focusing mainly on American-controlled multinational enterprises, Professor Vernon deals comprehensively with their character, their impact on the world economy and national political and economic reactions to them. Finally the need and prospects for increased international supervision are sensitively, and somewhat cautiously, explored. A major work.

ECONOMIC GROWTH OF NATIONS: TOTAL OUTPUT AND PRODUCTION STRUCTURE. By Simon Kuznets. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971, 363 p. $15.00.

The Nobel prize winner presents some of the major results of a massive inquiry into the increase in production in the industrial nations since the nineteenth century. In addition to careful analysis of the different factors in economic growth there are fascinating discussions of its relation to technological and social change.

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT. By Margaret P. Doxey. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1971, 162 p. $4.50 (Paper).

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The best up-to-date book on an old subject, covering the League, the United Nations and the efforts of single nations and groups of them. Not surprisingly, the Canadian professor's emphasis is on the limited usefulness of sanctions. Good bibliography.

THE FUTURE OF STERLING AS AN INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY. By BENJAMIN J. COHEN. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971, 260 p. $15.00.

A first-rate analysis of the costs and benefits to Britain of the pound's various roles as an international currency. Professor Cohen wrote the book while he was an International Affairs Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations.

LE PÉCHÉ MONÉTAIRE DE L'OCCIDENT. By JACQUES RUEFF. Paris: Plon, 1971, 285 p. Fr. 22.50.

Though no one has doubted the consistency of the eminent French economist in demonstrating why the gold exchange standard is a transgression and the efforts at reform of the '60s no better, it is useful to have this documented record. It is made up of past articles, retrospective commentary and some previously unpublished advice to the French government.

LAS INVERSIONES EXTRANJERAS EN VENEZUELA: ESTUDIO. By JOSÉ ANTONIO MAYOBRE. Caracas: Monte Ávila Editores, 1970, 103 p.

A Venezuelan central banker who was formerly Minister of Finance analyzes foreign investment in Venezuela, balances the advantages and disadvantages and sets forth a program of moderate policies for his country.

SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT. By ROELF L. HAAN. Leyden: Stenfert Kroese, 1971, 184 p. Gldrs. 28.

A discussion of many arguments leads to the conclusion that all future SDRs should be assigned initially to international agencies financing development.

THE KENNEDY ROUND AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN TRADE. By THOMAS B. CURTIS AND JOHN ROBERT VASTINE, JR. New York: Praeger, 1971, 239 p. $17.50.

When he was in Congress, Mr. Curtis of Missouri was one of the hardest-working supporters of liberal trade policies and Mr. Vastine was his assistant. This book, based on reports made to the House, is especially valuable for its material on specific industries and commodities.

RAZVIVAIUSHCHIESIA STRANY: OBRAZOVANIE, ZANIATOST, EKONOMICHESKII ROST. By G. E. SKOROV. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1971, 366 p. Rubles 1.58.

The chief of a research section in the Institute of World Economy and International Relations and one-time employee of UNESCO has written the first Soviet work on the place of education in economic development.

SILENT SURRENDER: THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION IN CANADA. By KARI LEVITT. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970, 185 p. $11.00.

Investment and other links make Canada increasingly dependent on the United States, according to this analysis. "Political mobilization around a new nationalism is the only way" to regain Canadian control of Canada, but the author, Professor of Economics at McGill, propounds no specific program.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DOMESTIC PROSPERITY: CANADA 1926–38. By R. W. THOMPSON. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970, 139 p. $5.00.

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A careful, fairly technical study of the mechanism and policy implications of Canada's dependence on the outside world's economy.

The United States

THE VANTAGE POINT: PERSPECTIVES OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1963–1969. By Lyndon Baines Johnson. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971, 636 p. $15.00.

The recurrent theme of this book, stated explicitly or implicitly in every chapter, is "I have done my best." Much space is devoted to "the war on poverty," "the struggle for justice," "breakthroughs in sickroom and schoolroom" and "the quality of life." Only three chapters deal with Vietnam but here Mr. Johnson seeks to justify, not analyze, let alone search for, the causes of the American catastrophe in which he participated to such a great extent.

WITHOUT MARX OR JESUS: THE NEW AMERICAN REVOLUTION HAS BEGUN. By Jean-François Revel. Garden City: Doubleday, 1971, 269 p. $6.95.

Basing his arguments essentially upon the possibility of dissent in America through strikes, marches and boycotts, the author, a French journalist, maintains that thorough-going reform in the root sense is possible only in the United States. An arresting, though often glibly optimistic polemic. The author is no de Tocqueville. (French edition, "Ni Marx ni Jésus," Paris: Laffont, 1970, 263 p. Fr. 18.)

NIXON IN THE WHITE HOUSE: THE FRUSTRATION OF POWER. By Rowland Evans, Jr. and Robert D. Novak. New York: Random House, 1971, 431 p. $8.95.

A disturbing portrait of a man "flawed by an instinct" seeking tactical short-range advantages without proper attention to long-range strategic considerations. The authors charge that Nixon's vision is often blurred by self-pity and fear of the press.

ELEANOR AND FRANKLIN. By Joseph P. Lash. New York: Norton, 1971, 765 p. $15.00.

A revealing and sympathetic portrait of a noble and courageous lady who battled against loneliness most of her life. Not much light is shed on FDR's complex nature.

CONGRESS, THE EXECUTIVE, AND FOREIGN POLICY. By Francis O. Wilcox. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1971, 179 p. $5.95.

This brief book offers a most constructive treatment of the foreign policy implications of the separation of powers. Statesmen, students and the general public can all benefit from the author's insights and balanced conclusions.

IMPERIALISTS AND OTHER HEROES: A CHRONICLE OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE. By Ronald Steel. New York: Random House, 1971, 447 p. $10.00.

American foreign policy from Truman through Nixon, the author asserts, has been a policy of empire. "John F. Kennedy," he writes, "was firmly committed to the imperial foreign policy evolved by Acheson and Dulles in the late forties and early fifties." The book is flawed by the author's tendency to advance broad generalizations and an unwillingness to recognize differences in degree, if not in kind.

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THE PRESIDENT'S WAR. By Anthony Austin. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1971, 368 p. $7.50.

By all odds the best treatment of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution to date. The author's persuasively argued conclusion is that there was no attack on the *Maddox* and the *Turner Joy* at all, that the President misled Congress and the people, and that through that deception was able to obtain congressional authorization for a war that he had decided on months before while promising the voters peace. The author does not preach but the facts add up to a strong indictment.

THE PENTAGON PAPERS: AS PUBLISHED BY THE NEW YORK TIMES. By Neil Sheehan and others. New York: Quadrangle Books, 1971, 810 p. $15.00.

These papers, a study in deception of the American people, also bring to light the ignorance of top policy-makers about the Vietnamese people through four successive Presidencies. A Greek tragedy in four acts.

LIEUTENANT CALLEY: HIS OWN STORY. By John Sack. New York: Viking, 1971, 181 p. $4.95.

The convicted murderer attempts to vindicate himself with an assist from a sympathetic ex-correspondent. He fails completely. What emerges instead is a terrifying portrait of what Hannah Arendt, in connection with the Eichmann trial, had described as "the banality of evil."

THE COURT-MARTIAL OF LT. CALLEY. By Richard Hammer. New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1971, 398 p. $7.95.

This factual, conscientiously researched account of the Calley trial emerges, in an objective, almost understated way, as a more devastating indictment of Calley than any polemic could have been.

WASHINGTON PLANS AN AGGRESSIVE WAR. By Ralph Stavins and others. New York: Random House, 1971, 374 p. $7.95 (Paper, $1.95).

The authors ruin their case through exaggeration and overstatement. For example, they describe the Kennedy administration as a "budding totalitarian state under the control of a leader." Some of the facts revealed in this book are shattering, but would have been more effective if left to speak for themselves.

AMERICA'S EMPIRE. By Claude Julien. New York: Pantheon Books, 1971, 442 p. $10.00.

The foreign editor of *Le Monde* argues the paradoxical thesis that America's idealism and liberalism inherently led to her quest for empire. The author's emphasis is analytical rather than polemical. Though he covers much ground that is familiar, he does it in a balanced and interesting manner.

FRAGMENTS OF MY FLEECE. By Dean Acheson. New York: Norton, 1971, 222 p. $6.95.

A collection of stories, articles and personal glimpses, all previously published, some trivial, some profound.

WHO OWNS AMERICA? By Walter J. Hickel. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971, 328 p. $6.95.

The great maverick of the early Nixon administration describes his battles on behalf of youth, conservation and open communications. The Nixon men he

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describes emerge as faceless, humorless and equivocating. The author writes with passion and obvious sincerity, but tends to confuse honesty with tactlessness.

SSHA. POLITIKI, GENERALY, DIPLOMATY: CHETVERT' VEKA POLITIKI "S POZITSII SILY." By Bor. Dmitriev. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1971, 349 p. Rubles 1.39.

A Soviet Americanist analyzes recent U.S. foreign policy with special emphasis on the "position-from-strength" doctrine.

CHANGING SOURCES OF POWER: AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE 1970s. By Frederick G. Dutton. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971, 263 p. $7.95.

A warning that the real danger to the American polity is neither revolution nor depression, but aimlessness, stalemate and drift—in the author's words, "public impotence."

THE U.S.A. ASTRIDE THE GLOBE. By Merlo J. Pusey. Boston: Houghton, 1971, 247 p. $5.95.

The author covers the familiar ground of the recent course of the American empire, but does so in a refreshingly lucid, and at times, quite original manner.

THE KING MAKERS. By Leonard Lurie. New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1971, 271 p. $7.95.

A hard-hitting account of the 1952 Republican Convention with particular emphasis on Nixon's relentless pursuit of the vice-presidential nomination. The author's main target for criticism, however, is the convention system itself.

UPROOTED AMERICANS. By Dillon S. Myer. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1971, 360 p. $8.50.

The former Director of the War Relocation Authority for Japanese-Americans during World War II reflects on his experiences. The result is a compassionate and often quite moving account of what America did to 110,000 of her citizens.

UNUSED POWER. By Stephen Horn. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1970, 285 p. $7.50.

An excellent monograph arguing for an enhanced role for the Senate Committee on Appropriations through stronger leadership.

The Western Hemisphere

REVOLUTION THROUGH PEACE. By Dom Hélder Câmara. New York: Harper and Row, 1971, 149 p. $5.95.

The racial idealism of the famous prelate (which, however, fails to surmount the church's traditional hostility to birth control) is expressed in essays on religion, youth and developed and underdeveloped worlds.

HOLOCAUST OR HEMISPHERIC CO-OP: CROSS CURRENTS IN LATIN AMERICA. By Justice William O. Douglas. New York: Random House, 1971, 216 p. $5.95.

A plea, animated by idealism and good will, for basic reordering of Latin American life, utilizing as one instrument the principle of a hemispheric co-op. The analysis is frequently simplistic and invokes too many weary, old stereotypes.

LATIN-AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT AND IDEOLOGY. By Miguel Jorrín and John D. Martz. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970, 453 p. $12.50.

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A useful examination into the theoretical and philosophical basis of political thought in Latin America, through analysis of the writings and themes of the region's foremost thinkers.

STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN A DEVELOPING ECONOMY: COLOMBIA'S PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS. By Richard R. Nelson and others. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, 322 p. $12.50.

Readers who are technically and mathematically proficient will profit from this study of the links between development and various social and economic phenomena. Its basis was a RAND Corporation study of the Colombian economy.

THE MILITARY IN POLITICS: CHANGING PATTERNS IN BRAZIL. By Alfred Stepan. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, 313 p. $10.00.

The most noteworthy conclusion of this scholarly study suggests that "the mode of military involvement in Latin American politics may well shift increasingly from that of system-maintenance to that of system-transformation." (A RAND Corporation Research Study.)

LORD AND PEASANT IN PERU: A PARADIGM OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE. By F. LaMond Tullis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970, 295 p. $10.50.

The author examines the possibilities of reform from below, through peasant and village initiative, as a means of effecting change in the Peruvian land-tenure system. (Sponsored by Harvard's Center for International Affairs.)

WEALTH AND POWER IN PERU. By Richard H. Stephens. Metuchen (N.J.): Scarecrow Press, 1971, 219 p. $5.00.

The characteristics, significance and increasing power of the Peruvian landed class are described with a fine understanding of cultural and psychological intangibles. Unfortunately, there is no reference to the impact of the 1968 revolution upon this élite.

THE UNITED STATES OCCUPATION OF HAITI, 1915–1934. By Hans Schmidt. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1971, 303 p. $10.00.

A well-researched account of the long Marine occupation, based on archival sources hitherto largely ignored.

Western Europe

MÉMOIRES D'ESPOIR. II: L'EFFORT 1962 —. By Charles de Gaulle. Paris: Plon, 1971, 223 p. Fr. 24.10.

The first two chapters of the projected second volume of memoirs. They deal with the referendum of 1962 and with the social and educational problems facing France in the early 1960s, but, as always, they deal with much more as well. They are marked by the same high intelligence and absorbing interest of all the General's writings, made more poignant by the finality of this volume. De Gaulle's plan for the second volume included a sketch of the great personages of France's past—a particular loss.

LES CHÊNES QU'ON ABAT. By André Malraux. Paris: Gallimard, 1971, 235 p. Fr. 21.

The record of Malraux's last extended conversation with de Gaulle, as well as the epitome of a close association of two self-consciously great men. A moving work of poetry and truth and an important source on what de Gaulle thought on

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topics ranging from the basis of his rule—"I had a contract with France"—to his views on politics and literature, on history and hippies, on the future and himself.

PRELUDE TO REVOLUTION: FRANCE IN MAY 1968. By Daniel Singer. New York: Hill and Wang, 1970, 434 p. $8.50.

A rhapsodic and absorbing account of May 1968, by a European journalist who believes the outburst of those days prefigured a real revolution.

THE FRENCH DEMOCRATIC LEFT 1963–1969: TOWARD A MODERN PARTY SYSTEM. By Frank L. Wilson. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971, 258 p. $8.95.

Despite successive efforts at reform, the non-communist Left in France has remained splintered and powerless. An American political scientist seeks to analyze the reasons for the failure and offers some general comments on the problems of transforming parties.

RUMOUR IN ORLÉANS. By Edgar Morin. New York: Pantheon Books, 1971, 276 p. $6.95.

A well-known French sociologist led a team of investigators to track down the rumor, widely believed in Orleans, that Jewish merchants were abducting girls into white slavery. The result is a fascinating study of who creates, spreads and believes rumors and why.

BRITAIN AND WEST GERMANY: CHANGING SOCIETIES AND THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by Karl Kaiser and Roger Morgan. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1971, 294 p. $13.00.

A translation of a superb book, "Strukturwandlungen der Aussenpolitik in Grossbritannien und der Bundesrepublik," published in 1970.

THE CHALLENGE OF WAR. By Guy Hartcup. New York: Taplinger, 1970, 295 p. $10.95.

A quick survey of Britain's successful mobilization of its scientific talent, based on the history of 41 major wartime innovations.

THE IMPACT OF LABOUR 1920–1924: THE BEGINNING OF MODERN BRITISH POLITICS. By Maurice Cowling. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971, 570 p. $17.50.

A detailed study of British policy during a crucial period of postwar regrouping. A British historian adduces new evidence and offers an important new perspective.

THE I.R.A. By Tim Pat Coogan. New York: Praeger, 1970, 373 p. $8.95.

A leading Irish journalist presents this timely and dramatic history of the Irish Republican underground. Though asserting that "the I.R.A. tradition is one of physical action and separatism," Coogan also discusses the ideological divisions and nascent Marxism influencing the movement. Based on research, empathy and many interviews.

SWEDEN: PROTOTYPE OF MODERN SOCIETY. By Richard F. Tomasson. New York: Random House, 1970, 302 p. $6.95 (Paper, $3.95).

An American sociologist presents a useful survey of Sweden today, covering *inter alia* education, sex and politics.

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LA SÉCURITÉ DE LA BELGIQUE: CONTRIBUTION À L'HISTOIRE DE LA PÉRIODE 1940–1950. By Fernand Van Langenhove. Brussels: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1971, 263 p. Belgian Fr. 254.

Belgium's move from neutrality and war to a new policy of close alliance in Europe and within NATO is here depicted by the former secretary-general of the Belgian Foreign Office. An informative and useful work.

MOTIVE FOR A MISSION: THE STORY BEHIND HESS'S FLIGHT TO BRITAIN. By James Douglas-Hamilton. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971, 290 p. $8.95.

The circumstances of Hess's flight are scrupulously set forth, with the help of new material. A fine study, dramatic and illuminating, by the son of one of the English principals in this extraordinary story.

IN THE TWENTIES: THE DIARIES OF HARRY KESSLER. By Harry Kessler. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971, 535 p. $10.00.

His diaries, at last translated into English, have long been hailed as a brilliant source for the interwar period, particularly in Germany. Kessler was a shrewd observer of men and events, with an unfailing flair for being at the center of all that was important.

HEINRICH HIMMLER: A NAZI IN THE MAKING, 1900–1926. By Bradley F. Smith. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971, 211 p. $6.95.

An interesting and thoughtful attempt to analyze the psychological and social factors shaping Hitler's early career in Nazism, based on the quantities of biographical material assembled by the meticulous Himmler himself.

WIEDERBEWAFFNUNG UND WESTINTEGRATION. By Klaus von Schubert. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1970, 216 p. DM. 9.80.

A broad, scholarly analysis of one of the turning points of the postwar world: the decision to rearm West Germany.

DDR-WIRTSCHAFT: EINE BESTANDSAUFNAHME. By Peter Mitzscherling and others. Frankfurt/Main: Fischer Bücherei, 1971, 383 p. DM. 5.80.

A useful survey of the character and progress of the East German economy.

THE BRUTAL TAKEOVER. By Kurt von Schuschnigg. New York: Atheneum, 1971, 382 p. $12.50.

Part recollections, part history, by Austria's hapless Chancellor. A useful record not so much for new evidence as for an evocation of the crisis months before the *Anschluss*.

THE APPEAL OF FASCISM: A STUDY OF INTELLECTUALS AND FASCISM, 1919–1945. By Alastair Hamilton. New York: Macmillan, 1971, 312 p. $7.95.

The political irresponsibility and anti-intellectualism of intellectuals is a fascinating subject, here treated by an English writer with moderate success. He examines intellectuals in Italy, Germany, England and France.

FASCISM AND THE INDUSTRIAL LEADERSHIP IN ITALY, 1919–1940. By Roland Sarti. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, 154 p. $8.00.

A brief account of the complex relationship between worried industrialists and ambitious Fascists, by an American historian born in Italy. He concludes that "by the Second World War, the industrialists were more entrenched in the economic and social system than they were when fascism came to power."

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OUT OF THE RUINS OF EUROPE. By Walter Laqueur. Freeport (N.Y.): The Library Press, 1971, 520 p. $12.95.

A collection of nostalgic essays and reviews which reflect the life and intellectual interests of a well-known writer, born in Germany, and now at home in Israel, England and America.

OXFORD REGIONAL ECONOMIC ATLAS: WESTERN EUROPE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, 96 p. $15.00.

A useful volume.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

THE RIVALS: AMERICA AND RUSSIA SINCE WORLD WAR II. By Adam B. Ulam. New York: Viking, 1971, 405 p. $10.95.

The author of important studies of Bolshevism and Soviet foreign policy here traces the recent history of Soviet-U.S. relations. He finds few heroes on either side, but many foibles and misconceptions. A hard-headed analysis, showing little patience for the new "revisionist" school.

HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS: STUDIES IN MARXIST DIALECTICS. By Georg Lukács. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1971, 356 p. $8.95.

A welcome, if long overdue, translation of Lukács' classic and enormously influential study. Includes the author's important preface to the 1967 German edition.

DECEITFUL PEACE: A NEW LOOK AT THE SOVIET THREAT. By Gerhart Niemeyer. New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1971, 201 p. $6.95.

In this extended essay Professor Niemeyer argues the continuing danger of communism, and the basic irrationality of its central premises.

RUSSIAN SEA POWER. By David Fairhall. Boston: Gambit, 1971, 286 p. $10.00.

An able and broadly conceived study of Soviet maritime power and prospects—mercantile as well as naval—by the defense correspondent of *The Guardian*.

THE VICTORS' DILEMMA. By John Silverlight. New York: Weybright and Talley, 1970, 392 p. $10.00.

A very solid study of Allied, especially British, intervention in the Russian Civil War. Makes extensive use of recently available documents in the Public Record Office.

THE MEDVEDEV PAPERS. By Zhores A. Medvedev. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971, 470 p. $11.95.

This book is a translation of two manuscripts by a leading Soviet biochemist and prepared originally for private circulation. An important example of current *samizdat* criticism, in the case of the disastrous impact of the Soviet bureaucrats and censors on scientific inquiry.

SOLZHENITSYN: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD. Edited by Leopold Labedz. New York: Harper and Row, 1971, 229 p. $7.95.

Documents on Solzhenitsyn's continuing battle for creative freedom, from his rehabilitation in 1956, through his mounting troubles in the 1960s, to the Nobel prize award in 1970.

SOVIET JEWRY TODAY AND TOMORROW. By Boris Smolar. New York: Macmillan, 1971, 228 p. $5.95.

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A bleak picture by a Russian-born American journalist, editor of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency until his retirement in 1967.

FERMENT IN THE UKRAINE. Edited by Michael Browne. New York: Praeger, 1971, 267 p. $15.00.

Documents on political and intellectual protest in the Ukraine in the 1960s, and the counterattack through political trials and repression.

MEN VERSUS SYSTEMS. By Arthur E. Adams and Jan S. Adams. New York: Free Press, 1971, 327 p. $12.50.

A comparative study of the agricultural systems of the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia, based in part on the authors' personal observations and interviews in 1967.

NATIVE FASCISM IN THE SUCCESSOR STATES 1918–1945. Edited by Peter F. Sugar. Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1971, 166 p. $9.50 (Paper, $4.50).

A symposium of papers by East European and Western scholars, dealing with Fascist and right-radical movements in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and Jugoslavia, chiefly in the interwar years.

GOMULKA. By Peter Raina. Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1970, 191 p. DM. 22.

A political biography, by an Indian historian who lived five years in Poland.

WHY DUBCEK FELL. By Pavel Tigrid. London: Macdonald, 1971, 229 p. £2.75.

A usefully documented narrative of the Dubček experiment, the motives for the Soviet 1968 intervention and the dreary succession of events between the invasion and Dubček's elimination from public life a year later.

THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE PRAGUE SPRING. By Vladimir V. Kusin. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971, 153 p. $8.95.

A serious effort to get at the evolution of reformist ideas among Czech intellectuals in the decade 1956–67.

WRITERS AGAINST RULERS. By Dušan Hamšík. New York: Random House, 1971, 208 p. $6.95 (Paper, $1.95).

Centrally an account of the embattled preparation for the notable 1967 Congress of the Czech Writers' Union.

THE EMBATTLED MOUNTAIN. By F. W. D. Deakin. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, 284 p. $9.50.

The author of this valuable personal account (reinforced by much subsequent research and discussion) was a member of the first British mission, in May 1943, to Tito's headquarters, where he remained until September. A limited theme but of great significance.

YUGOSLAVIA. By Stevan K. Pavlowitch. New York: Praeger, 1971, 416 p. $11.00.

A substantial survey, in the "Nations of the Modern World" series. The author, born in Belgrade, is presently Lecturer in Balkan History at the University of Southampton.

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EYEWITNESS IN GREECE: THE COLONELS COME TO POWER. By JOHN A. KATRIS. St. Louis: New Critics Press, 1971, 317 p. (New York: Dutton, distributor, $9.95.)

A Greek journalist and editor, now in exile in the United States, presents his view of the background to the Colonels' coup. Very critical of what he sees as America's deep involvement in the whole affair.

The Middle East and North Africa

MIDDLE EAST RECORD: VOLUME THREE, 1967. Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press (for the Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel-Aviv University), 1971, 637 p. (Portland, Ore.: International Scholarly Book Services, $25.00.)

The third volume (the earlier ones covered 1960 and 1961) in this valuable series describes in detail the domestic and international developments in one of the area's most eventful years. Although the editors have decided not to cover the years 1962 through 1966 in annual volumes, background material here makes some reference to that period.

MIDDLE EASTERN OIL AND THE WESTERN WORLD: PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS. By SAM H. SCHURR AND PAUL T. HOMAN WITH OTHERS. New York: American Elsevier, 1971, 206 p. $16.00.

THE AGRICULTURAL POTENTIAL OF THE MIDDLE EAST. By MARION CLAWSON AND OTHERS. New York: American Elsevier, 1971, 312 p. $19.50.

The first two of a five-volume series which will cover various economic and political problems of the area. The study of agriculture is more exclusively technical in nature than that of oil, which discusses some of the relevant political issues. Both have many useful statistical tables.

THE ARAB COLD WAR: GAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR AND HIS RIVALS, 1958–1970. By MALCOLM H. KERR. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1971, 166 p. $1.95 (Paper).

This latest edition adds a chapter describing the lineup that emerged after the Six Day War: in brief, Nasser and Hussein in coöperation against the fedayeen.

PROTESTANT DIPLOMACY AND THE NEAR EAST: MISSIONARY INFLUENCE ON AMERICAN POLICY, 1810–1927. By JOSEPH L. GRABILL. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971, 395 p. $13.50.

Thorough research marks this detailed account of missionary "diplomacy," particularly its intense though fruitless lobbying for direct American governmental support of national minorities in the collapsing Ottoman empire.

ZIONISM, ISRAEL AND ASIAN NATIONALISM. By G. H. JANSEN. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971, 347 p. L.L.6.

A rather intemperate indictment of Israel as a foreign intrusion in Asia by a one-time pro-Zionist Indian, interesting nevertheless for its exploration into Israel's relations with Asian and African states.

THE MIDDLE EAST SUPPLY CENTRE. By MARTIN W. WILMINGTON; EDITED BY LAURENCE EVANS. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1971, 248 p. $10.00.

The only complete treatment of this Allied-operated economic structure which proved indispensable to victory in the Second World War. The author regrets the failure to transform it to peacetime usage.

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EGYPT UNDER NASIR: A STUDY IN POLITICAL DYNAMICS. By R. Hrair Dekmejian. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1971, 368 p. $10.00.

The reader who is not put off by the charts and jargon of political science can find a great deal in this book to explain the Nasser régime in its various phases.

RURAL POLITICS IN NASSER'S EGYPT. By James B. Mayfield. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971, 288 p. $8.50.

This description of rural institutions sets out the myriad difficulties that beset Cairo's attempts to bring the tradition-bound fellaheen into the state and party system of the régime.

ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS. Edited by Shlomo Avineri. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971, 168 p. $10.00.

A collection of previously published articles by Israelis (including Moshe Dayan and Arie Eliav) and Arab Palestinians, which tend to bear out the editor's view that Israeli public opinion is moving toward a more open mind on the Palestinian question and that moderate views exist also on the Arab side.

THE JERUSALEM QUESTION, 1917–1968. By H. Eugene Bovis. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971, 175 p. $4.95.

The merit of this compact book is its straight factual story of the problem from 1917 to the present. The question of a settlement is discussed, but no specific solution is pressed.

THE SHATTERED SILENCE: THE ELI COHEN AFFAIR. By Zwy Aldouby and Jerrold Ballinger. New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1971, 453 p. $7.95.

The story of the exploits of Israel's most famous and ill-fated spy. In tracking it down the authors have done a masterly sleuth job themselves.

THE POLITICAL ELITE OF IRAN. By Marvin Zonis. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, 389 p. $12.50.

New data, based largely on extensive interviewing and a psycho-sociological approach, on the subject of Iran's unique political system, showing how the Shah has managed to control the potentially powerful élite groups.

THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN AFGHANISTAN: POLITICS OF REFORM AND MODERNIZATION, 1880–1946. By Vartan Gregorian. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969, 586 p. $17.50.

A distinguished historical work, especially good on the period between the two world wars.

East Asia and Pacific Ocean

A NEW U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA. By A. Doak Barnett. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1971, 132 p. $5.95 (Paper, $2.50).

The prescriptions of this little book, published just after the table-tennis tour, became shortly thereafter the model for U. S. diplomacy in the matter.

CHINA IN FERMENT: PERSPECTIVES ON THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. Edited by Richard Baum with Louise B. Bennett. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971, 246 p. $6.95 (Paper $2.95).

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The co-authors have put together a very useful compendium of attempts at analysis of the Cultural Revolution. The essays range from awed pro to scornful con, from brilliant to silly; this variety is one of the collection's virtues.

WARLORD POLITICS: CONFLICT AND COALITION IN THE MODERNIZATION OF REPUBLICAN CHINA. By Lucian W. Pye. New York: Praeger, 1971, 212 p. $10.00.

A respect for the logic of power; sensitivity to changing circumstances; a delicate calculation of advantage coupled with a fundamentally conservative defensive orientation—these distinguishing characteristics of Chinese military diplomacy in a pluralistic world are highlighted in a historical case study which has unexpected relevance now.

THE YENAN WAY IN REVOLUTIONARY CHINA. By Mark Selden. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971, 311 p. $10.00.

A vivid history of the Chinese communist base areas during the war years. It suggests that rural revolution is spurred by rural modernization but succeeds only in areas not yet modernized; that concrete economic and political democracy can be a deeper and more enduring motive than nationalism; that the Yenan experience gave the later rulers of China a unique education in, and model for, government. These are only a few of the author's insights.

THE EARLY CHIANG KAI-SHEK: A STUDY OF HIS PERSONALITY AND POLITICS, 1887–1924. By Pichon P. Y. Loh. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971, 216 p. $7.50.

A valuable biographical study which will add to our understanding of the young Chiang, Loh's work could have been improved by more empathy and less psychological jargon.

JAPAN'S IMPERIAL CONSPIRACY. By David Bergamini. New York: Morrow, 1971, 1,239 p. $14.95.

Revisionist history par excellence. This giant blend of intuitive speculation and painstaking research offers a radically different picture of twentieth-century Japanese politics. Bergamini's emperor-centered view can no longer be rejected for political reasons of state, but it will still upset orthodox applecarts right and left. It will be read with care (especially in Japan) if only in order that its impressive logic can be refuted.

ELECTION CAMPAIGNING JAPANESE STYLE. By Gerald L. Curtis. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971, 275 p. $10.00.

The author, gathering material in 1966 for his Columbia dissertation in political science, was befriended by an aspiring Conservative candidate and lived with him and his family for the nine months preceding the election. His observations are scrupulous, perceptive and valuable. The candidate and the political scientist did not always agree on strategy; but both were successful in their respective tasks.

THE POLITICS OF MILITARY REVOLUTION IN KOREA. By Se-Jin Kim. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971, 239 p. $9.25.

Probably the most detailed and informative study of the internal politics of the military régime to appear in English, this book finds the Korean case too ambiguous to answer the currently fashionable theoretical question as to whether military dictatorship helps or hinders "progress."

BRITISH STRATEGY IN THE FAR EAST 1919–1939. By Wm. Roger Louis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, 284 p. $10.50.

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Written for the Yale Far Eastern History Seminar, this lucid analysis argues that racism in the United States and Great Britain was the most important single factor in the dropping of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the subsequent failures to achieve conciliation and to satisfy the Japanese need for a feeling of equality. If it is possible to learn from history, this book offers important lessons.

TRADE STRATEGY AND THE ASIAN-PACIFIC REGION. Edited by Hugh Corbet. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971, 221 p. $8.75.

The Atlantic Trade Study Group of London sponsors here four essays arguing that Britain's future lies in the open environment of a free-trade Treaty linking the United States, Japan and the Commonwealth, rather than with the inward-looking "continentalists." Cogent, moving but hopeless.

PROBLEMS OF AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE. Edited by H. G. Gelber. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, 359 p. $17.75.

Seventeen trenchant essays analyzing the factors affecting Australian military security are gathered here. The collection is a model of what strategic analysis should be. It casts a bright light on the inevitability of U.S. and Japanese concern for Australian integrity, and ought to be read with interest by those concerned professionally.

THE FRENCH PACIFIC ISLANDS: FRENCH POLYNESIA AND NEW CALEDONIA. By Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, 539 p. $16.75.

Tahiti, Bora Bora—the names of French Polynesia have long been known to every romantic dreamer; those of French New Caledonia, 60 parallels westward, only to the anthropologist or missionary. Now the first, as an atomic testing ground, and the second, as one of the world's major nickel sources, have assumed a new and unromantic importance. They share the distinction, consequently, of being the only colonies in the world which have less autonomy now than ten years ago. An interesting book.

South and Southeast Asia

FOREIGN POLICIES IN SOUTH ASIA. Edited by S. P. Varma and K. P. Misra. New Delhi: Orient Longmans (for South Asia Studies Centre, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur), 1969, 403 p. Rs. 40.

A somewhat uneven collection of papers stemming from a 1968 seminar on foreign policy at the University of Rajasthan; many reiterate the pious shibboleths of Indian official thinking for public consumption. That scholars are not seers is evidenced by the total lack of attention to East Pakistan.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH ASIA. Edited by E. A. G. Robinson and Michael Kidron. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971, 585 p. $19.50.

A number of interesting and technically sophisticated papers are here collected. Behind the limited data of the economist lie the moral paradox that economic growth may necessarily imply increased economic inequality, and the social truth that political causes generally overshadow economic ones.

THE MAKING OF INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY. By J. Bandyopadhyaya. Calcutta: Allied Publishers, 1970, 286 p. Rs. 20.

An extremely interesting analysis of the limits of Indian policy and the mechanisms by which it is shaped. The author, an ex-officer of the Department of External Affairs, has strong opinions and does not hesitate to let them appear.

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GANDHI: HIS RELEVANCE FOR OUR TIMES. Edited by G. Ramachandran and T. K. Mahadevan. Berkeley: World Without War Council, 1970, 393 p. $2.95 (Paper).

A volume of studies on Gandhian themes, of which the most relevant pursue imaginatively the development of strategies of conflict which minimize the probability that both sides will lose.

THE SPEAKING TREE: A STUDY OF INDIAN CULTURE AND SOCIETY. By Richard Lannoy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, 466 p. $15.00.

Lannoy discusses Indian art, society, values, religion and the family; but no enumeration of topics can convey the interest of this ambitious attempt at a synoptic understanding of Indian culture. A remarkably subtle and thought-provoking work.

THE CHALLENGE OF BANGLA DESH: A SPECIAL DEBATE. Edited by Pran Chopra. New York: Humanities Press, 1971, 159 p. $5.00; Bombay: Popular Prakashan, Rs. 20.

The contributors to this set of emergency position papers, members of the Indian opinion-making élite, concur in the implicit judgment that any conceivable outcome in the current crisis is preferable to a re-imposition of Pakistani central government control. From the Indian standpoint the logic is convincing.

BURMA AND PAKISTAN: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DEVELOPMENT. By Mya Maung. New York: Praeger, 1971, 164 p. $13.50.

The author, of Boston College and the Fletcher School, uses the two nations to illustrate his thesis that varying degrees of economic development can be explained at least as much by the cultural factor of "openness" or tolerance of variability as by the more orthodox economic causal factors.

TONKIN GULF. By Eugene G. Windchy. Garden City: Doubleday, 1971, 358 p. $7.95.

The author spent 11 years with the USIA in East Asia, and that experience gave him a sensitivity to political fact and bureaucratic fiction which is displayed to excellent advantage in this carefully researched, vividly written and totally shocking analysis.

EXPORT PROSPECTS FOR THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. By Frederick T. Moore and others. New York: Praeger, 1971, 389 p. $20.00.

Prepared under contract to AID, this volume analyzes the outlook for South Vietnamese exports in a hypothetical postwar world. The most favorable option envisaged is the export of traditional primary products; manufacturing is deemphasized; the possibilities of oil and tourism are touched upon. Voluminous in statistics, scant in imagination, depressing as regards development.

Africa

TUPIKI I PERSPEKTIVY TROPICHESKOI AFRIKI. By V. B. Iordanskii. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1970, 472 p. Rubles 1.96.

One of the first and best-informed Soviet commentators on Africa, who combines a journalistic career with scholarship, has written a serious analysis of the tropical African tribal, social and national structures. The book avoids applying stereotyped Marxism, stressing instead the novel and indigenous revolutionary processes resulting from rapid tribal decomposition and change.

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THE NIGERIAN MILITARY: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF AUTHORITY AND REVOLT, 1960–67. By Robin Luckham. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971, 376 p. $18.50.

Comprehensive and detailed, this study focuses on the training, organization and functions of the military in order to explain its fateful political interventions in 1966. The author is a lecturer in sociology at Harvard University.

THE CAMEROON FEDERAL REPUBLIC. By Victor T. Le Vine. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971, 205 p. $8.50.

A compact introductory survey by a political scientist at Washington University. The basic argument is that President Ahidjo's able leadership accounts for a decade of internal political stability and steady economic progress.

POLITICAL ROLES IN A NEW STATE: TANZANIA'S FIRST DECADE. By Raymond F. Hopkins. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971, 293 p. $12.50.

Based on extensive interviews with political leaders, this volume by a Swarthmore political scientist attempts to measure the degree of institutionalization of the roles of legislator, administrator and president. A contribution to the literature on political development.

OBED MUTEZO: THE MUDZIMU CHRISTIAN NATIONALIST. By Ndabaningi Sithole. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, 210 p. $6.00 (Paper).

The imprisoned Rhodesian nationalist has smuggled out of prison a portrait of the life of a fellow nationalist, also imprisoned.

MODERNIZING RACIAL DOMINATION: SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL DYNAMICS. By Heribert Adam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, 203 p. $8.00.

Disputing the widespread claim that racial discrimination and continued growth and industrialization are increasingly incompatible, this book by a social scientist at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver is an interesting analysis of contemporary politics.

THE OXFORD HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA. II: SOUTH AFRICA 1870–1966. Edited by Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, 584 p. $8.00.

A series of essays by eminent scholars on basic topics such as urbanization, political history, economic development, agriculture, foreign relations, etc.

THE RISE OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS 1912–1952. By Peter Walshe. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, 480 p. $13.50.

A general history of the major nationalist party by the Director of the African Studies Program of the University of Notre Dame.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

I. DOCUMENTS

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Errata: October 1971 issue of "Foreign Affairs," p. 151, l. 31, for "development" read "self-management"; p. 152, l. 38, for "as" read "or"; p. 153, l. 15, for "four" read "three"; p. 154, l. 16, for "6" read "61"; p. 159, l. 5, for "place" read "peace".

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